[ No. L-62. February 18, 1946 ] 76 Phil 143
EN BANC
[ No. L-62. February 18, 1946 ]
OLIMPIA K. VDA. DE DIMAYUGA, PETITIONER, VS. GASPARA RAYMUNDO AND MARIANO NABLE, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT, BRANCH I, MANILA, RESPONDENTS. DECISION
BENGZON, J.:
A. Facts. —In civil case No. 206 of the Manila Municipal Court, Olimpia K. Vda. de Dimayuga vs. Gaspara Raymundo and Patricio Torres, the complaint, for ejectment, of April 20, 1945, alleged that defendants, occupying plaintiff’s house, had failed to pay the monthly rental of P15 from December, 1944. April 28, 1945, the case was heard. But before the heading, Gaspara Raymundo paid plaintiff’s counsel the sum of P60 for the months of December to March, 1945, and was, by the latter, assured immunity from the decision to be. rendered in the litigation, because plaintiff’s real animosity was only against Patricio Torres, who had allegedly entered the premises without her consent. On the same day, judgment was promulgated requiring defendants to get out, and to pay rents from March 1, 1945 at the rate of P15 per month, until the date they completely vacate the premises. As to the previous rents claimed by plaintiff, judgment was withheld, obviously due to the moratorium. No appeal was interposed, the order became final, and on June 7, 1945, execution was issued whereby the other defendant, Patricio Torres, was ousted. Gaspara Raymundo was not turned away, probably by reason of the agreement she had with the attorney on April 28, 1945, and probably because she paid him P45, and obtained a receipt, worded as follows, on June 12, 1945:
“Received the sum of P45 for the months of April, May and June of 1945, from Gaspara Raymundo, for the house of Mrs. Olimpia K. Vda. de Dimayuga.
(Sgd.) “S. O. CORNEJO “Atty. for Mrs. Dimayuga”
On July 26,1945, plaintiff asked for alias execution, which was issued as a matter of course; but upon motion by Raymundo’s attorney and a hearing, the respondent judge cancelled the writ, explaining:
“Despues de oir a las partes, habiendose establecido que se dicto sentencia en abril 28, 1945, y habiendo la demandante seguido recibiendo rentes que cubren haste junio, 1945, es claro que se ha estublecido un nuevo contrato.”
Petitioner Dimayuga thereafter instituted this special civil action to annul the above order of cancellation, contending that, in quashing the execution, the respondent Judge had acted without, or in excess of, his jurisdiction, or with great abuse of discretion.
Raymundo’s “urgent petition to vacate order of execution,” averred that, in accepting payment of P45 in June, despite the order of execution in her hands, plaintiff Dimayuga virtually renewed the contract of lease and there by rendered ineffective the judgment for dispossession she had previously obtained. Raymundo additionally alleged that, subsequent to the 45-peso payment, she concluded a new arrangement with plaintiff Dimayuga, whereby she was allowed to retain the premises at the higher rental of P35 a month.
B. Discussion. —The jurisdiction of courts to entertain motions to quash their writs of execution is unquestioned. It has been maintained in numerous cases, because every court has the inherent power, for the advancement of justice, to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own process. (23 C. J., 535.)
One of the grounds for quashing an execution is that, before its issuance, the judgment had been paid or otherwise satisfied. (23 C. J., 540.) The motion should be addressed to the court out of which the writ issued, and by the party to the original suit who is liable to be injured thereby. (23 C. J., 541.)
Yet the quashing of an execution rests largely in the court’s discretion, that will be exercised in the furtherance of justice. (23 C. J., 545.)
The court’s power to quash being clear, the resultant issue is, whether the Municipal Court abused its discretion in the circumstances herein described.
It appears that plaintiff Dimayuga, instead of enforcing the order of execution, which she got on June 7, 1945, by ejecting Raymundo from the premises, received from her about June 12, the sum of P45, which included the rent for the whole month of June. She thereby placed herself in a position of inability to enforce the writ of dispossession, at least, up to the end of June. Hence she acted against the tenor of the judgment to dispossess Raymundo, and must be deemed to have renounced it. She cast away her right as victorious litigant, to resume her role as lessor. True, under the judgment, she was entitled to rents: but rents past due “back rents” (Annex B). Had she collected rents in advance for one year, there would be no doubt she had thereby abandoned her contention that Raymundo, as deforciant, must be turned out. Her conduct would equally be interpreted had she received advance rents for a shorter period, say, for six months or three months. Now, should the rule be different, simply because the tenant chose (or could afford) to pay one month only, or half a month, in advance, as in this case?
Obviously, the application of the principle should not depend on the number of days or months —impossible to fix the exact limits—but upon the nature of the act.
That the prevailing party may, by inaction, delay the execution of his judgment is certainly undeniable. The question whether, in general, by express contract, for consideration, and without the approval of the court, he may validly agree to postpone such execution for a definite period of time, we are not prepared to answer now. But bearing in mind the philosophy of the recent law penalizing speculation on rents (Act No. 689) there is room to doubt the advisability of permitting the judgment creditor, by contract to periodically postpone the carrying out of his judgment, in unlawful detainer cases. A smart landlord bent on hiking the proceeds of his property might get judgment against the hard-pressed occupant; but to avoid monetary loss due to vacancy, he foregoes execution from time to time, and then, when a suitable prospect offers to pay increased monthly payments, suddenly waving the writ, he drives away the unsuspecting tenant, without benefit of new proceedings, hearing, appeal, etc. Court proceedings should not be used as a means to speculate on the chance of getting higher rents.
On the other hand, it is not hard to imagine landlords resorting to detainer judgments, and then purposely withholding the writ to demand clock-work punctuality in the payment of rents —or else. The situation, if tolerated, would mean that the landlord may, through technicality, turn the scales of. justice into a sword of Damocles over the tenant’s head and convert the courts into a regular collecting agency. As there is no limit to the number of alias executions available to the judgment-creditor, it is easy to imagine how the landlord might employ such writs to collect rents. If the tenant neglects to pay —writ of execution. When he pays—no ouster. Upon new default—alias execution. And so on. A veritable now-you-go —now-you-don’t performance, entirely incompatible with the dignity of the courts. Lastly, conceding the victorious landlords’ power to postpone execution, there is here no showing that Dimayuga’s action—collecting rents in advance—was just that; for one thing, no such understanding with Raymundo was asserted. From all indications it was rather a resumption (or recognition) of the lessor-lessee ties, which she had attempted to terminate by the suit, but which she had agreed to continue through her counsel on April 28, 1945.
At any rate, supposing, for the sake of argument, that Dimayuga’s act was open to two interpretations —either postponement or resumption—surely the respondent judge is not to blame for adopting that which benefited the debtor-tenant. Resumption of the lease was renunciation of the judgment, and the latter amounted to payment thereof, which, as stated, is legal ground to quash executions.
A sounder basis for the lifting of the execution is the parties’ 35-peso-a-month covenant. That was expressly alleged by Raymundo in her urgent petition to vacate (Annex D): yet plaintiff Dimayuga failed to deny it in her reply (Annex E). Her petition for reconsideration (Annex G) denying its existence because no 35-peso rent had been paid is of course ineffective —if not an implied admission—for it is settled that no payment is necessary to perfect the consensual contract of lease. Wherefore, as Raymundo agreed to pay, and Dimayuga agreed to receive 35 pesos a month as rent, the judgment to dispossess became obsolete and unenforceable even if, as seems to be the case, Raymundo neglected to pay the 35-peso rent.
This neglect did not operate to give new life to the judgment.
All in all, we are convinced that the significant equities favor the tenant, Raymundo.
C. Judgment. —The petition is denied, with costs. So ordered.
Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, and Briones, JJ., concur.