[ L-329. April 16, 1946 ] 77 Phil 516
[ L-329. April 16, 1946 ]
VICENTE SOTTO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL., RESPONDENTS. DECISION
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition filed by Vicente Sotto for review of the decision of the Commission on Elections which declared the respondent Emilio M. Javier as the trueand legitimate President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party. The petitioner Vicente Sotto contends in his petition that he is the President of said Party, and prays that said decision be reviewed and reversed and that petitioner be declared the legitimate President of the Party.
The Commission on Elections after stating the facts and the evidence submitted by both parties in this case, makes, among others, the following findings of fact and law in its decision.
“Creemos que no hay ninguna discusion sobre el hecho de que durante la enfermedad del difiunto, Don Juan Sumulong, y despues del fallecimiento de este, el Dr. Emilio M. Javier actud y fue reconocido por los miembros del partido como presidente interino del Partido Frente Popular (Sumulong), por lo menos, hasta el 1. ° de febrero de 1946, en que cuatro miembros del directorio del partido tomaron la resolucion (Exhibit E) aceptando la dimision presentada por aquel el 30 de abril de 1942, sometida a dichos miembros el 1.(o degree ) de febrero de 1946. El mismo, Sr. Lorenzo Sumulong, abogado del Sr. Vicente Sotto, admitio ante la Comision que el Dr. Javier era el presidente interino del partido durante dicho periodo de tiempo, si bien le califico como presidente interino de facto.
“Se sostiene por el Sr. Vicente Sotto que el Dr. Javier dejo de sor presidente interino del partido en virtud de su carta dimision (Exhibit F) que fue aceptada el 1.o de febrero de 1946. * * *
“Las pruebas no demuestran de que haya tenido lugar alguna vez una eleccion para llenar la vacante producida por la muerte del Sr. Sumuiong. Por el contrario, aparece claramente establecido que to dos los miembros del Directorio incluyendo a los que actualmente son oponentes del Dr. Javier y todos los delegados que asistieron en la alegada convencion celebrada el 27 de enero de 1946, reconocieron al Dr. Javier como el presidente interino del Partido.
“El derecho que el Sr. Sotto invoca para reclamar que se le reconozca como el verdadero y legitimo presidente del Partido Frente Popular (Sumulong) se deriva de la resolucion adoptada por cuatro miembros del Directorio el 1.o de febrero de 1946, aceptando la dimision del Dr. Javier presentada en 30 de abril de 1948 en virtud de su carta (Exhibit F).
“Ahora bien; es legal y valida la reunion del Directorio de 1.o de febrero de 1946 y la resolucion adoptada por cuatro miembros de dicho Directorio y ha producido el efecto de despojar al Dr. Javier del cargo de presidente interino del Partido Frente Popular (Sumulong) “Opinamos que la reunion del Directorio del Partido convocada el 1. ° de febrero de 1946 por el secretario, Sr. Laude, y la resolucion adoptada por cuatro miembros de dicho Directorio son nulas e in validas por la razon de que dicha reunion ha sido convocada por el secretaries Sr. Laude, sin conocimiento ni autorizacion del presidente del Partido y la Resolucion fue adoptada por una minoria de cuatro miembros constando, segun aparece de las pruebas, que el Directorio del Partido lo constituian once miembros. Ademas, dicha resolucion esta fundada en una carta dimision que, a todas luces, no era real y efectiva, puesto que habia sido presentada bajo la presion de las circunstancias predominantes entonces durante el regimen Japones, segun explico satisfactoriamente el Dr. Javier.
“Habiendo nosotros llegado a la conclusion de que la reunion convocada por el secretario, Sr. Laude, el 1.o de febrero de 1946 y la resolucion adoptada en dicha reunion por cuatro miembros del Directorio que no forman mayoria son nulas e invalidas, y derivando el derecho que invoca el Sr. Sotto para que se le reconozca como el verdadero y legitimo presidente del Partido Frente Popular (Sumulong) de la mencionada resolucion en que se acepto la supuesta dimision del Dr. Javier, forzoso es concluir que las pretensiones del Sr. Sotto carecen absolutamente de base.”
Before proceeding to discuss the questions involved in this case, it is necessary to determine whether or not, under section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, we can review the findings of fact of the Commission on Elections. Said section 9 provides:
“Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court or with such rules as may be promulgated by the Supreme Court.”
Undoubtedly the law, in using the words “may be reviewed by writ of certiorari,” does not refer to the special civil action of certiorari (Rule 67 of the Rules of Court), for by this special civil action the superior court can only review the acts of the inferior court, board or officer exercising judicial functions when the respondent acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, in order to annul or modify the acts complained of. By certiorari errors committed by the respondent cannot be reviewed and corrected.
Under section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, as well as our Rules of Court, final judgment and decrees of the inferior or lower courts may be reviewed by this Court by appeal, writ of error, or certiorari. By appeal the appellate court reviews all the findings of law and of fact of the court a quo, as in special proceedings (Rule 105, Rules of Court). By writ of error the appellate court reviews only the findings of law or of fact of the lower court assigned in the assignment of errors of the appellant, as in ordinary civil actions (section 19, Rule 48). And by certiorari the appellate or superior Court can only review questions or errors of law decided or committed by the lower court, as provided in Rules 43, 44 and 46 of the Rules of Court. Questions or findings of fact of the inferior tribunal, cannot be reviewed on certiorari. “Evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justifies the finding on which the decision or judgment was made.” (See the following rule.)
“The general ruleis that, in the absence of statute or local practice otherwise, questions or findings of fact, in the inferior tribunal, are not reviewable on certiorari, and that evidence which is made a part of the record cannot be examined to determine whether or not it justified the findings on which the decision or judgment was made; nor will rulings on questions of fact, within the inferior tribunal’s jurisdiction, be reviewed.” (14 Corpus Juris Secundum, pp. 311,312.) (Italics supplied.)
In accordance with the provision of section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 657, this Court cannot, therefore, review the rulings or findings of fact of the Commission on Elections.
It is true that Article X, section 2, of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that “decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court.” As the review may only be effected, as above-stated, by any one of the three modes or ways above-mentioned, and not by the three at the same time, for the scope of each one is different and at variance with the others, and the Philippine Congress has provided in section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 657, that decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on Elections may be reviewed by this Court by writ of certiorari in accordance with the Rules of Court, we have to apply said provision of Act No. 657, since its constitutionality is not assailed by the parties in this case, and the presumption is that it is constitutional. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties, and that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable (Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, seventh edition, p. 231). The contention in the dissenting opinion that “whether the point (unconstitutionality) of the provision of section 9, Act No. 657, is raised or not by either party, we cannot close our eyes to the constitutional mandate,” is therefore evidently erroneous.
But assuming that this Court may review the findings of facts in the decision of the Commission on Elections, it is obvious that the findings of fact as well as of law in the decision of the Commission are supported by the evidence in the record and are in accordance with the law.
There is no question that respondent Emilio M. Javier was designated in November, 1941, by the late Juan Sumulong, President of the Popular Front (Sumulong) Party as his substitute or acting President of the Party during his illness, under section 13 (third paragraph) of the “Rules and Regulations of the Party.” After the death of Juan Sumulong on January 9, 1942, not only the members of the Directorate, but also the members of the Party in the convention of January 27, 1 946, considered and recognized Emilio M. Javier as Acting President of the Party (Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 16 and 19-Javier; and Exhibit H-Sotto). The right of said respondent to act as such President was only questioned after the meeting of four members of the Directorate held on February 1, 1946, in which the said four members adopted a resolution accepting the alleged resignation of respondent Javier tendered in his letter dated April 30, 1942, and designating petitioner Sotto as Acting President.
The only question raised and to be determined by this Court, is whether or not the action or resolution of the four members of the Directorate, Lorenzo Sumulong, Jose Robles, Jr., Jose de Leon and Vicente Sotto, accepting the said resignation of respondent Javier and designating or appointing Vicente Sotto as Acting President of the Party, was valid.
We are of the opinion and so hold that Commission on Elections’ conclusion to the effect that it is not valid, and that respondent Emilio M. Javier continues to be up to now the acting President of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong), is in conformity with the facts and the law of the case, for the following reasons:
First, because respondent Javier’s letter dated April 30, 1942 (Exhibit F), in which he tendered his resignation as acting President of the Party, was not a real resignation. According to him, he was compelled to write said letter not because he really wanted to resign, but in order to avoid being molested by the Japanese who wanted to appoint him to some government position. This explanation has not been contradicted, and is confirmed by the subsequent attitude or acts of the said respondent. If it were really his intention to resign he would have insisted on or reiterated his resignation, and not acted as President in all the meetings of the Directorate and the convention of the Party after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, as shown in Exhibits 5, 6, 7, 11, 12,19 (Javier) and H (Sotto) The fact that the four members of the Directorate had to dig it up from the records and papers of the party, wherein it lay buried and forgotten since the year 1942, and acted on said letter of resignation only after the Party convention on January 27, 1946, in their meeting of February 1, 1946, which was called by the Secretary without the knowledge and held without the consent of respondent Javier (Exhibit 10-Javier), confirms this conclusion.
Secondly, because said meeting of February 1, 1946, was called by the Secretary on January 30, of the same year, without the knowledge and consent of the President Emilio Javier. According to the Rules and Regulations of the Party, “an executive council, consisting of not less than five nor more than fifteen, shall act as a body of immediate advisers to the President, when their opinion is sought by the President regarding questions falling within his powers and prerogatives” (section 12). “The President and Executive Council shall constitute the Directorate of the Party” (section 13). And “the executive council shall be called to a meeting by the President at least once every month or as often as, in the opinion of the President, the affairs of the country or of the party so require” (section 12). As the President and the Executive Council constitute the Directorate, and there is no provision in said Rules and Regulations about when the Directorate shall meet and by order of whom the meeting thereof shall be called, it is obvious that the meetings of the Directorate shall be called and held at the same time and in the same manner as those of the Executive Council. That it was called without the knowledge and consent of Emilio A. Javier is admitted by Secretary Laude, who further testified that according to said section 12, the call to a meeting must be made by the President or by his authority (testimony of Laude, p. 37). Whether or not the Secretary had, in case the President was absent or incapacitated, authority to call a Directorate meeting upon the request of some members, is immaterial in the present case, for acting President Javier was not then absent or incapacited to act as President.
Thirdly, because the meeting was called without previous notice to all the members of the Directorate, at least to President Javier. According to section 13 of the Rules and Regulations of the Party, “The presence of four members of the Directorate shall be sufficient for the adoption of valid measures, if the General Secretary or the Secretary to the President should certify that all the members were duly notified.” It is true that at the foot of the resolution adopted by the petitioner and three other members of the Directorate in their meeting of February 1, 1946 (Exhibit E-Sotto), there appears a certificate of Secretary Laude to the effect that all the members of the Directorate were notified of the holding of said meeting; but such certificate constitutes at most a presumption juris tamtum of the truth of the facts therein stated. And that presumption was rebutted by the fact affirmed by the respondent Javier in the letter he wrote to Nicolas Laude on January 30, 1946 (Exhibit 10-Javier), as soon as Javier knew about the proposed meeting on February 1, 1946, through Geronimo Santiago, in which letter he reproached Laude for having called a meeting without the knowledge and consent of Javier as President and for having sent notice thereof only to the few members of the Directorate who solicited therefor, which imputation Laude did not deny in his answer of January 31, 1946 (Exhibit W-Sotto). Javier’s letter reads as follows:
“It has come to my attention that you are calling a meeting of the National Directorate of our party for this coming Friday, February 1, 1946, at 3 p. m. in the Office of Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, candidate nominated by the Roxas faction, Liberal Wing of the Nacionalista Party. As President of the party, I did not have any previous knowledge of this proposed meeting. Nobody has asked me for the holding of the same and I have not authorized anyone that this meeting be called. I am, therefore, directing you to cancel the notification that you have given the few members who have solicited for this meeting for reasons that are obvious.”
The requirement of notice to all the members of the Directorate or Board of Directors for the validity of the acts or resolutions adopted by those present in a special meeting, as that of February 1, 1946, is in conformity with the following well-established rule, which may be applied to special meeting of directorates of political parties and other associations:
“The great weight of authority, therefore, is to the effect that notice of a special meeting must be given to every director, unless there is some express provision in the charter or by-laws or established usage to the contrary, or unless it is impossible or impracticable to do so. Except in these cases, a special meeting held in the absence of some of the directors, and without any notice to them, is illegal, and the action at such a meeting, although by a majority of the directors, is invalid, unless subsequently ratified or unless rights have been acquired by innocent third persons, as against whom the corporation must be held estopped. A provision that a majority shall form a board for the transaction of business does not change the rule. The reason for this rule has been said to be that each member of a corporate body has the right of consultation with the others, and has the right to be heard upon all questions considered, and it is presumed that, if the absent members had been present, they might have dissented, and their arguments might have convinced the majority of the unwisdom of their proposed action and thus have produced a different result. If, however, they had notice and failed to attend they waived their rights, likewise if they signed a waiver of notice prior to the meeting.’ Moreover, a director cannot be deprived of his right to be notified of a special and unusual matter which is to be considered and acted upon at a directors’ meeting on the ground that if such notice had been given and by reason thereof he had been present he would have been unable to have induced the directors to have refrained from the action taken. So it is no excuse for failure to give notice to say that the quorum present at the meeting all voted in favor of the act under consideration, and that the presence of the directors not notified would not have changed, the result.” (Italics supplied; Flecther’s Cyclopedia of Private Corporations, Vol. 3, pp. 3059-3061.)
Fourthly, the resolution (Exhibit B-Sotto) adopted in the meeting of February 11, 1946, by the votes of the same four members, and those cast by Lorenzo Sumulong by proxy from Jose Alejandrino and Sixto Lopez, in which the resolution adopted in the meeting of February 1, 1946, was ratified, shows that the petitioner and his associates impliedly admit that the previous resolution was of no effect unless so ratified. But said resolution of February 11 could not have the effect of validating the previous one because the resolution of February 11 was also null and void for the same reasons or grounds militating against the validity of the resolution of February 1, 1946. Respondent acting President Emilio M. Javier did not cease and was still the acting President of the Party when the meeting of February 11 was called, and the only members called to the said meeting, according to Exhibit N-Sotto, were Lorenzo Sumulong, personally and as attorney in fact of Jose Alejandrino and Sixto Lopez, Jose Robles, Jr., Jose de Leon and Vicente Sotto, and Geronimo Santiago who refused to attend alleging that the meeting was being called in violation of the Rules and Regulations (Exhibit N-1-Sotto).
The question raised and decided in the present case as to who is the legitimate President of the party, Popular Front (Sumulong), is material and necessary for the purpose of determining who form or constitute the Directorate of the Popular Front Party. As some members of the Directorate have sided with the petitioner Vicente Sotto, and the others with respondent Emilio M. Javier, the decision on said question carries necessarily with it the determination of which of the two sets claiming to constitute the Directorate is the legitimate one. The Commission on Elections having declared that respondent Emilio M. Javiar is the legitimate President, the members of the Directorate who support him constitute the Directorate of the Party.
The calls to meetings and minutes of the meetings of the Directorate signed by the Secretary Nicolas Laude, which are the only reliable records which can be taken into consideration, for all the records and papers of the Party were destroyed by fire in the house of the late President Juan Sumulong (testimony of Laude, p. 3), show that the members of the Directorate were the following: Emilio Javier as acting President and Chairman of the Directorate, Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Jose de Leon, Jose Alejandrino, Lorenzo Sumulong, Vicente Sotto (Exhibit 6-Javier), Servando de los Angeles (Exhibit 8-Javier), Mamerto Manalo, Jose Robles and Josefina Phodaca (Exhibit 11-Javier). Of these eleven members, Jose de Leon, Jose Robles, Jr., and Lorenzo Sumulong have sided withpetitioner Vicente Sotto, and Jose Alejandrinoand SixtoLopez (the latter’s name does not appear as member of the Directorate in the calls to and minutes of the meetings presentedas evidence) gave their proxy to Sumulong, which was issued by the latter in the meeting of February 11, 1946.And the majority of the members, Geronimo Santiago, Vicente G. Cruz, Jose Palarca, Servando de los Angeles, Mamerto Manalo and Josefina Phodaca, who have sided with respondent Emilio M. Javier, constitute, therefore, the legitimate directorate of the Popular Front Party.
According to section 11 of the Rules and Regulations of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong), “the President shall be the supreme representative of the Party.” Respondent Javier, with the Directorate formed by the majority of the members thereof who have remained loyal to the party and have sided with him, is the one who can act for the party. The individual members of the Directorate who refuse to recognize the legitimate President of the Party cannot be considered as members of the Directorate of said party, because section 13 of the said Rules and Regulations provides that the President and his Executive Council shall constitute the Directorate of the Popular Front Party. Any subsequent defection or resignation of members of the legitimate Directorate of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong) could not affect the constitution of the Directorate, since according to the last paragraph of said section 13, “vacancies occurring in the Directorate shall be filled by the remaining members who shall elect, by unanimous or majority vote of all the members, the persons who are to fill the vacancies.”
The contention that, the minority party Popular Front (Sumulong) having split itself in two groups, one headed by Vicente Sotto, and the other by Emilio M. Javier, “the practical, equitable, just, and lawful way of deciding this case, in my opinion, is to divide equally the number of inspectors corresponding to the Sumulong Popular Front Party in every city or municipality where said party polled at least ten per centum of the number of votes cast in the last national election in this manner * * *” is untenable.Because there is nothing in the record to show that there was a split or division of the Popular Front Party (Sumulong) or that Vicente Sotto, Lorenzo Sumulong, Jose de Leon and Jose Robles, Jr. have formed a faction of national character. In fact, the evidence shows that the Directorate of the respondent voted to give Lorenzo Sumulong inspectors if he filed his certificate of candidacy in the name of the Popular Front (Exhibit 14-Javier); and that Sumulong, in a letter he sent to Javier during the pendency of this case and exhibited by the latter at the hearing in this Court, asked the latter to appoint him as representative of the Party who shall propose election inspectors in his representative district. The most that can be inferred from the facts of the present case is that there has been a tentative secession of those members of the Directorate from the Popular Front Party (Sumulong): and according to section 72 of the Election Code “no inspector shall be granted to any branch or faction which has seceded from its respective party * * *.”
Besides, assuming, arguendo, that the Popular Front Party (Sumulong) was split into two groups or factions of national character, the provision of section 8 of the Commonwealth Act No. 725, to the effect that “should the majority party be divided into two factions of national character with candidates for President, Vice-President and Senators, each faction shall have one inspector and his substitute, etc.” cannot be invoked by analogy. If Congress had to expressly so provide in said section 8 of Act No. 725, it was because without such express provision, the faction of the Nacionalista Party headed by Manuel A. Roxas would not have been entitled to election inspectors under the Election Code. And as said section 8 applies only in case of a division of the majority into two factions, it is to be presumed that it was not the intention of Congress to authorize a division or distribution of election inspectors in case of a split of any one of the minority parties, which are entitled to at most one inspector. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Whether a pact of alliance with the faction of the Nacionalista Party headed by Manuel A. Roxas was validly adopted in the convention of the Party held on January 27, 1946, as contended by the petitioner Vicente Sotto, or not as contended by the respondent Dr. Emilio M. Javier, is immaterial and foreign to the question submitted to the Commission on Elections. The latter has no jurisdiction to determine that question which is a matter of policy of the Party, nor to enforce compliance with said resolution (section 3, Commonwealth Act No. 657 in connection with section 2, Article X, Philippine Constitution). Such alliance has nothing to do with the right to appoint representatives who shall propose the election inspectors to which the party is entitled under the law. Even if such an alliance had been actually effected, said faction of the Nacionalista Party could not have acquired the right of the Popular Front Party to have one election inspector in certain representative districts; though the Popular Front Party was free to designate persons affiliated to the said faction of the Nacionalista Party as its representatives who shall propose the election inspectors to which it is entitled. As the Rules and Regulations (Exhibits A-Sotto, 1-Javier) do not authorize the Directorate to remove or appoint the President of the Party, the proper procedure would have been to submit to said convention of January 27, 1946 or some other convention duly called for the purpose, the question whether respondent Emilio M. Javier should continue acting as President or a new one appointed in his place.
The statement in the dispositive part of the decision of the Commission on Elections to the effect that the President Emilio M. Javier “tiene derecho, por medio de su Directorio,” to appoint the persons who shall propose the election inspectors to which the party is entitled, is not erroneous.
Section 8 of Act No. 725 provides that the inspector shall be recommended by the political party. A political party, as any other association, acts generally through its directorate. But in the present case, section XI of the Rules and Regulations of the Popular Front Party provides that the President is the supreme representative of the Party, and acts as chairman of the Directorate. Although the Directorate votes for or selects the representatives, the President, as chairman of the Directorate and the supreme representative of the Party, is the one who shall appoint the representative selected or approved by the Directorate. The Commission on Elections in stating that the President has the right to appoint “por medio de su Directorio,” does not mean to say that the President is the only one who selects and appoints them, and that the only function of the Directorate is to transmit the selection and appointment made by the President to the proper authorities. It means to say that the President has the right, with the express or implied approval of the Directorate, to appoint such representatives. That such is the meaning of that part of the decision complained of, is confirmed by the petitioner himself, who in paragraph 2 of his petition alleges “que el recurrente es el actual presidente interino del Partido Politico denominado Frente Popular Sumulong, y, como tal es el que tiene derecho, por medio de su directorio, a nombrar las personas que han de proponer los inspectores electorales a que tiene derecho dicho partido en las proximas elecciones.”
In view of all the foregoing, the Commission on Elections’ decision that the respondent Emilio M. Javier, and not the petitioner Vicente Sotto, is the legitimate President of the Popular Front Party and, therefore, the members of the Directorate who have sided with him constitute the legitimate Directorate of the Party, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
So ordered.
Jaranilla, Pablo, and Briones, JJ., concur. Moran, C. J., concurs in the result.