[ G.R. No. L-99. November 16, 1945 ] 75 Phil. 410
[ G.R. No. L-99. November 16, 1945 ]
PIO DURAN, PETITIONER, VS. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS, JUDGE OF PEOPLE’S COURT, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
JARANILLA, ACTING C.J.:
This certiorari proceeding was instituted by petitioner Pio Duran against respondent Honorable Salvador Abad Santos, Judge of the People’s Court, praying that the order of said respondent judge of October 12 and October 15, 1945, denying him bail be set aside and that he be allowed to put up a bail not to exceed P20,000 for his provisional release.
The pertinent allegations of the petitions are:
That the petitioner is a Filipino political prisoner under the custody of the Director of Prisons in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, for not less than three months without any information having filed against him;
That the petitioner filed a petition in the People’s Court for his release on bail and that the Solicitor General recommended that the petitioner be provisionally released on P35,000 bail ;
That after hearing the statements of Special Prosecutor V. D. Carpio, in representation of the Solicitor General, and Atty. Marciano Almario, counsel for the petitioner, which statements are contained in Appendix B of the petition, the said respondent judge denied the petition for bail on October 12, 1945, and refused to reconsider it by his order issued on October 15, 1945; and
That the denial of said petition is a flagrant violation of the Constitution of the Philippines and of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, and that the respondent has committed a great abuse of discretion for which petitioner has no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The respondent judge, in answer to the petition, denies abuse of discretion and alleges that the reason for the denial of the petition for the release of the petitioner on bail was set forth in his order of October 15, 1945, which reads as follows:
“The detainee’s adherence to the enemy as manifested by his utterances and activities during the Japanese domination especially as Executive General of the Makapili; as Director of General Affairs of the Kalibapi; as Vice-Minister of State for Home Affairs; as member of the Council of State; as member of the National Assembly under the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic and as President of the New Leaders Association—historical facts of contemporary history and of public knowledge which the petitioner cannot deny— makes the case against him quite serious and may necessitate the imposition of the capital punishment.”
The evidence against the petitioner, according to said Appendix E of the petition, consists of documentary proofs received by the Office of Special Prosecutors from the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), which documentary evidence is considered confidential, having been received with that injunction from the military authorities, and so the special prosecutor who appeared at the hearing in the court below manifested that he was not free to divulge the contents thereof. The special prosecutor, however, mentioned in his statements before the People’s Court certain facts which are stated by the respondent judge in his answer to the petition.
It appears that the petitioner was originally detained by the United States Army, which had investigated the acts of said petitioner and gathered the corresponding evidence; and that after the hostilities were ended, with the formal acceptance by Japan of the terms of the Allies, the said petitioner and the evidence gathered against him were turned over to the Commonwealth Government and the Office of Special Prosecutors for such action as may be warranted. The said petitioner was detained by the military authorities from July 4 to September 26, 1945, when he was turned over to the Commonwealth Government, as may be gleaned from Appendix A filed by him in this case. As a military political prisoner, he could not be bailed out. Now he invokes the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 682, creating the People’s Court and the Office of Special Prosecutors, and specifically section 19 of said Act, as said section reads partly as follows:
“* * * Provided, however, That existing provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the aforesaid political prisoners may, in the discretion of the People’s Court, after due notice to the Office of Special Prosecutors and hearing, be released on bail, even prior to the presentation of the corresponding information, unless the Court finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense * * *.”
As may be seen the above express provision of law, the release of a detainee on bail, “even prior to the presentation of the corresponding1 information,” is purely discretionary on the People’s Court. The only exception to it is when “the Court finds that there is strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense,” in which case no bail whatever can be granted, as the provision appears mandatory. In other words, aside from that, the People’s Court has the absolute discretion to grant bail or not. Having invoked the clear provision of said section 19 of Act No. 682 for his temporary release on bail, the petitioner cannot attack it as being illegal or unconstitutional. And it appearing that his case is covered by said exception of the law, it must be held that he cannot be admitted to bail. But even if we should concede counsel’s contention, for the sake of argument, that the People’s Court has not been given that discretion to deny bail to the petitioner, still the conclusion of the respondent judge is not unfounded for the following reasons:
First, the special prosecutor stated that the information to be filed in the case would be for treason, which is “the highest of all crimes” (In re Charge to Grand Jury, 80 F. Cas., No. 18, 269; 2 Curt., 530; U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 P. R. A. 247; 3 Phil., 472, U. S. vs. Abad, 1 Phil., 437), penalized with capital punishment under article 114 of the Revised Penal Code; and
Secondly, the recital by the special prosecutor of the supposed acts committed by the petitioner and. referred to by the respondent judge in his order of October 15, 1945, above quoted, which acts were not rebutted by counsel for the petitioner at the hearing on the petition for bail, supports the conclusion and ruling of the People’s Court.
It is true that during the oral argument in this case counsel for the petitioner denied the imputation that the petitioner was the Executive General of the “Makapili,” but he openly admitted that at the hearing before the People’s Court he did not make any effort to deny or disprove the said imputation or the others appearing in Appendix E of the petition. In view thereof, how can we expect the People’s Court not to take into consideration what had been stated then, appearing in said Appendix E?
Counsel’s contention that the special prosecutor should have presented evidence to prove that there was strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense before the People’s Court could deny bail in this case was substantially complied with, although the information charging the commission of the crime of treason had not as yet been filed. We are of the opinion and so hold that the hearing set and held for the purpose (see Appendix E) was amply sufficient for the People’s Court to be informed and to determine whether there was strong evidence of the commission of a capital offense. The special prosecutor clearly informed the People’s Court in the presence of the adverse counsel, in part, as follows:
“* * * I understand strict assurance has been made that ail witnesses required to make a testimony will be considered secret, and that their statements will be held strictly confidential and if we have to answer that question now as propounded by the Court, as I have said, I would be violating the injunction given to us to consider those documents as confidential. I may venture, however, to explain by stating several facts which we believe are so well known not only by the Court or by the Office of the Special Prosecutors but by the people as a whole, which no one can deny, not even the detained petitioner or anyone else, and those facts are as follows: That the petitioner herein was a member of the Council of State during the Japanese occupation. He was the Director of General Affairs of the Kalibapi. He was elected member of the National Assembly under the puppet Kepublie. He was Vice-Minister of State for Home Affairs. He was the Executive General of the Makapili. Lastly, he became President of the New Leaders Association. These facts, I repeat, are things which I venture to say neither the petitioner nor anyone else can dare deny and, therefore, I feel free to divulge without any violation of trust or confidence. Furthermore, I can state with assuredness that among the articles of association of the Malapili, of which the petitioner was the Exceutive General, it is stated: To fight the common enemies side by side with other Asians on any front in the present war.’ Another: ‘To collaborate unreservedly and unstintedly with the Imperial Japanes Army and Navy in the Philippines in such ways and means as may, in the joint judgment of the Imperial Japanese forces and the association (association meaning Makapili) be deemed necessary and fruitful.’
“The case of the petitioner herein by reason of his prominence in social, political and court circles is such that this case has assumed pre-eminence and interest of tremendous proportion not only in this country but perhaps even in the United States—all by reason of known associations, connections and statements made by the detained petitioner publicly and privately in his advocacy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and his advocacy of Japan as the leading nation in the Orient in the proposed Asiatic Monroeism on which he had been working for so many years before and during the war, and I take it for granted even now. And no one can dispute the facts that in his advocacy of this program aforesaid the petitioner has made statements, as follows: ‘The flight, of MacArthur once again shows that the White men’s interest in East Asia is mercenary and imperialistic. He comes to exploit the people and the natural resources, fill his pockets with as much wealth as can be obtained irrespective of the means, and later return to his own native land to spend the declining years of his life in comfortable indolence. He cares not for the defense of any of the colonies he may have acquired. At first sign of danger he packs his bag and baggage and runs away, leaving the native inhabitants to whatever fate awaits them.’ This appears in an article written by the detained petitioner in the Tribune of March 22, 1942.
“Further, the detained petitioner has said: ‘We, who have always doubted the sincerity of occidental disinterestedness in Asia, adhere to the theory that it is only through the unified efforts of all Asiatics that the complete emancipation not only of the Philippines but of all Asia may be achieved, that is why we are co-operating solely and wholeheartedly with the Japanese military administration and urge our countrymen to do the same.’ That come from a radio speech, reported in the Tribune of May 6, 1942.
“Again, the detained petitioner has stated: ‘With the Japanese spirit moving the one hundred million people of Japan, who are solidly behind the prosecution of the Greater East Asia War to a successful end, the Great Empire of Japan cannot be beaten in the current war.’ That also came from an article reported in the newspaper, Tribune, July 7, 1942.
“And on January 30, 1945, there appeared an article in the Tribune an item, as follows: ‘Lingayen front, Jan. 27.—Makapili members thrust into American lines following the landing of the invaders in the Lingayen gulf shores, it was revealed here. Forming deathdefying squads, these youthful Filipinos stormed into enemy lines with fixed bayonets causing heavy casualties among the Americans.’
“Up to the present time, the Office of Special Prosecutors has not the material time to check up all the evidence submitted to us by the military authorities. There are more than 4,000 such cases in our hands and unless we are given enough time it will be very hard for us to go over this particular case. Eight now, it is our conviction that the evidence against the petitioner is rather convincing. Neither have we formulated the necessary information; but I venture to say that when we file the necessary information to the Court it would not be for a simple crime but for treason. I submit, however, the foregoing facts as above stated to give the Court an idea of the nature of the evidence that will in due time be adduced in support of the information that wo will file.” (See Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil., 210.)
In view of the foregoing, it cannot be stated that the petitioner has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law, because his petition for bail had been set for hearing and he was given an opportunity to,be heard when the above circumstances were submitted to the People’s Court, where it was made to appear satisfactorily that he was being detained due to highly treasonable activities against the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the United .States, which activities would be charged in the information for a capital offense and punishable by death, and that the evidence in the case was strong.
Wherefore, we find and so hold that the petition is without merit and therefore the same is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Feria, De Joya, and Pablo, JJ., and Buenaventura and Santos, Acting JJ., concur.