G.R. No. L-54

FRANCISCO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. MAJOR JUAN CRISOLOGO, PROVOST MARSHAL, MILITARY POLICE, PHILIPPINE ARMY, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. L-54. September 27, 1945 ] 75 Phil. 225

[ G.R. No. L-54. September 27, 1945 ]

FRANCISCO REYES, PETITIONER, VS. MAJOR JUAN CRISOLOGO, PROVOST MARSHAL, MILITARY POLICE, PHILIPPINE ARMY, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N

PARAS, J.:

Francisco Reyes  has instituted  this  original  petition, praying for the issuance of the writ  of  habeas corpus  on the alleged ground that, without having been charged with or convicted of any offense whatsoever,  the said Francisco Reyes, who is  a  civilian and, therefore,  beyond military jurisdiction, has been detained and imprisoned by the Provost Marshal of the Military Police, Philippine Army,  at Camp Murphy, since August 30, 1945,  and that the said Provost Marshal,  notwithstanding the representations properly made by or on behalf of the said Francisco Reyes, has refused and still refuses to  release the latter from such detention  and imprisonment.

The respondent Provost  Marshal,  in  his return, alleges that since August 31, 1945, or thereabouts, the petitioner, a first sergeant of the Philippine Army, has been committed to his custody upon a charge of desertion, in that the “said Francisco Reyes,  while assigned to ‘K’  Company, 3rd Bn, 41st Infantry,  41st  Division, deserted  the service of the Philippine Army at Matabang, Abucay, Bataan, on or about the 31st day of December,  1941, and remained absent  in desertion until he was apprehended on or  about August 31,  1945.”

On the other hand, the petitioner alleges that “he was properly discharged by his Commanding Officer on or about December 10, 1941, by virtue of an order  to  that  effect dated about the 2nd of November, 1941,  from Philippine Army Headquarters in Manila.”

The decisive question that presents itself under the averments of the parties, is  whether the petitioner had  been discharged, as claimed by him, or is still a member of the Philippine Army,  as contended by the respondent.  We are of the opinion that said question, which is one of fact, should be raised before, and can  better be determined by, the proper military court  which, under the Articles of  War (Commonwealth Act No. 408),  has  unquestionable jurisdiction over the serious military offense of desertion.  Indeed, we cannot decide said factual issue without necessarily, touching the merits of the case for desertion, the claim that the petitioner had been discharged being a matter of  defense.  Even so, we shall presently make reference to certain  details just to demonstrate that no prima facie case—which the  petitioner is  bound to  show—has been established so as to even suggest that the military court has no jurisdiction or that petitioner’s  confinement is illegal for lack of due process.  It is admitted that, notwithstanding the alleged discharge, the petitioner had remained with the Philippine forces in Bataan  twenty-one days thereafter. According to Article of War 109, no enlisted man shall be discharged  from the military service before his term has expired,  except  by order of the President, the Chief of Staff, or by sentence of a general court martial; and there is absolutely no documentary evidence in the record indicating that this requirement had  been complied with.  Upon the other hand, it is noteworthy that Article  of  War 71 provides, among other  things, that  “no  charge  will be referred for trial until after a  thorough and impartial investigation thereof shall hav.e  been made,”  and we have every reason to believe that the investigation had been convinced as to the sufficiency of the facts warranting at least the formulation and reference  of the charge of desertion.

In  this connection, it is likewise  noteworthy that the military  authorities had in this case strictly complied with the provisions of said Article of War 71 by taking the following steps:  On  July 26, 1945, an investigation was ordered.  This  was followed by the  corresponding report submitted on August 11, 1945.  On August  24, 1945, the Judge Advocate recommended  that  charges  be filed.  On August 31, 1945,  the petitioner was apprehended.  Soon thereafter,  or  on September 2,  1945, the  Adjutant General ordered the filing of formal charges.  A report was submitted to the  Chief of Staff on September 8,  1945.   The next day, September 9, 1945, formal charges were signed under oath by Lt. A. de la Cruz.

In view whereof, it cannot be seriously contended that the arrest and confinement of the petitioner are without any due process of law.  But it is insisted on behalf of the petitioner that the presentation  of the charge  of desertion against him has been or is being unreasonably delayed to the detriment of his legal and constitutional rights.   It is true that, under Article of War 71, charges against a person held for a trial by a general court martial should be forwarded within eight days, if practicable, after his arrest or confinement; but considering the explanation given by the respondent at the hearing of this case, we are not prepared to rule that there was  such  a delay as to make the detention and confinement of the petitioner illegal, specially in view of the uncontradicted circumstance that many officers or persons having knowledge of  the charge are stationed in different parts of th,e Islands and that there, are actually numerous cases pending investigation by the Army authorities.  While this Court  will not hesitate to grant without fear or favor, in clear cases of illegal confinement, the writ of habeas corpus, it  will be cautious and slow in interfering with the official acts of another agency of the government in the absence of  a showing that they are patently violative of  the  law or the Constitution,  It is undoubtedly  to  forestall  unavoidable situations that  the requirement in said Article of War 71 is not absolute, and should be fulfilled only “if practicable.”  Moreover, if any one is in fact guilty of negligence or omission resulting in the alleged delay, he may be held accountable therefor also under Article of War 71.

Upon  the whole, we are constrained  to hold that the petition is without merit.   The  same  will therefore be,  as it is hereby, denied  without special pronouncement as to costs.  So ordered.

Moran, C, J., Jaranilla, De  Joya,  Pablo, and Hilado, JJ., concur.