[ G.R. No. L-5.[1]. September 17, 1945 ] 75 Phil. 113
[ G.R. No. L-5.[1]. September 17, 1945 ]
CO KIM CHAM (ALIAS CO CHAM), PETITIONER, VS. EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH AND ARSENIO P. DIZON, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation were not de facto governments. On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed “the Military Administration under martial law over the districts occupied by the Army.” In said proclamation, it was also provided that “so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now inforce in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past,” and “all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before.” A civil government or central administrative organization under the name of “Philippine Executive Commission” was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces1 in the Philippines, and Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and of judicial courts, based upon what had existed theretofore, with the approval of the said Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts. The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February 5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter’s’ Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers. Section 1 of said Order provided that “activities of the administrative organs and judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders, ordinances and customs * * *.” On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, but no substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission, and in the laws they administered and enforced. On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
“1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; “2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control; and “3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippine free of enemy occupation and control.”
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27, 1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States, solemnly declared “the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here re-established as provided by law.” In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal questions to be resolved in the present case may be reduced to the following: (1) Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2) Whether the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas McArthur, Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared “that all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,” has invalidated all judgments and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same courts existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands. We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces. 1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments established in these Islands under the names of Philippine Executive Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal government and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine, which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and of Tampico, Mexico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a country who rise in insurrection against the parent state, such as the government of the Southern Confederacy in revolt against the Union during the war of secession. We are not concerned in the present case with the first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments. Speaking of government “de facto” of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: “But there is another description of government, called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by military force * * *. One example of this sort government is found in the case of Castine, in Maine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 * * *. U. S. vs. Rice (4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States * * *. Fleming vs. Page (9 Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possession of territory by lawful and regular governments at war with the country of which the territory so possessed was part.” The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of Military Authority over Hostile Territory. Article 43 of said Section III provides that “the authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” According to these precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de facto government, and he can suspend the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and regulate the social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering justice; and the judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed by the Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted by the Supreme Court and applied by the Presidents of the United States. The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): “The right of one belligerent to occupy and govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from the laws of war, as established by the usage of the world, and confirmed by the writings of publicists and decisions of courts—in fine, from the law of nations * * *. The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private rights, continue in force during military occupation, except so far as they are suspended or changed by the acts of the conqueror * * *. He, nevertheless, has all the powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the existing laws or make new ones.” And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19, 1898, relating to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: “Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitant, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may, if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the American Commander in Chief.” (Richardson’s Messages and Papers of President, X, p. 209.) As to “de facto” government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the government set up by the Confederate States as a de facto government. In that case, it was held that “the central government established for the insurgent States differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the circumstance that its authority did not originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it was not, on that account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be classed among the governments of which these are examples * * *.”
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United States, discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: “The same general form of government, the same general laws for the administration of justice and the protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall, 570; 21 Law. ed., 657): “The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution’. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other cases.” And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: “That what occurred or was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil society as organized within the enemy’s territory although they may have indirectly or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame ’except when proved to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection;’” and “That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution.” In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission, which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine, Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, “The government established over an enemy’s territory during the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government. Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far as it concerns the inhabitants of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or illegality of its acts.” (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the general direction of a French official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and, in the same way, the Duke of Wellington, on invading France, authorized the local authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.) The Germans, on the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials, at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.) The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people, was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same—the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted, “under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the ‘Republic of the Philippines’ was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free expression of the people’s will nor the sanction of the Government of the United States.” Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hague Conventions of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power), that belligerent occupation, being essentially provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9 Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other allied nations. Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will of the Filipino people who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion, had organized an independent government under that name with the support and backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or the United States. And, as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to that organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and recognized as such by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional government, and shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took possession of the Island and established a republic, governing the Island until possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And the said Supreme Court held in that case that “such government was of the class of de facto governments described in I Moore’s International Law Digest, S 20, * * * ‘called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of paramount force * * *’.” That is to say, that the government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the legitimate power. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law, the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate government or sovereignty, “does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and individuals’ the evil would be scarcely less,—it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest that sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance of the intrusive government.” (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty, as the Japanese intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. 615.) That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory occupied, by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by General Douglas1 MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio. 2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase “processes of any other government” as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944—that is, whether it was the intention of the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and avoid thereby all judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation. The phrase “processes of any other government” is broad and may refer not only to judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known principles of international law all judgments and judicial proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes or court proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, “a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.” It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an agent of his government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the military occupation demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy, during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, “upon the loyal citizens of the Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines,” should not only reverse the international policy and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation.” Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship would result, and great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled, accrued or vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests; would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R.C. L., pp. 1025, 1027.) The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgments or decisions may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escape the penalty if judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside. That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. Said Executive Order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided “that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision.” This provision impliedly recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases which had been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but to cases which had theretofore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945 in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime. The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton’s International Law which say: “Moreover when it is said that an occupier’s acts are valid and under international law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can hardly be put further than this.” (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotation the respondent judge “draws the conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government the right to exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government.” There is no doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of the fact that the proclamation uses the words “processes of any other government” and not “judicial processes” precisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and void. But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of the Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror. Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience, constitute or form the law of nations, (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed., Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant “to declare * * * suspended * * * in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile party,” forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L. R. [1915], 1 K. B., 857.) If a belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the rights and action of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by the enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something will not at the same time empower another to undo the same. Although the question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States Army has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Ochoa vs. Hernandez (230 U. S., 139), has declared that they “arise from general rules of international law and from fundamental principles known wherever the American flag flies.” In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U. S., 712), a special order issued by the officer in command of the forces of the United States in South Carolina after the end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the same year (15 id., 14), which denned the powers and duties of military officers in command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision the court said: “We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question * * *. The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that the power given by these acts should be so exercised * * *. It was an arbitrary stretch of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. (Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4 Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s. C., 1 Smith’s L. C., pt. 2, p. 934.) Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order was void.” It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23, 1944, which declared that “all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control,” has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not of a political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were good and valid before and are now good and valid after the reoccupation or liberation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. 3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth, which are the same as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth Government was restored. Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.” And Taylor in this connection says: “From a theoretical point of view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his arbitrary will for all pre-existing forms of government, legislative, executive and judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local laws and institutions so far as military necessity will permit.” (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged, inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government established by the occupant of transient character. Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied, the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the army, and ordered that “all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past,” and “all public officials shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before.” When the Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23, 1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace courts, with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated, the same courts were continued with no substantial change in the organization and jurisdiction thereof. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which have become reestablished and conceived of as having been in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principle “a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired * * *. Such political resurrection is the result of a law analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon the removal of the external force,—and subject to the same exception in case of absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content.” (Taylor, International Public Law, p. 615.) The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support of his conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him “has no authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines * * * shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and left pending therein,” is “that said courts were of a government alien to the Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws—and the courts had become the institutions—of Japan by adoption (U. S. vs. Reiter, 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines.” The court in the said case of U. S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws and institutions of the country occupied, if continued by the conqueror or occupant, become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside. The laws and institutions or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or courts of the occupied territory. The laws and courts of the Philippines, therefore, did not become, by being continued as1 required by the law of nations, laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the population of occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, “extends to prohibit everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political- life of the occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence, so far as the courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the name of the legitimate sovereign” (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton, however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government. When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering, after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in the name of the “High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine,” upon the ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of the French people and government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the name of “High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine,” but later offered to allow the use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.) Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, “Law once established continues until changed by some competent legislative power. It is not changed merely by change of sovereignty.” (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.) As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict of Laws (Cambridge, 1916, Section 131): “There can be no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a change takes place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until the new sovereign by legislative act creates a change.” As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence depends upon that of the laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such laws, not being of a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty, and continue in force “ex proprio vigore” unless and until repealed by legislative acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws. Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the courts of Japan, as the said courts and the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are repealed by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the possession of the United States, the “Audiencia” or Supreme Court was continued and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said “Audiencia” or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of cases pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts in the Islands were continued. On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136 was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then pending in the said provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the municipal courts created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter. That the present courts are the same courts which had been functioning during the Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive Order provides “(1) that the Court of Appeals, created and established under Commonwealth Act No. 3, as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished,” and “(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. * * *” In so providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in discussing the previous question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must have been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese occupation, it would have provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January 2, 1942, been duly appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government. Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of that court, having refused to act and continue the said proceedings, which the law specifically enjoins him to do as a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of that court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now pending in all the courts of these Islands. In view of all the foregoing, it is adjudged and decreed that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, and Pablo, JJ., concur.