[ G.R. No. L-22. December 20, 1945 ] 75 Phil. 612
[ G.R. No. L-22. December 20, 1945 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. BENEDICTO JOSE Y SANTOS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
FERIA, J.:
On May 24, 1945, Benedicto Jose y Santos was accused of a violation of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code in an information filed by the City Fiscal of Manila, as follows:
“That on or about some time prior to April 19, 1944, the said accused was prosecuted and convicted in Criminal Case No. 3 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction of the City of Greater Manila, for a violation of section 8 (6) and 2 (6) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 of the President of said Republic, and sentenced to ten years of imprisonment, which sentence he commenced to serve on the aforesaid date, April 19, 1944.
“That after serving about six months of his sentence aforesaid, the said accused was, on October 15, 1944, granted a pardon by the President of the Republic of the Philippines, on. condition that the said accused should not again violate any of the Penal Laws of the Philippines, a condition which was duly accepted by him, for which reason he was immediately released from confinement.
“That some time prior to April 5, 1945, the said accused, while enjoying the conditional pardon granted him as aforesaid, did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the condition of said pardon, by then commiting1, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the crime of qualified theft, for which he was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced in Criminal Case No. A-605 of the Municipal Court of said city, the said accused having been received on the said date, April 5, 1945, at the new Bilibid Prison to serve the said sentence imposed upon him. Contrary to law.”
Defendant filed a motion to quash the information upon the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, because both the judgment rendered by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, are void and without legal effect in accordance with the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944; because, even without such proclamation, the proceedings of said court would be null and void inasmuch as it was exclusively a creature and an agency of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines and the motives behind its creation are diametrically opposite to the political policies of the present regime; and because the fundamental constitutional rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the Commonwealth were denied an accused under the procedure adopted by said court. Defendant alleged as a further ground for his motion to quash that the court has no jurisdiction to try the case because it has no authority to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment proceedings commenced and pending in the courts under the so-called Eepublic of the Philippines.
The City Fiscal opposed this motion to quash on the ground that “there should be no question as to the legality of the sentence imposed upon him (defendant) by the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction and the pardon granted him after serving six months of his sentence by the then President of the defunct Republic because, as said before, the defunct Republic being a de facto government, the courts created by it as well as the laws and ordinances under it should be upheld as being legal in conformity with the principles of International Law as elicited in the case of Williams vs. Bruffy (26 U. S. 176, 185; 25 Law. ed., 716), which, among other things, says (referring to de facto government) ‘its legislation is in general recognized and the rights acquired under it are with few exceptions respected after the restoration of the authorities which were expelled.’ "
The court, after considering both the motion to quash and the opposition thereto, rendered a resolution dismissing the case with costs de oficio. In said resolution the court held: first, that the facts alleged in the information constitute no offense, because article 159 of the Revised Penal Code punishes one convicted by a court of the legitimate or the Commonwealth Government, who violates a conditional pardon granted him by the Chief Executive, that is, the Governor General or his legitimate successor, the President of the Commonwealth, and not one convicted by a summary criminal court created by the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, who violates a conditional pardon granted him by the President of the said Republic; and besides, the proceedings provided for the trial of the offenses punishable under Act No. 65 and Ordinance No. 7 are repugnant to and derogatory of the constitutional rights of every accused under the Constitution of the Commonwealth; secondly, that the proceeding’s had in said criminal case No. 3 of the said Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction are now void and without legal effect in accordance with the proclamation of General Douglas MacArthur; and thirdly, that granting that the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government, the validity of its acts against the lawful government and its citizens depended entirely upon its ultimate success, and having been overthrown by the forces of liberation, all such acts necessarily perished with it.
The City Fiscal duly appealed from said resolution to this Court.
The Solicitor General, in his brief for the appellant, upheld the resolution of the lower court on the ground that, although the so-called Republic of the Philippines was a de facto government and consequently its legislative and judicial acts are valid as a general rule, as an exception to that rule, such acts as are hostile in their purpose and mode of enforcement to the authority of the national government, or impair the rights of the citizen under the constitution, are null and of no effect. Therefore, the judicial act or punitive sentence imposed upon the appellee Benedicto Jose by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, under a summary procedure which denies an accused a fair hearing and deprives him of his right to appeal, is null and void because said act impaired the rights of the citizen under the Commonwealth Constitution, and was in excess of the powers of the said de facto government. As a logical corollary, the conditional pardon granted to the appellee, which was a mere sequence of said proceedings, should also be deemed null and ineffective.
The questions involved in this appeal are: (1) whether or not the sentence of ten years’ imprisonment imposed upon the defendant by the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction should be denied validity after the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government, and (2) whether the defendant can now be prosecuted for having allegedly violated the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines.
As to the first question, the alleged crime of which the defendant was prosecuted and convicted in criminal case No. 3 of the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction, according to the information above copied, was for a violation of sections 3 (b) and 2 (b) of Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, in connection with section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 of the President of the said Republic. Said section 11 of Ordinance No. 1 reads as follows:
“No one except the control organization or the persons designated by said organization shall engage in the purchase, importation, sale or transfer of rice and corn, or act as agent, broker, or intermediary in the purchase, sale or transfer of such commodities for the purpose of their sale or transfer unless authorized by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce.”
Section 3(b) and 2(b) of Act No. 65 provide for the imposition in its maximum period of the penalty imposed by section 14 of said Ordinance No. 1 for the violation of the above-quoted provisions by private individuals. In accordance with our decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (G. R. No. L-5, promulgated on September 17, 1945, p. 113, ante), judicial acts of the governments de facto established by the Japanese forces of occupation in these Islands remained good and valid, except those which were of a political complexion, upon the restoration of the Commonwealth Government; and in the case of Peralta vs. Director of Prisons (G. R. No. L-49, promulgated on November 12, 1945, p. 285, ante), we have expounded our opinion as well as the opinion of writers on International Law on the nature and description of a punitive sentence of a political complexion.
Applying to the present case what we have stated in the said decisions relating to penal sentences of a political complexion, it is evident that the punitive sentence which convicted the appellee to ten years’ imprisonment, was of a political complexion and, therefore, it became of no effect upon the reoccupation of the Philippines and restoration of the Commonwealth Government, because it penalized as a crime an act “not criminal by the municipal law.” As Hall says, upon the restoration of the legitimate government in a territory which has been occupied by an enemy, by virtue of the right of postliminium, “judicial acts done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, * * * remain good * * * Political acts on the other hand fall through as of course * * * the execution also of punitive sentence ceases as of course when they have had reference to the acts not criminal by the municipal law of the state * * *.” (International Law, seventh ed., p. 518.)
As to the second question, we hold that the appellee cannot now be prosecuted criminally for a violation of the conditional pardon granted by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, for the following reasons:
Because, without necessity of discussing and determining the intrinsic validity of the conditional pardon, as an act done by the President of the so-called Republic of the Philippines, after the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, no elaborate argument is required to show that the effectivity of a conditional pardon depends on that of the sentence which inflicts upon a defendant the punishment from, which the latter was exempted by the pardon. If a punitive sentence is or becomes null and void, the conditional pardon which remits the punishment inflicted by that sentence ceases to be of any effect in so far as the individual upon whom it is bestowed is concerned, for the latter cannot be required to serve, a void sentence of penalty imposed on him, even without such pardon.
Besides, under the provisions of Acts Nos. 1524 and 1561, which were the sources of article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, a violator of a conditional pardon was liable to suffer or serve the unexpired portion of the original sentence, irrespective of the length of time of said unexpired portion; and article 159 of the Revised Penal Code provides that if the penalty remitted by the granting of a pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall suffer the unexpired portion of his original sentence. As the unexpired portion of the original punitive sentence imposed upon the appellee is higher than six years (inasmuch as he had served only about six months of the ten years’ imprisonment imposed upon him), if the appellee be now prosecuted and convicted, he shall have to be sentenced to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence; but as the said sentence is now invalid and of no effect, it is obvious that the appellee Benedicto Jose can no longer be prosecuted, for no penalty can be imposed upon him for violation of said conditional pardon.
In order to avoid confusion and error, it,may not be amiss to say that a conditional pardon remits the punishment to be served by virtue of a sentence, and does not remit, terminate, or set aside the sentence itself. Pardon is prospective, that is, remits only the penalty not yet suffered, and not retrospective or does not affect that which has already been served and much less the sentence. (Robert vs. State, 51 N. Y. Supp., 691, 692; 30 App. Div., 106; In re Spencer [U. S.], 22 Fed. Cas., 921, 923.) The validity of a sentence is one thing, and the enforceability thereof another. A conditional pardon has the effect of suspending the enforcement of a sentence, or exempting the culprit from serving the unexpired portion of the penalty, if he does not violate the conditions under which pardon was granted. But the sentence is still valid. This is confirmed by the second paragraph of article 36 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that “a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of civil indemnities imposed upon him by the sentence.” The punitive sentence had not therefore, become null and void before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government by the pardon, but only upon the restoration of said government by virtue of the right of postliminium, as above stated.
Violation of a conditional pardon is not a substantive offense or independent of the crime for the commission of which the punishment inflicted in the sentence was remitted by the pardon. In the case of United States vs. Ignacio (35 Phil., 202, 204), it was held that “the defendant accepted the conditional pardon and thereby secured his release from imprisonment. Having accepted the conditional pardon, he is bound by its terms. The record shows that he has been guilty of misconduct after his conditional pardon. By such misconduct, he forfeited his pardon and his right to liberty thereunder. When a pardoned person violates the conditions of his pardon, he is left in the exact situation in which he was when the pardon was granted, and the original sentence may be enforced against him. (Ex parte Wells, 18 Howard [U. S.], 307; Ex parte kins, 61 Ark., 321; 30 L. R. A., 736; 54 Am. St. Rep, 209; Kennedy’s Case 135 Mass., 48; Ex parte Marks, 64 Cal., 29.)”
Our holding that violation of a conditional pardon is not a substantive or independent offense, is in support of our conclusion that the invalidity of the original sentence upon the restoration of the Commonwealth Government carried with it the ineffectiveness of the conditional pardon, because “a conditional pardon delivered and accepted has1 been said to constitute a contract between the sovereign power or the executive and the criminal that the former will release the latter upon the compliance with the conditions.” (State vs. Eby, 170 Mo., 497; 71 S. W., 52; Peo. vs. Potter, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. [N. Y.] 235; 1 Park Cr., 47; State vs. Smith, 17 S. C. L., 283; 19 Am. D., 679; Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Gratt. [63 Va.], 789; 12 Am. R., 563; 46 C. J.; 1202.) Consequently, if a culprit violates the conditions1 of the contract of conditional pardon, this is resolved of set aside, and the original punitive sentence, which, has not been nullified but only suspended in its force and effect by such pardon, shall have to be enforced against him. But if the said sentence is no longer good and valid and cannot be enforced, the defendant cannot be criminally prosecuted for the violation of the conditional pardon. :
For the foregoing reasons, the resolution appealed from is affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Jamnilla, De Joya, Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.