[ G.R. No. 49107. April 21, 1944 ] 74 Phil. 634
[ G.R. No. 49107. April 21, 1944 ]
TAN KUY, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
Certiorari to the Court of Appeals to review its decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Manila whereby the above-named petitioner was found guilty of hoarding, in violation of section 6 (d) of Executive Order No. 157, and sentenced to pay a fine of P20,000. Hoarding, especially in times of general scarcity, is undoubtedly one of the manifestations of human selfishness. As a recognized public evil, it far antedates the Christian Era and is probably coeval with history itself.[1] To provide against that evil which had been rampant in the present acute scarcity of prime commodities brought about by the war and which had caused, and is still causing, untold suffering to the population of the Philippines, the Executive Commission, through its Chairman, promulgated Executive Order No. 157. But precisely because public opinion and, along with it, our own personal feeling have been indignantly rising in revolt against the evil of hoarding and profiteering, we as members of the Court should take special care, before we adjudged anyone accused under that law, to depose our hostile personal attitude and to consider the case with complete detachment from the biased environment in order that passion may not obscure our reason and that our judgment may be the unquestionable utterance of the traditionally blindfolded symbol of Impartial Justice. Just as it would be hard for anyone to swim against a strong current, it would be difficult for any court composed of human beings to ignore a strong public opinion if it should ever forget in an unguarded moment that its sworn duty is to obey only the mandate of law and justice and never the will or whim of the populace. As the highest tribunal of the land and the court of last resort, we should (and we hope we do), by our courage, independence, impartiality, and perspicacity, insure all litigants before us against any undue deprivation of life, liberty, or property under all circumstances. Chiefly in this manner does a court like this distinguish itself from Pontius Pilate, from the French revolutionary court that sent Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, and thousands of innocent citizens to the guillotine in obedience to the clamor of the populace, or from the tribunal that sentenced Rizal to death at the behest of his enemies. On May 15, 1943, the Military Administration issued an order prohibiting the removal or sale from May 16 to May 20,1943, of cotton and rayon manufactured goods and cotton and rayon textiles then existing in the City of Manila, and requiring every dealer concerned to submit a list of his stock of said goods on or before the 27th of the same month. On May 18, 1943, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission issued Executive Order No. 157, which was approved by the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration on the same date, authorizing the Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce to fix from time to time the maximum prices at which any and all commodities may be sold or purchased and prohibiting among others the following :
“Sec. 6.—The following acts are also prohibited:
* * * * * * *
" (d) Cornering or hoarding commodities for the purpose of obtaining unjustifiable profits therefrom, even if maximum prices have not been fixed for such commodities. For the purposes of this Order, ‘cornering’ shall mean the acquisition of commodities with the intent of creating, or tending to create, or effecting artificial scarcity thereof in the market, in order to alter prices; arid ‘hoarding’ shall mean the keeping or concealing of commodities in amounts or quantities in excess of the ordinary demands of trade or business.”
Section 8 of the Executive Order prescribes as penalty for violation of said prohibition imprisonment not exceeding five years or a fine not exceeding P50,000, or both, in the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, aside from confiscation of the commodities involved in the offense.. Previous to May 18, 1943, the petitioner had acquired cotton and rayon textiles valued at from P40,000 to P50,000 and had kept them on the ground floor of his residence at 188 Juan Luna, Manila, but had not sold or disposed of them up to June 4, 1943. On June 2, 1943, the petitioner prepared an inventory of his stock of textiles (exhibit D) and delivered it to the Chinese Retailers Association, which in turn delivered it to the Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Assocaition on the following day, June 3. On June 4, 1943, certain agents of the Economic Division of the Metropolitan Canstabulary searched the petitioner’s premises and seized his stock of textiles, arresting him at the same time. Investigated after his arrest, the petitioner declared among other things that he had begun acquiring the merchandise in question by purchase from different Chinese agents more than one year before June 4, 1943, and had kept it to be sold at a future time; that he had not sold any part of it because it was only on the morning of the day of his arrest that he procured a license. When asked why he had not reported his stock before June 3, 1943, notwithstanding the military order requiring such report on or before May 27, 1943, he replied that he had been unable to do so because he was in Tanauan, Batangas, suffering with a boil and that he returned to Manila only on June 2, 1943 (Exhibit E). On June 8, 1943, an information was filed by the fiscal against the petitioner, charging him with a violation of section 6 (d) of Executive Order No. 157 in that on or about the 4th day of June, 1943, and for some considerable length of time prior to said date, he did voluntarily, wilfully, and feloniously corner cotton and other cloths, all valued at P50,814.36, in quantities far in excess of the ordinary demands of his unlincensed business as cloth dealer and did hoard the same at 188 Juan Luna, Manila, instead of selling them to the public. The trial court found the petitioner guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of P20,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The merchandise seized was ordered confiscated. The Court of Appeals affirmed that sentence with the only modification that the subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months. There would be no question that the petitioner was guilty of cornering and hoarding if an ex post facto law were permissible and the courts could give the said executive order a retroactive effect. But, needless to explain, that is entirely beside the point; and in spite of our personal attitude against the petitioner’s antisocial and reprehensible conduct, we cannot and must not take it into account for the purpose of determining his guilt or innocence of the offense with which he is charged, namely, hoarding in violation of Executive Order No. 157, The petitioners hoarding of the merchandise in question before May 18, 1943, altho antisocial and reprehensible, was not felonious or unlawful. To consider it as evidence of intention on his part to continue keeping or concealing the goods after the prohibition was made on May 18, is to beg the question. The question is clear-cut and simple: Did the petitioner violate section 6 (d) of Executive Order No. 157 by continuing to keep his dry goods from May 18, when the prohibition was made, until June 4,1943, when they were seized by the Economic Police ? The Court of Appeals found the petitioner guilty because he acquired a great quantity of textiles and did not dispose of even a portion thereof. But the petitioner’s acquisition and failure to dispose of said textiles before May 18, 1943, as we have indicated, cannot be charged against him, because there was then no law prohibiting and punishing cornering and hoarding. The consideration, therefore, must be confined to his failure to dispose of the goods between May 18, and June 4,1943. But inasmuch as Executive Order No. 157 did not require the immediate disposal of all existing stock of textiles, the petitioner’s failure to dispose of his stock between May 18 and June 4, 1943, is material only insofar as it may evince an intention on his part to hoard, or to continue keeping or concealing, said merchandise in spite of the prohibition. We are persuaded that no such intention can be deduced from the petitioner’s failure to sell or dispose of his stock of textiles between May 18 and June 4, 1943, for the following reasons: (1) It appears that the sale or removal of textiles from May 16 to May 20 was absolutely prohibited by Military Administration Order No. 12, and the official statement accompanying said order announced that beginning May 21, 1943, the ration-card system was to be adopted in the distribution to the public of cotton and rayon textiles and other cotton and rayon manufactured goods. Accordingly, the Government devised a “system of distributing and rationing cotton and rayon clothing,” which was published in the May 1943 issue of the Official Gazette and which among other things provided that:
“4.—The distribution of ration tickets for cotton and rayon clothing shall be dpne in the following manner: “Ration tickets printed and issued by the Primco (Philippine Prime Commodities Distribution Control Association) shall pass through the City Hall, district chiefs, district presidents, and then neighborhood association leaders to each member of the associations.” (2 Off. Gaz., 484.)
It does not appear when the ration tickets were actually distributed among the individual members of the different neighborhood associations of Manila; they may not have been actually distributed in time to enable the petitioner to sell and the public to buy such commodities in a few days after May 21. In the absence of such showing, it would be unjustifiable and unfair to conclude that the petitioner could and should have disposed of his goods or part thereof between May 21 and June 4, considering that there is no provision in the executive order from which it may be inferred that such haste was required, and considering further that no sale could be lawfully made without a ration ticket. (2) Neither is there any showing that between May 21 and June 4,1943, anyone attempted to buy textiles from the petitioner by presenting a ration ticket and that the petitioner refused to sell. (3) The fact that the petitioner reported his stock of merchandise to the Primco on June 3, 1943, before it was seized from him, negatives any intention on his part to violate the law, inasmuch as by submitting such report he placed his stock of merchandise within the control of the authorities in accordance with the laws and regulations on the subject. Even if he should reject the petitioner’s explanation for the delay in submitting his report, as the lower courts apparently did, such delay could not be considered incriminatory because Executive Order No. 157 did not require the presentation of such report and Military Administration Order No. 12, which required it, imposed no punishment for the delay or failure to submit it. It has been suggested that the petitioner probably delayed the presentation of his report so that he could dispose of his goods unlawfully in the meantime. But such supposition runs counter to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the petitioner did not dispose of any part of his stock of textiles. In order to convict the petitioner of hoarding under section 6 (d) of Executive Order No. 157 it is not enough to show that he failed to sell or dispose of his large stock of textiles within 17 days after May 18, 1943, when said order was promulgated; it must be shown that he kept or concealed—hoarded—the commodities “for the purpose of obtaining unjustifiable profits therefrom.” The facts of this case do not establish such illicit purpose. On the contrary it appears that from May 18 to May 20 the sale of textiles was prohibited, and thereafter it could be made only with ration tickets and at prices fixed and controlled by the Government. And inasmuch as the petitioner reported his stock of said commodities to the authorities, thereby placing the same within their price control, “the purpose of obtaining unjustifiable profits therefrom” cannot be imputed to him. The judgment is reversed and the accused-petitioner is acquitted, with costs de oficio. The merchandise seized and confiscated is hereby ordered returned to him. Horrilleno, Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.