[ G.R. No. 48577. February 11, 1944 ] 74 Phil. 545
[ G.R. No. 48577. February 11, 1944 ]
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE IGNACIO UY QUIMCO. MONICO UY YT (ADMINISTRATOR), OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT, VS. QUIRINA RIOS & SONS, MOVANTS-APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
On December 7, 1937, one year and six months after the project of partition of the estate of the deceased Ignacio Uy Quimco had been approved by the court, the latter granted the petition of the administrator Monico Uy Yt for authority to withdraw from the China Banking Corporation the sum of P600 and to pay the same to his attorney, Mr. Jose G. Macatañgay, for services rendered by him to the estate covering the period from November 6, 1934, up to that date. The estate consisted of real property valued at P13,390 and credits amounting to P15,673.73. The said sum of P600 was the only money remaining undistributed with which to pay the services of the attorney for the administrator. Pursuant to said authority the administrator withdrew the said sum from the bank and out of it paid P350 to Attorney Macatañgay, retaining the balance of P250 in his hands pending the result of the motion for reconsideration filed by the attorney for Quirina Rios on behalf of her two minor children who are heirs of the estate. Said motion for reconsideration, wherein the movants contended that one-half of the P600 should be paid to them, was denied by the court, and Quirina Rios and her children appealed to the Court of Appeals from the order of December 7, 1937, authorizing the withdrawal of the said sum of P600 from the bank and its payment to Attorney Jose G. Macatañgay. The Court of Appeals, in its decision promulgated on February 27, 1941, affirmed the order appealed from. Thus the authority of the administrator to withdraw the sum of P600 and pay all of it to his attorney was definitely established. In the meantime the appeal of two of the heirs, Benito Uy and Maria Uy, from the approval of the project of partition was decided in their favor with costs against the appellee administrator. The costs amounted to P141.60. And on August 15,1939, pending the appeal of Quirina Rios and her children from the order authorizing the payment of P600, her attorney filed a petition with the court to order the administrator to pay the said costs. That petition was granted on August 30, 1939, and inasmuch as the property of the deceased had been distributed among his heirs, the court (Judge Gervasio Diaz presiding) ordered all of the heirs to pay the said costs amounting to P141.60. The attorney for Quirina Rios and her children moved for the reconsideration of that order on the ground that his clients, the minors Benito Uy and Maria Uy, who were among the heirs of the deceased, should not be made to bear any part of the costs which were awarded in their favor against the appellee administrator. The court granted the motion for reconsideration and amended its previous order in the sense that the costs of P141.60 be paid by the appellee administrator. Subsequently, and in another order, the court (Judge Abeto presiding) ordered the administrator not to dispose of the balance of P250 in his hands without previous order of the court. On October 7, 1940, upon petition of the attorney for Quirina Rios and her children, Judge Abeto ordered the administrator to pay the costs of P141.60 out of the sum of P250 in his hands. From that order the present appeal has been taken. The question is whether the costs of P141.60 should be paid out of the sum of P250 remaining in the hands of the administrator, which, by a previous order of the probate court subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, had been authorized to be paid to the attorney for the administrator as his fees for his services, or whether said costs should be paid by the heirs and distributees of the estate out of the property they had received. The question is not one of preference of credits, for the estate was not insolvent. Both claims—the administrator’s attorney’s fees of P600 and the costs of P141.60 awarded against the administrator —were expenses of administration. Had both claims been authorized by the court at the same time, they could have been paid partly out of the remaining cash of P600, and the balance out of the properties that had been delivered to the heirs. But since the said remaining cash of P600 had been adjudicated by the court to the attorney for the administrator in payment of his fees long before the said costs were awarded against the administrator, it would be inequitable and would cause unnecessary inconvenience to said attorney to require him to pursue two remedies, to wit, against the cash on hand and against the properties that had been distributed to the heirs. The only objection of the appellees against the order requiring the heirs to pay the costs in question out of the properties they had received from the estate is that since they (the appellees) are also heirs, and since the costs were awarded in their favor against the administrator, they as heirs should not be made to bear part of said costs. This objection, altho plausible, is not intrinsically sound. The costs having been adjudged against the administrator in relation to his endeavor to sustain an order of the probate court, he had the right to charge the same as expense of administration against the estate. The fact that the assets of the estate had been distributed among the heirs at the time the costs were awarded, did not affect the nature of the expense and could not redound to the benefit of any of the heirs and to the prejudice of the others. It has been suggested that the attorney for the administrator has no lien on the cash of F600 and that, therefore, the probate court could properly modify its order of December 7, 1937, in the sense that out of the said sum the costs of P141.60 should be paid, and that the balance should be used to satisfy part of the fees of the attorney for the administrator. We think, however, that the trial court had no more jurisdiction to modify its order after an appeal therefrom had been perfected and was pending consideration by the appellate court; and the latter having subsequently affirmed that order in toto, the same must be enforced as originally granted by the trial court. The order of Judge Quirico Abeto dated October 7, 1940, requiring the administrator to pay the sum of P141.60 out of the sum of P250 remaining in his hands is hereby set aside, and the order originally issued by Judge Garvasio Diaz dated August 30, 1939, requiring the heirs to pay the said sum of P141.60 out of the properties they had received from the estate is hereby reinstated, with costs against the appellees. Yulo, C. J., Horrilleno, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.