[ G.R. No. 48176. July 21, 1944 ] 74 Phil. 690
[ G.R. No. 48176. July 21, 1944 ]
MARTIN DIUQUINO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS.J. ANTONIO ARANETA, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on the ground that it states no cause of action against the defendant. The complaint alleges that the defendant employed one Pedro Estrada as a chauffeur, who operated defendant’s car in Baguio on April 6, 1940; that on said date the said chauffeur, in driving the defendant’s automobile No. 1-9940, thru negligence, carelessness, and imprudence, caused the said automobile to bump and hit the plaintiff while the latter was pouring water into the tank of the automobile belonging to his employer, Mr. Manuel Aguas, which was then parked in front of Villa Carmelita in Baguio; that the plaintiff suffered physical injuries, his kneeball having been broken, and was confined in the hospital from April 6 to May 4, 1940; that before the accident he was earning a salary of P35 a month, but that as a result of the accident he became permanently disabled to perform his ordinary work. The plaintiff claims damages from the defendant in the sum of P10,000, upon the allegation that the defendant did not use and exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his said chauffeur. The action is predicated upon article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code. These two articles read as follows:
“Art. 1902.—Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. “Art. 1903.—The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. “The father, or in case of his death, or incapacity, the mother, is liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live, with them. “Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the same way, liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties. “The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable. “Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody. “The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.”
It is needless to say that article 1902 is not applicable against the present defendant—even assuming as true the allegation that he failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of his chauffeur— because such failure on his part was not the proximate cause of the damage complained of. He did hot by such act or omission cause the damage in question. Said article would be applicable against the defendant’s chauffeur alone, who himself was guilty of the negligent acts by which the damage was caused. (Johnson vs. David, 5 Phil., 663, 666- 667.) It is, however, insisted for the appellant that the appellee should be held responsible for the acts of his chauffeur under article 1903. But said article specifies the persons who are held responsible for the acts and omissions of another; and, as found by this Court in the cases of Johnson vs. David, supra, and Chapman vs. Underwood, 27 PhiL, 374, “the driver does not fall within the list of persons in Article 1903 of the Civil Code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible.” It is not alleged that the appellee is the owner or director of an establishment or business and that he was employing his chauffeur in such business at the time the latter is alleged to have caused the damage. We are not persuaded that the interpretation of the codal provisions in question heretofore made by this Court in the cases above cited is wrong. Indeed, we feel that for the Court to so interpret said provisions as to include persons other than those therein specified as liable for the acts and omissions of another would be an invasion of the powers and prerogatives of the legislature. The later of the two cases above cited (Chapman vs. Underwood) was decided by this Court on March 28, 1914, and for nearly three decades the legislature has not seen fit to change the law as interpreted by this Court. The judgment appealed from is affirmed, but no finding is made as to costs because the appellant has beep allowed to litigate as a pauper. Yulo, C. J., Moran, and Horrilleno, JJ,, concur.