[ G.R. No. 48840. December 29, 1943 ] 74 Phil. 479
[ G.R. No. 48840. December 29, 1943 ]
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ROSARIO GUEVARA AND HER HUSBAND PEDRO BUISON, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
OZAETA, J.:
Ernesto M. Guevara and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter, respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their inheritance from the latter. The action was commenced on November 12, 1937, by Rosario Guevara to recover from Ernesto Guevara what she claims to be her strict ligitime as an acknowledged natural daughter of the deceased—to wit, a portion of 423,492 square meters of a large parcel of land described in original certificate of title No. 51691 of the province of Pangasinan, issued in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara— and to order the latter to pay her P6,000 plus P2,000 a year as damages for withholding such legitime from her. The defendant answered the complaint contending that whatever right or rights the plaintiff might have had, had been barred by the operation of law. It appears that on August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A), apparently with all the formalities of the law, wherein he made the following bequests: To his stepdaughter Candida Guevara, a pair of earrings worth M.50 and a gold chain worth P40; to his son Ernesto M. Guevara, a gold ring worth P180 and all the furniture, pictures, statues, and other religious objects found in the residence of the testator in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan; “a mi hija Rosario Guevara,” a pair of earrings worth P120;to his stepson Pio Guevara, a ring worth P120; and to his wife by second marriage, Angustia Posadas, various pieces of jewelry worth Pl,020. He also made the following devises: “A mis hijos Rosario Guevara y Ernesto M. Guevara y a mis hijastros, Vivencio, Eduviges, Dionisia, Candida y Pio, apellidados Guevara,” a residential lot with its improvements situate in the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan, having an area of 960 square meters and assessed at P540; to his wife Angustia Posadas he confirmed the donation propter nuptias theretofore made by him to her of a portion of 25 hectares of the large parcel of land of 259-odd hectares described in plan Psu-66618. He also devised to her a portion of 5 hectares of the same parcel of land by way of complete settlement of her usufructuary right. He set aside 100 hectares of the same parcel of land to be disposed bf either by him during his lifetime or by his attorney-in-fact Ernesto M. Guevara in order to pay all his pending debts and to defray his expenses and those of his family up to the time of his death. The remander of said parcel of land he disposed of in the following manner:
“(d).—Toda la porcion restante de mi terreno arriba descrito, de la extension superficialaproximada de ciento veintinueve (129) hectareas setenta (70) areas, y veinticinco (25) centiareas, con todas sus mejoras existentes en la misma, dejo y distribuyo, pro-indiviso, a mis siguientes herederos como sigue: “A mi hijo legitimo, Ernesto M. Guevara, ciento ocho (108) hectareas, ocho (8) areas y cincuenta y cuatro (54) centiareas, hacia la parte que colinda al Oeste de las cien (100) hectareas referidas en el inciso (a) de este parrafo del testamento, como su propiedad absoluta y exclusiva, en la cual extension superficial estan ineluidas cuarenta y tres (43) hectareas, veintitres (23) areas y cuarenta y dos (42) centiareas que le doy en concepto de mejora. “A mi hija natural reconocida, Rosario Guevara, veintiun (21) hectareas, sesenta y un (61) areas y setenta y un (71) centiareas, que es la parte restante. “Duodecimo.—Nombro por la presente como Albacea Testamentario a mi hijo Ernesto M. Guevara, con relevacion de fianza. Y una yez legalizado este testamento, y en cuanto sea posible, es mi deseo, que los herederos y legatarios aqui nombrados se repartan extrajudicialmente mis bienes de conformidad con mis disposiciones arriba consignadas.”
Subsequently, and on July 12, 1933, Victorino L. Guevara executed a deed of sale (exhibit 2) in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara whereby he conveyed to him the southern half of the large parcel of land of which he had theretofore disposed by the will above mentioned, in consideration of the sum of Pi and other valuable considerations, among which were the payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral expenses. As to the northern half of the same parcel of land, he declared : “Hago constar tambien que reconozco a mi referido hijo Ernesto M. Guevara como dueno de la mitad norte de la totalidad y con junto de los referidos terrenos por haberlos compradg de su propio peculio del Sr. Rafael T. Puzon a quien habia vendido con anterioridad.” On September 27, 1933, final decree of registration was issued in land registration case No. 15174 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and pursuant thereto original certificate of title No. 51691 of the same province was issued on October 12 of the same year in favor of Ernesto M. Guevara over the whole parcel of land described in the deed of sale above referred to. The registration proceeding had been commenced on November 1, 1932, by Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara as applicants, with Rosario, among others, as oppositor; but before the trial of the case Victorino L. Guevara withdrew as applicant and Rosario Guevara and her co-oppositors also withdrew their opposition, thereby facilitating the issuance of the title in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone. On September 27, 1933, Victorino L, Guevara died. His last will and testament, however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate. Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father. In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father’s last will and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the will. But a little over four years after the testator’s demise, she (assisted by her husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated but only to prove that the deceased Victorino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals sustained that theory. Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2) the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
I
We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara, it being in our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was in force up to the time this case was decided by the trial court, contains the following pertinent provisions:
“Sec. 625. Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution.—No will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. “Sec. 626. Custodian of Will to Deliver.—The person who has the custody of a will shall, within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. “Sec. 627. Executor to Present Will and Accept or Refuse Trust.—A person named as executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after knowing of the death of the testator, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction, unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period, signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept it. “Sec. 628. Penalty.—A person who neglects any of the duties required in the two preceding sections, unless he gives a satisfactory excuse to the court shall be subject to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars. “See. 629. Person Retaining Will may be Committed.— If a person having custody of a will after the death of the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the court so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued by the court, and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.”
The foregoing provisions are now embodied in Rule 76 of the new Rules of Court, which took effect on July 1, 1940. The proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, with notice by publication to the whole world and with personal notice to each of the known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator (section 630, C. C. P., and sections 3 and 4, Rule 77). Altho not contested (section 5, Rule 77), the due execution of the will and the fact that the testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting under duress, menace, and undue influence or fraud, must be proved to the satisfaction of the court, and only then may the will be legalized and given effect by means of a certificate of its allowance, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court; and when the will devises real property, attested copies thereof and of the certificate of allowance must be recorded in the register of deeds of the province in which the land lies. (Section 12, Rule 77, and section 624, C. C. P.) It will readily be seen from the above provisions of the law that the presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the probate of a will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the will. The Court of Appeals took express notice of these requirements of the law and held that a will, unless probated, is ineffective. Nevertheless it sanctioned the procedure adopted by the respondent for the following reasons:
“The majority of the Court is of the opinion that if this case is dismissed ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties, and that therefore, it is preferable to leave them in the very status which they themselves have chosen, and to decide their controversy once and for all, since, in a similar case, the Supreme Court applied that same criterion (Leano vs. Leaño, supra), which is now sanctioned by section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Besides, section 6 of Rule 124 provides that, if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of procedure may be adopted which appears most consistent to the spirit of the said Rules. Hence, we declare the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law.”
Let us look into the validity of these considerations. Section 1 of Rule 74 provides as follows:
“Section 1. Extra judicial settlement by agreement between heirs.—If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent.”
That is a modification of section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
“Sec. 596. Settlement of Certain Intestates Without Legal Proceedings.—Whenever all the heirs of a person who died intestate are of lawful age and legal capacity and there are no debts due from the estate, or all the debts have been paid the heirs may, by agreement duly executed in writing by all of them, and not otherwise, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court.”
The implication is that by the omission of the word “intestate” and the use of the word “legatees” in section 1 of Rule 74, a summary extrajudicial settlement of a deceased person’s estate, whether he died testate or intestate, may be made under the conditions specified. Even if we give retroactive effect to section 1 of Rule 74 and apply it here, as the Court of Appeals did, we do not believe it sanctions the nonpresentation of a will for probate and much less the nullification of such will thru the failure of its custodian to present it to the court for probate; for such a result is precisely what Rule 76 sedulously provides against. Section 1 of Rule 74 merely authorizes the extrajudicial or judicial partition of the estate of a decedent “without securing letters of administration.” It does not say that in case the decedent left a will the heirs and legatees may divide the estate among themselves without the necessity of presenting the will to the court for probate. The petition to probate a will and the petition to issue letters of administration are two different things, altho both may be made in the same case. The allowance of a will precedes the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration (section 4, Rule 78). One can have a will probated without necessarily securing letters testamentary or of administration. We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts arid the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among themselves to the exclusion of others. In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate. Even if the decedent left no debts and nobody raises any question as to the authenticity and due execution of the will, none of the heirs may sue for the partition of the estate in accordance with that will without first securing its allowance of probate by the court, first, because the law expressly provides that “no will shall pass either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court”; and, second, because the probate of a will, which is a proceeding in rem, cannot be dispensed with and substituted by any other proceeding, judicial or extrajudicial, without offending against public policy designed to effectuate the testator’s right to dispose of his property by will in accordance with law and to protect the rights of the heirs and. legatees under the will thru the means provided by law, among which are the publication and the personal notices to each and all of said heirs and legatees. Nor may the court approve and allow the will presented in evidence in such an action for partition, which is one in personam, any more than it could decree the registration under the Torrens system of the land involved in an ordinary action for reivindicacion or partition. We therefore believe and so hold that section 1 of Rule 74, relied upon by the Court of Appeals, does not sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent. The case of Leaño vs. Leaño (25 Phil., 180), cited by the Court of Appeals, like section 1 of Rule 74, sanctions the extrajudicial partition by the heirs of the properties left by a decedent, but not the nonpresentation of a will for probate. In that case one Paulina Ver executed a will on October 11, 1902, and died on November 1, 1902. Her will was presented for probate on November 10, 1902, and was approved and allowed by the Court on August 16, 1904. In the meantime, and on November 10, 1902, the heirs went ahead and divided the properties among themselves and some of them subsequently sold and disposed of their shares to third persons. It does not affirmatively appear in the decision in that case that the partition made by the heirs was not in accordance with the will or that they in any way disregarded the will. In closing the case by its order dated September 1, 1911, the trial court validated the partition, and one of the heirs, Cunegunda Leaño, appealed. In deciding the appeal this Court said:
“The principal assignment of error is that the lower court committed an error in deciding that the heirs and legatees of the estate of Dna. Paulina Ver had voluntarily divided the estate among themselves.”
In resolving that question this Court said:
“In view of the positive finding of the judge of the lower court that there had been a voluntary partition of the estate among the heirs and legatees, and in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, we must conclude that the lower court had some evidence to support its conclusion.”
Thus it will be seen that as a matter of fact no question of law was raised and decided in that case. That decision cannot be relied upon as an authority for the unprecedented and unheard of procedure adopted by the respondent whereby she seeks to prove her status as an acknowledged natural child of the decedent by his will and attempts to nullify and circumvent the testamentary dispositions made by him by not presenting the will to the court for probate and by claiming her legitime as an acknowledged natural child on the basis of intestacy; and that in the face of express mandatory provisions of the law requiring her to present the will to the court for probate. In the subsequent case of Riosa vs. Rocha (1926), 48 Phil. 737, this Court departed from the procedure sanctioned by the trial court and impliedly approved by this Court in the Leaño case, by holding that an extra judicial partition is not proper in testate succession. In the Riosa case the Court, speaking thru Chief Justice Avanceña, held:
“1. EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION; NOT PROPER IN TESTATE SUCCESSION.—Section 596 of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizing the heirs of a person who died intestate to make extrajudicial partition of the property of the deceased, without going into any court of justice, makes express reference to intestate succession, and therefore excludes testate succession. “2. ID.; EFFECTS OF; TESTATE SUCCESSION.—In the instant case, which is a testate succession, the heirs made an extrajudicial partition of the estate and at the same time instituted proceeding for the probate of the will and the administration of the estate. When the time came for making the partition, they submitted to the court the extrajudicial partition previously made by them, which the court approved, Held: That for the purposes of the reservation and the rights and obligations created thereby, in connection with the relatives benefited, the property must not be deemed transmitted to the heirs from the time the extrajudicial partition was made, but from the time said partition was approved by the court.” (Syllabus.)
The Court of Appeals also cites section 6 of Rule 124, which provides that if the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by the Rules of Court, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of the said Rules. That provision is not applicable here for the simple reason that the procedure which the court ought to follow in the exercise of its jurisdiction is specifically pointed out and prescribed in detail by Rules 74, 76, and 77 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals also said “that if this case is dismissed, ordering the filing of testate proceedings, it would cause injustice, inconvenience, delay, and much expense to the parties.” We see no injustice in requiring the plaintiff not to violate but to comply with the law. On the contrary, an injustice might be committed against the other heirs and legatees mentioned in the will if the attempt of the plaintiff to nullify said will by not presenting it to the court for probate should be sanctioned. As to the inconvenience, delay, and expense, the plaintiff herself is to blame because she was the custodian of the will and she violated the duty imposed upon her by sections 2, 4, and 5 of Rule 76, which command her to deliver said will to the court on pain of a fine not exceeding P2,000 and of imprisonment for contempt of court. As for the defendant, he is not complaining of inconvenience, delay, and expense, but on the contrary he is insisting that the procedure prescribed by law be followed by the plaintiff. Our conclusion is that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the action instituted by the plaintiff to be in accordance with law. It also erred in awarding relief to the plaintiff in this action on the basis of intestacy of the decedent notwithstanding the proven existence of a will left by him and solely because said will has not been probated due to the failure of the plaintiff as custodian thereof to comply with the duty imposed upon her by the law. It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named executor in said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as required by section 3 of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil Procedure), because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2 and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.
II
This brings us to the consideration of the second question, referring to the efficaty of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title issued to the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara. So that the parties may not have litigated here in vain insofar as that question is concerned, we deem it proper to decide it now and obviate the necessity of a new action. The deed of sale exhibit 2 executed by and between Victorino L. Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary public on July 12, 1933, may be divided into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the sourthern half of Victorino L. Guevara’s hacienda of 259-odd hectares in consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations therein mentioned; and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own money from Rafael T. Puzon. A. As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter’s assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because: " (a) it has not been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon him in the deed of transfer.” As a matter of fact the Court of Appeals found: “It appears that the defendant has been paying the debts left by his father. To accomplish this, he had to alienate considerable portions of the above-mentioned land. And we cannot brand such alienation as anomalous unless it is proven that they have exceeded the value of what he has acquired by virtue of the deed of July 12, 1933, and that of his corresponding share in the inheritance.” The finding of the Court of Appeals on this aspect of the case is final and conclusive upon the respondent, who did not appeal therefrom. B. With regard to the northern half of the hacienda, the findings of fact and of law made by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
“The defendant has tried to prove that with his own money, he bought from Rafael Puzon one-half of the land in question, but the Court a quo, after considering the evidence, found it not proven; we hold that such conclusion is well founded. The acknowledgment by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara, of the said transactions, which was inserted incidentally in the document of July 12, 1933, is clearly belied by the fact that the money paid to Rafael Puzon came from Silvestre P. Coquia, to whom Victorino L. Guevara had sold a parcel of land with the right of repurchase. The defendant, acting for his father, received the money and delivered it to Rafael Puzon to redeem the land in question, and instead of executing a deed of redemption in favor of Victorino L. Guevara, the latter executed a deed of sale in favor of the defendant. “The plaintiff avers that she withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the defendant, because of the latter’s promise that after paying all the debts of their father, he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. As their father then was still alive, there was no reason to require the delivery of her share and that was why she did not insist on her opposition, trusting on the reliability and sincerity of her brother’s promise. The evidence shows that such promise was really made. The registration of land under the Torrens system does not have the effect of altering the laws of succession, or the rights of partition between coparceners, joint tenants, and other cotenants nor does it change or affect in any other way any other rights and liabilities created by law and applicable to unregistered land (sec. 70, Land Registration Law). The plaintiff is not, then, in estoppel, nor can the doctrine of res judicata be invoked against her claim. Under these circumstances, she has the irght to compel the defendant to deliver her corresponding share in the estate left by the deceased, Victorino L. Guevara.”
In his tenth to fourteenth assignments of error the petitioner assails the foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals. But the findings of fact made by said court are final and not reviewable by us on certiorari. The Court of Appeals found that the money with which the petitioner repurchased the northern half of the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father’s, it being the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to Silvestre P. Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her opposition to the registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter’s promise that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after all the debts of the original owner of said land had been paid. Such finding does not constitute a reversal of the decision and decree of registration, which merely confirmed the petitioner’s title; and in the absence of any intervening innocent third party, the petitioner may be compelled to fulfil the promise by virtue of which he acquired his title. That is authorized by section 70 of the Land Registration Act, cited by the Court of Appeals, and by the decision of this Court in Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343, and the cases therein cited. Upon this phase of the litigation, we affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the northern half of the land described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. In the event the petitioner Ernesto M. Guevara has alienated any portion thereof, he is under obligation to compensate the estate with an equivalent portion from the southern half of said land that has not yet been sold. In other words, to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara still belongs one half of the total area of the land described in said original certificate of title, to be taken from such portions as have not yet been sold by the petitioner, the other half having been lawfully acquired by the latter in consideration of his assuming the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased. Wherefore, that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which declares in effect that notwithstanding exhibit 2 and the issuance of original certificate of title No. 51691 in the name of Ernesto M. Guevara, one half of the land described in said certificate of title belongs to the estate of Victorino L. Guevara and the other half to Ernesto M. Guevara in consideration of the latter’s assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of the deceased, is hereby affirmed; but the judgment of said court insofar as it awards any relief to the respondent Rosario Guevara in this action is hereby reversed and set aside, and the parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the proper court for probate in accordance with law, without prejudice to such action as the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan may take against the responsible party or parties under section 4 of Rule 76. After the said document is approved and allowed by the court as the last will and testament of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, the heirs and legatees therein named may take such action, judicial or extrajudicial, as may be necessary to partition the estate of the testator, taking into consideration the pronouncements made in part II of this opinion. No finding as to costs in any of the three instances. Yulo, C. J., and Hontiveros,[1] J., concur.