G.R No. 48925

LUCIA Y. MATIAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R No. 48925. August 30, 1943 ] 74 Phil. 326

[ G.R No. 48925. August 30, 1943 ]

LUCIA Y. MATIAS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF NUEVA ECIJA, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

PABLO, J.:

This is a direct appeal from the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, to which the case was submitted for decision upon a stipulation of facts and which dismissed the complaint without costs.  The undisputed facts are as follows: In civil case No 6043 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija entitled “Lucla Y. Matlas et al., plaintiffs, vs. Gonzalo H. Cotoco et al., defendants, the plaintiffs procured a writ of preliminary attachment by virtue of which, on August 26, 1931, they attached the shares of stock belonging to the defendant Gonzalo H. Cotoco in the  corporation known as Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.  The attachment was duly noted on the books  of the corporation.  Final judgment was subsequently entered in said case in favor of the plaintiff Lucia Y. Matias against the defendant Gonzalo H. Cotoco for the sum of P11,023.80, with legal interest thereon from August 22, 1931, and by virtue of the writ of execution issued thereon the sheriff levied upon and advertised for sale at public auction 5,894 shares of stock belonging to the judgment debtor Gonzalo H. Cotoco in the Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., which had been previously attached as aforesaid.  On September 30,1932, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Ecija, in representation of the Collector of Internal Revenue,  wrote to the provincial sheriff as follows:

“Septiembre 30, 1932

“Sr.  SHERIFF PROVINCIAL. “Cabanatuan, Nueva  Ecija “SEÑOR: “En relacion con las propiedades embargadas por Vd. en virtud de una orden de ejecucion expedida en la causa civil No. 6043 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Nueva Ecija, titulada ‘Lucia Y. Matias y otros contra Gonzalo H. Co Toco y otros,’ cuya venta en publica, subasta esta anunciada por Vd. para el dia 3 de octubre, 1932, tengo el honor de reclamar todas y cada una de dichas propiedades en nombre y representacidn del Administrador de Rentas Internas en virtud del gravamen preferente que el Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas tiene sobre las  mismas por impuestos de comercio e ingreso que Gonzalo H. Co Toco debe a este, segun relacion que aparee en el ‘proof of debt’ suscrito y jurado por el Administrador de Rentas Internas en 22 de junio ultimo, cuyo original esta unido aUexpediente de la causa civil No. 6041 de dicho Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Nueva Ecija, copia de la cual he remitido a la oficina de Vd. antes de ahora. Nuestra reclamation se funda en las disposiciones del articulo 1588 del Codigo Administrativo tal como esta  enmendado. “Esta reclamacion hacemos extensiva al producto de dichas propiedades en caso de venta de las mismas. “Respetuosamente,

(Sgd.)  “ALFONSO SANTOS        ‘Fiscal Provincial”

There was another third-party claimant named Guan Suy (alias Gonzalo Chua Guan), and the execution creditor filed an indemnity bond of P58,000 in favor of the sheriff “in view of the said claim of Guan Suy (alias-Gonzalo Chua Guan),  *  *  * for which reason the provincial sheriff of Nueva Ecija on October 3, 1932, sold, as scheduled in the publication, the said stocks of Gonzalo  H. Cotoco in the Samahang Magsasaka, Inc., consisting of 5,894 shares of stock in favor of Lucia Y. Matias, [she] being the highest bidder for the amount of P2.947.” The provincial sheriff demanded of the plaintiff the payment in cash of the amount of her bid in view of the claim of the Collector of Internal Revenue over the proceeds of the sale, but the plaintiff refused to pay it on the ground that being the execution creditor she was “not obliged to give a cash payment of the said bid.”  The sheriff refused to issue a certificate of sale to the plaintiff, and the latter on April 25, 1938, brought the present action to compel him to do so. The claim of the Collector of Internal Revenue against the judgment debtor Gonzalo H. Cotoco  consisted of the following: P10,479.73 for sales tax and penalties due from the limited copartnership Gonzalo Cotoco & Co. for the year 1931, and deficiency income taxes (whether on the income of the partnership of Gonzalo H. Cotoco personally was not specified) for the years 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1931 amounting to more than P18,000. The trial court  held  that  Gonzalo H. Cotoco, as general  and managing partner of Gonzalo H. Cotoco & Co., was personally liable for the Government’s claim against the partnership,  and that under section 1588 of the Administrative Code, said claim constituted a lien on the property of the debtor superior to the claim of the plaintiff herein.  Hence the judgment of dismissal. In her first assignment of error, appellant contends that being the judgment creditor and having filed a bond in favor of the sheriff, she was not obligated to pay in cash the amount of her bid at the public sale of the property of the judgment debtor.   The Solicitor-General, representing the sheriff appellee in this Court, on the other hand contends  that all bids in a public sale should be paid in cash regardless of whether or not the successful bidder be the judgment creditor himself. Section 19 of Rule 39 (formerly section 457 of Act No. 190) provides that all sales of  property under execution must be made to the highest bidder, and that after sufficient property has been sold to satisfy the execution, no more property shall be sold.  Section 20  of Rule 39 (formerly section 458 of Act No. 190) provides as follows:

“Sec. 20. Refusal of purchaser to pay—If a purchaser refuses to pay  the amount bid by him for property  struck off to him at a sale under execution, the officer may again sell the property to the highest bidder and shall not be responsible  for any loss occasioned thereby; but the court may order the refusing purchaser to pay into court the amount of such loss, with costs, and may punish him for contempt if he disobeys the order.  The amount of such payment shall be for the benefit of the person entitled to the proceeds of the execution, unless the execution has been fully satisfied, in which event such proceeds shall be for the benefit of the judgment debtor.  When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may thereafter reject any subsequent bid of such person.”

It will be seen that the law is silent as to the manner of payment in case the successful bidder is the execution creditor himself.  In the absence of a third-party claimant to the  proceeds of the sale, the execution creditor need not pay down the amount of the bid if it does not exceed the amount of his judgment; and if rt does, he  should only be required to pay the excess.  That has been the invariable practice, dictated by common sense, the correctness of which is too  obvious for argument. In the present case, however, the Collector of Internal Revenue claimed the proceeds of the sale on the ground that the Government had a lien for taxes on the property sold superior to the claim of the appellant.  That claim was controverted by the appellant.  The sheriff had no authority, to decide the controversy; so in order to protect himself  against the conflicting  claims he had the right to demand of the herein appellant as successful bidder the payment in cash of the amount of her bid as a condition precedent to the issuance by him of the certificate of sale, in order that he might hold the amount subject  to the  order of the court, which alone has jurisdiction to decide said controversy.  If the court should decide it in favor of the execution creditor, it would and  should order the sheriff to issue  the certificate of  sale, and the sheriff would thereby be relieved of any responsibility to the other  claimant.  If the court should find that the claim of the third party over the proceeds of the sale was superior to that of the execution creditor, the latter should  be ordered  to pay the amount of his bid to the sheriff within a reasonable time (which should be specified by the court) as a condition precedent to the issuance of the certificate of sale by the sheriff.  Failure of the execution creditor to make the payment would automatically annul the sale. It is true that in this case the appellant gave the sheriff an indemnity bond of P58,000  in  order that the latter might proceed with the sale; but we believe that said bond did not  cover the claim of the Government over the proceeds of the sale, since m paragraph 5 of the stipulation of facts it appears that appellant filed said bond “in view of the said claim of Guan Suy (alias Gonzalo Chua Guan).”  The bond is not attached to the record In view of the foregoing considerations,  we overrule appellant’s first assignment of error. Appellant’s second and last assignment of error is that “the lower court erred in holding that the Collector of Internal Revenue has a preferential right over the stocks of Gonzalo  Cotoco in the Samahang Magsasaka, Inc.”  That is the controversy between the appellant and the Collector of Internal Revenue.  It cannot be decided without hearing both parties.  Since the Collector of Internal Revenue was not made a party respondent in this case, any decision adverse to his claim would not be binding on him for lack of jurisdiction over  his  person.  The provincial fiscal in the lower court and the Solicitor General in this Court appeared for the sheriff, but the latter is not the Collector of Internal Revenue.  For this reason, the trial court did not have, and this Court does not have, jurisdiction to pass upon the merit of the controversy discussed in appellant’s second assignment of error. For this reasons above stated, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is affirmed, without any finding as to costs. So ordered. Yulo, C. J., Moran and Paras,  JJ., concur.