G.R. No. 48115

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FLORENHNO SAN GIL. JOSEFA R. OPPUS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. BONIFACIO SAN GIL, ETC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. 48115. October 12, 1942 ] 74 Phil. 1

[ G.R. No. 48115. October 12, 1942 ]

INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED FLORENHNO SAN GIL. JOSEFA R. OPPUS, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. BONIFACIO SAN GIL, ETC., OPPOSITOR AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N

OZAETA, J.:

In civil  case No.  3498 of  the Court of First Instance of  Tayabas, the herein appellant Josefa R. Qppus sued the  herein M administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Florentino San  Gil for the possession, among others, of the following personalties:  24 beds, 1 “Schkler” piano, 12 chairs, 8 small tables, 2 iceboxes, 1 phonograph,  2 long dining tables, and 1  big mirror. On  November 1, 1933, the  court in said case rendered judgment ordering the defendant to deliver the possession  of said furniture to the plaintiff,   For reasons  that do not appear in the   record, that  judgment has not been satisfied.  On October 6, 1939, Josefa R.    Oppus presented a motion  in the above-entitled intestate proceeding of Florentino   San Gil, asking the court to order the administrator Bonifacio San Gil to deliver  to  her  the furniture above  mentioned,  The probate court denied said motion on  the grounds (1) that the furniture in question does not belong to the estate of the deceased Florentino San Gil and (2) that in any  event the execution of the judgment in civil  case No. 3498 should be applied for in said case.  We are now asked to review and reverse that order. The first ground  stated by the probate court is correct because it was established in said  civil case No. 3498 that the furniture in question belongs  to  the appellant Josefa R. Oppus, who bought it from   the  deceased Florentino San Gil.   The   second  ground is also well founded because the administrator Bonifacio San Gil  having been sued as such in the ordinary  court and judgment having been rendered  there against him,  we find no legal impediment to the execution of said  judgment by order of the court that rendered  it.  Appellant’s contention that she has  to apply to the probate court for the execution  of  said judgment on the theory   that the property in  question is in custodia  legis, is untenable.  The  judgment in  question is not one for a sum  of money  which has to be satisfied by levying execution on property  belonging to the estate  and  therefore in custodia legis. It is a   judgment  for the manual delivery and  possession of specific articles  of personal property, the action for  which  survives by express  provision of law “and may be  commenced and prosecuted by or against  the executor or administrator.”   (Section 703, Code of Civil Procedure; section 1, Rule  88, Rules of Court.)  On the one hand, the prosecution of an action against an  executor or administrator  which the law allows regarding the possession of specific articles, necessarily includes the execution of the judgment that may be entered  in said action.  On the other hand, once the court determines in such action that the property in litigation  belongs  to the plaintiff and not to the estate of the deceased, it cannot  be maintained that such property is in custodia legis, it not forming part of the estate of the deceased. Hence appellant’s motion herein was not in order and was properly  denied. We might add  that perhaps such motion in the probate court was resorted  to instead of a petition  for execution in the ordinary court that  rendered  the judgment, because more  than  five  years had elapsed since it became final in December, 1933.   Suffice  it  to  say,  however, that what the law does not permit to be done directly cannot be done indirectly. Lastly, we  observe  from the record (p. 37, B. of E.) that twice did appellant procure writs  of  execution  in said case No. 3498—first in February, 1934, and again  in September,  1935. We cannot understand why the judgment in question has remained unsatisfied. The order appealed  from is affirmed; but we refrain from awarding costs to the appellee because we think his obstinate refusal to deliver the furniture in question to the appellant notwithstanding the judgment  of a  competent tribunal  is unjustifiable  and unworthy of a law-abiding citizen.  So ordered. Yulo, C. J., Moran and Bocobo, JJ., concur.