G.R. No. 48109

NATALIA BELTRAN, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO CABRERA, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, AND CIRILO MAPA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

[ G.R. No. 48109. September 07, 1942 ] 73 Phil. 666

[ G.R. No. 48109. September 07, 1942 ]

NATALIA BELTRAN, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO CABRERA, JUDGE OF MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, AND CIRILO MAPA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N

MORAN, J.:

In an action instituted against defendant Cirilo Mapa by plaintiff Natalia Beltran for a sum of money, judgment was rendered on November 7, 1940, by the municipal court of Manila awarding plaintiff the amount prayed for in her complaint. On November 16, 1940, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration and new trial, claiming that the judgment was not justified by the evidence and was contrary to law. The respondent court granted this motion in its order of December 28, 1940. On January 20, 1941, plaintiff moved to set aside this order and prayed that the judgment of November 7, 1940 be executed. The court denied both motions and set the case for new trial on February 8, 1941. On this last mentioned date, plaintiff instituted in this Court certiorari proceedings seeking to annul respondent court’s order of December 28, 1940, and prayed that it be restrained from proceeding with the new trial. On the same date the respondent judge dismissed plaintiff’s complaint for her failure to appear at the new trial. Rule 4, section 16, of the new Rules of Court is authority for the municipal court to grant a new trial “to correct an error or injustice it may have committed.” This provision is a mere restatement of the doctrine laid down in Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya (42 Phil., 557), wherein it was held (page 562) that even in the absence of statutory authority to grant a new trial, a justice of the peace court has the inherent power “to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice” (par. 7, sec. 11, Act No. 190, now Rule 124, sec. 5, par. (g), Rules of Court). In other words, “a judge has an inherent right, while his judgment is still under his control, to correct errors, mistakes, or injustices” (page 563), and may grant a new trial for that purpose. But new trial, in such case, does not mean that the parties shall have to introduce anew all the proofs they had presented before. It only means that there shall be a new consideration of the evidence already presented and of the law applicable to the case for the purpose of rendering a new judgment. Since the new trial is predicated upon an erroneous appreciation of the evidence and/or upon an erroneous construction and application of the law, the court has nothing to do at the new trial but to correct the errors it may have committed. It is obvious that the presence of the parties at the new trial is not indispensable except for purposes of argument which may be dispensed with, and, accordingly, the non-appearance of the plaintiff thereat is not a ground for dismissal.  Such non-appearance may merely   signify that the plaintiff is submitting the case for new judgment without further argument. There may be instances where the court cannot adequately correct a mistake in its judgment without additional evidence to clarify doubtful points; but in such a case it is the duty of the court so to state in its order for new trial for the guidance of the parties. The municipal court, in the instant case, failed to do so. It may be suggested that appeal to the Court of First Instance from the order rendered by the municipal court is the proper remedy for the petitioner. Since) however, the only course which the Court of First Instance may take on appeal is to remand the case to the municipal court for further proceedings in accordance with Rule 40, section 10, of the Rules of Court, and since we may properly make that direction now under the issues made by the parties in their pleadings, we shall do so to avoid further delay in the proceedings. The order of the respondent court granting new trial is declared valid, but its order dismissing the action for non-appearance of the plaintiff at the new trial is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the municipal court for further proceedings, without costs. Yulo, C. J., and Ozaeta, J., concur.