[ G. R. No. 47864. May 12, 1942 ] 73 Phil. 575
[ G. R. No. 47864. May 12, 1942 ]
GAUDENCIO C. HIQUIANA ET AL., PETITIONERS-APPELLES, VS. ISMAEL L. VELOSO, ETC., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
OZAETA, J.:
The only question raised in this appeal is whether or not a justice of the peace has authority to grant a new trial in a criminal case. In the justice of the peace court of Malita, Davao, four persons were accused of theft. Two of them were convicted and two acquitted by Acting Justice of the Peace Valerio P. Reyes in a decision dated April 22, 1940. On the last-mentioned date the two accused who were convicted, presented a motion for new trial, which was submitted to Justice of the Peace Ismael L. Veloso, who in the meantime had relieved Acting Justice of the Peace Reyes. Without expressly setting aside the decision, Justice of the Peace Veloso granted a new trial, saying that “the court is convinced that a review of the case is necessary,” and announcing its intention to make an ocular inspection of the place of the crime. A motion for reconsideration was presented by the offended party, but it was denied by the justice of the peace, who in the same order set the case for new trial on June 22, 1940. Thereupon the offended party and the chief of police who acted as prosecutor instituted the present certiorari proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Davao to annul the order of the respondent justice of the peace granting the motion for new trial. The Court of First Instance (Judge Fernando Hernandez presiding) granted the writ prayed for and ordered the justice of the peace to abstain from holding a new trial in said criminal case to the Court of First Instance as if it had been appealed by the accused. From that decision the respondent justice of the peace appealed to this Court. The reasoning of the court below may be summarized as follows: The granting of a new trial is practically a revision of the case, which pertains to the appellate court and not to the respondent justice of the peace. There is no provision in General Orders No. 58 authorizing justices of the peace to grant a new trial in criminal cases. Neither is there any provision in Rule 119 of the new Rules of Court for such authorization. It is only in civil cases that a justice of the peace may grant a new trial, under the authority of Veluz vs. Justice of the Peace of Sariaya (42 Phil. 557). To authorize a justice of the peace to grant a new trial would merely delay the proceedings, inasmuch as the accused can appeal to the Court of First Instance, where a trial de novo is held. A justice of the peace, according to the trial court, may grant a motion for reconsideration but not a new trial. We think the opinion of the court below is neither sound nor logical. In the Veluz case (supra) this Court admitted “that there is no statutory provision granting the justice of the peace authority to consider a motion for a new trial,” but held nevertheless that “it does not require statutory authority for a court to correct its errors or mistakes during the time which it has control over its decisions,” citing paragraph 7 of section 11 of Act No. 190, which provides that the court may, as one of its incidental powers, “amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.” In other words the authority to grant a motion for reconsideration or a new trial is implied from the inherent power of the court to correct its own error before its decision becomes final; and what is implied need not be expressed. Such authority is clearly deduced by implication from the provision of Court, referring to appeals from judgement of the justice of the peace or municipal court in criminal cases, which says that “the period of appeal shall be interrupted from the date a motion for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have been served upon the defendant or his attorney.” Resolving the question in the affirmatively, we reserve the decision appealed from, with costs. Yulo, C. J., Paras, and Bocobo, JJ., concur.