[ G.R. No. 47593. September 13, 1941 ] 73 Phil. 201
[ G.R. No. 47593. September 13, 1941 ]
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., PETITIONER VS. SERAFIN D. FELICIANO D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
One Evaristo Feliciano filed an application for insurance with the herein petitioner upon the solicitation of one of its agents. Two insurance policies to the aggregate amount of P25,000 were issued to him. Feliciano died on September 29, 1935. The defendant company refused to pay on the ground that the policies were fraudulently obtained, the insured having given false answers and statements in the application as well as in the medical report. The present action was brought to recover on said policies. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The lower court found that at the time Feliciano filed his application and at the time he was subjected to physical examination by the medical examiner of the herein petitioner, he was already suffering from tuberculosis. This fact appears in the negative both in the application and in the medical report. The lower court, after an exhaustive examination of the conflicting testimonies, also found that Feliciano was made to sign the application and the examiner’s report in blank, and that afterwards the blank spaces therein were filled in by the agent and the medical examiner, who made it appear therein that Feliciano was a fit subject for insurance. The lower court also held that neither the insured nor any member of his family concealed the real state of health of the insured. That as a matter of fact the insured, as well as the members of his family, told the agent and the medical examiner that the applicant had been sick and coughing for sometime and that he had also gone three times to the Santol Sanatorium. On appeal, this finding of facts of the lower court was sustained by the Court of Appeals. This concludes the controversy over the facts in so far as this Court is concerned. The first assignment of error of the petitioner raises the question we are now called upon to decide:
“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an insurance company has no right to avoid a policy where its agent knowingly and intentionally wrote down the answers in the application differing from those made by the insured, in disregard of the exception that when the agent, instead of serving the interests of his principal, acts in his own or another’s interest and adversely to that of his principal, the said principal is not bound by said acts of the agent.”
On the proposition thus presented, there are two main avenues of approach indicated: one leading to the validation of a policy where its agent, without fraud, collusion or bad faith on the part of the insured, falsified the answers given by the insured; and the other, leading to the avoidance of the policy under the circumstances. We see no need for an extended discusion of the conflicting authorities. Whenever courts are given the choice between two conflicting principles, the determinative fact which should sway them is the conformity of its contemplated course to reason and to “the common sense of the situation.” The life of the law is not only logic but experience. The phenomenal growth of insurance from almost nothing a hundred years ago to its present gigantic proportion is not of the outstanding marvels of present-day business life. The demand for economic security, the growing need for social stability, and the clamor for protection against the hazards of cruel-crippling calamities and sudden economic shocks, have made insurance one of the felt necessities of modern life. Insurance is no longer a rich man’s monopoly. Upon it are heaped the assured hopes of many families of modest means. It is woven, as it were, into the very warp and woof of national economy. It touches the holiest and most sacred ties in the life of man-love of parents, love of wives and love of children. It is of common knowledge that the selling of insurance today is subjected to the whirlwind pressure of modern salesmanship. Insurance companies send detailed instructions to their agents to solicit and procure applications. These agents are to be found all over the length and breadth of the land. They are stimulated to more active efforts by contests and by the keen competition offered by other rival insurance companies. They are supplied with blank applications and paid large commissions on the policies secured by them. All transactions are generally done through these agents. They act, in fact and in theory, as the general representatives of the insurance companies. They supply all the information, prepare and answer the applications, submit the applications to their companies, conclude the transactions, and otherwise smooth out all difficulties. The agents, in short, do what the company set them out to do. In the present case, the agent knew all the time the true state of health of the insured. The insurer’s medical examiner approved the application knowing full well that the applicant was sick. The situation is one in which one of two innocent parties must bear a loss for his reliance upon a third person. In this case, it was the insurer who gave the agent authority to deal with the applicant. It was the one who selected the agent, thus implying that the insured could put his trust on him. It was the one who drafted and accepted the policy and consummated the contract. It seems reasonable that as between the two of them, the one who employed and gave character to the third person as its agent should be the one to bear the loss. The company received the money of the applicant as the price of the risk to be taken by it. If the policy should be avoided, it must be because it was void from the very beginning, and the result would be that the insurer, while it received the money, never assumed any risk. The result would be, in the language of one of the cases, “to place every simple or uneducated person seeking insurance at the mercy of the insurer who could, through its agent, insert in every application, unknown to the applicant and over his signature, some false statements which would enable him to avoid all liability while retaining the price paid for the supposed insurance.” (State Insurance Company v. Taylor, 14 Colo. 499, 24 Pac. 333.) The weight of authority is that if an agent of the insurer, after obtaining from an applicant for insurance a correct and truthful answer to interrogatories contained in the application for insurance, without knowledge of the applicant fills in false answers, either fraudulently or otherwise, the insurer cannot assert the falsity of such answers as a defonse to liability on the policy, and this is true generally without regard to the subject matter of the answers or the nature of the agent’s duties or limitations on his authority, at least if not brought to the attention of the applicant. The fact that the insured did not read the application which he signed, is not indicative of bad faith. It has been held that it is not negligence for the insured to sign an application without first reading it if the insurer by its conduct in appointing the agent influenced the insured to place trust and confidence in the agent. (Den Hartog v. Home Nat. Ins. Asso., 197 Iowa, 143, 196 N. W. 944.) As the court said in the case of Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Lunkenbiemer, 127 Ind. 538, 26 N. E. 1082, “Nor can it be said that the assured, who has fully, frankly, truthfully, and in good faith answered all the required questions, is guilty of negligence in signing, without reading, the application which is thereupon prepared by the agent. He is justified in assuming that the agent has, with equal good faith, truthfully recorded the answers given him. He may well say to the company: ‘You accredited this man to me as your representative and I signed the application thus prepared by him, relying upon the character which you gave him when you commissioned him to come to me as your agent. If he acted dishonestly in the matter, you and not I must suffer the consequences.’ * * *” In the instant case, it has been proved that the insured could not read English, the language in which the application was written, and that after the contract was signed, it was kept by his mother. As a consequence, the insured had no opportunity to read or correct any misstatement therein. (Bill of Execptions, pp. 60-61.) We have not been insensible to the appeal that the course we have followed may lead to fraud and work hardship on insurance companies, for it would be easy for insurance agents and applicants to insert false answers in their applications for insurance. This means that it is to the particular interest of these companies to exercise greater care in the selection of their agents and examiners. Their protection is still in their own hands and which may be achieved by other means. Withal, the attainment of a common good may involve impairment and even sacrifice of beneficial interests of a particular group, but in life compromise is inevitable until the hour of doom strikes. The petition is hereby dismissed and the judgment sought to be reviewed is affirmed with costs against the petitioner. So ordered. Abad Santos, Diaz, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.