[ G.R. No. 46593. February 03, 1940 ] 69 Phil. 518
[ G.R. No. 46593. February 03, 1940 ]
RAMON TORRES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF LABOR, AND JOSEGALLOFIN, ASACTINGCOLLECTOR OFCUSTOMSOF CEBU, PETITIONERS, VS. TAN CHIM, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
LAUREL, J.:
Tan Chim,the petitioner here,arrived at theport of CebuonJanuary 18,1937, and soughtadmission as a minor son of AlejandroTan Bangco.Afterhearing, the Board of SpecialInquirydecided todeny himentry on the groundthatthe status of hisfather hadnotbeen passed upon by the Secretary of Labor.Apetition for habeas corpus was filedwith the Courtof First Instance of Cebu(civil case No. 308), which ruled that Alejandro TanBangco was a Filipino citizenjussoli,havingbeen borninManila onFebruary27, 1893. On appeal, the Courtof Appeals, by decision ofFebruary 23, 1939, upheld the conclusion of thelower court and declined to overrule the doctrine inRoa vs. Collector ofCustoms, 23 Phil., 315, in the following commendable language:
“But theappellant impugns the soundness of thedoctrine laid down in the foregoing decisions and urgesus to overrule them.We donot think itnecessary to enter upon a discussionof the alleged misapplication of the law or erroneous conclusions reached inthecases referred to. It isour understanding that the decisions criticized are conclusive and bindinguponthisCourtand all other courts inferior to the Supreme Court as expressing the lawon thesubjectstreated therein.The rule ofstare decisis and"a becoming modesty” which demands of inferior courts ‘conscious realization ofthe positionthat theyoccupy intheinterrelation andoperationof the integratedjudicial system ofthenation,“compels us to respect and follow these decisions, while unreversed, regardless of the divergencies of opinion that aresaid to existabouttheircorrectness (ThePeople of thePhilippine Islands and the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, petitioners, vs. Jose0. Vera,Judge ad interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mariano Cu Unjieng,respondents, G.R.No.45685,November 16, 1937).This should be our norm of conduct at least where the decisions sought to bedisregarded are not manifestly wrong, unjust or contraryto law, and where a departure therefrom mightonly result in ‘going from one doubtful rule to another”
A comparison between this case and that of Roa v. Collector of Customs, supra, will show the following similarities and dissimilarities: Similar (1) in that Roa was born in the Philippines in 1889, whereas Alejandro Tan Bangco (father of the petitioner)was born here in 1893, both before the advent of American soverignty;(2)the fathers of both Roa and Tan Bangco were of Chinese nationality and their mothers, Filipino; (3) at the time of the ratification of the treatyof peace between the United States and Spain,both were minor residents of the Philippines; and(4)both, in their boyhood, went to Chinaf or the purpose of studying there, returning thereafter to the Philippines.The dissimilarities are: (1)Roa returned to the Islands after attaining the age of maturity, whereas TanBangco returned to this country when still a minor; and(2) the father of Roa was domiciled inthe Philippines until the year 1895 when hewent toChina and never returned, dying therein 1900, whereas, in the present case the record is silent on this point.The similarities are very close and the dissimilarities are in favor of Alejandro Tan Bangco. The Solicitor-General does not dispute the analogy and evidently yields to the proposition that if the doctrine in the Roa case, which has been followed in many subsequent cases, principally in Vano vs. Collectorof Customs (23 Phil., 480); United States vs. Ong Tianse(29Phil.,332); United States vs. Ansr (36 Phil., 858); United States vs. Urn Bin (36 Phil., 927); Go Julian vs. Government of the Philippines Islands (45 Phil., 290); Haw. vs.Collector of Customs,(59 Phil., 612), is to be adhered to, thenAlejandro Tan Bangco isa Filipino citizen, and consequently, the petitioner, who is his minor child, is also a Filipino. Itis urged upon us by the Solicitor-General that we reexamine and reverse the doctrine laid down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, because the law,we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by tfcis court in that case.A suggestion of this kind should be sympathetically received but for the fact that the principle of territoriality or jussoli adopted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, stipra, does not have to be set asideby this Court for the reason that that principle is no longer predominating inthis jurisdiction afterthe taking effect of the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary principle of jussanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar should be decided on anentirely different principle because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we are of the opinion that this cannot be done unlesswe give are troactive effect to the Constitution.We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the authority of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, for the following reasons:
Asalready observed, the present case is similar to Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, in that the facts determinative ofcitizenship inboth relate to events which hadtaken place beforetheadventof Americansovereignty. Wecannot reverse thedoctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, if to convert Roainto an alien, after our finalpronouncement in 1912 that he was a Filipino.If we depart from the rule there established notwithstanding thealmost-exact analogybetweenthetwo cases, nothingshortof legalanachronism would follow, andwe shouldavoidthis result. While weprofess no “idolatrousreverence for precedents”,(Philippine Trust Co.vs.Mitchel,59 Phil., 30), we should notoverlook the fact that the rule laid down in the Roa case had been adhered toandaccepted for more than 20 years before the adoption ofourConstitution; not only this Court but also inferior courts had consistently and invariably followed it; theexecutiveand administrative agencies of the Government had theretofore abided by it; andthe general public had acquiesced in it. Withal, our decisionsshould not be, as to a given period of time, upon the sameor similar factsand underthe same or similar circumstances, as fluctuating astoengender the phenomenon described by Mr.JusticeThompson, of the Supreme Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus.(Perkins v. Clements etals. 1 Pat. & H. (Va.)153.) When in Roa vs.Collector of Customs we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, VOLUME 69.523 that declaration was a statement of a general principle, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa individually but to all those who were in the same situation, that is to say, to all persons born in the Philippines before the ratification of thetreatyofpeace between theUnited States and Spain, of Chinesefatherand Filipino mother; residents of the Philippines at the time mentionedin the treaty of peace, although in theirminority; thereafter, goingto China for thepurpose of studying, and returning to the Philippines to live here.This was the rule at the time of the adoption of our Constitution.With it, the bench and the bar werefamiliar.The members of the Constitutional Conventionwere also aware of thisrule, andin abrogating the doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by making the jus sanguinis the predominatingprinciple in the determination of Philippine citizenship, they did not intend to exclude those who, in the situation of Tranquilino Roa,werecitizensof thePhilippines byjudicial declaration at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.This is apparent from the following excerpt of the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention when Article IV of the Constitution was discussed:
“Delegate Aruego.—Mr. President, may I just have one question?May I askMr. Roxas if, underthis proposition that youhave,all children born in the Philippines before the adoption of the Constitution was included? “DelegateRoxas.—No,sir: that istosay, ifthey are citizens in accordance withthepresent law, they willbe citizens. “DelegateAruego.—But as Isaid they are citizensby judicial decisions. “DelegateRoxas.— they are citizensnow by judicial decisions, they will becitizens. “DelegateAruego.—I should like to make it clear that wearevoting on the proposition so that it will includeall those born inthePhilippines, regardless of their parentage,because I have heard some objectionshere to the incorporation intoto of the doctrineofjussoli.There are many who do not want to include, as citizens, children of Chinese parents, but they are included inthe propositionwe are voting upon * * * “I should like to find out from the gentleman from Capiz if that proposition would make Filipino citizens of childrenof Chinese parents born last year or this year. “Delegate Roxas.—No, because by the laws of the Philippine Islands, they are not Filipino citizens now.” (Record of the Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, Session of November 26, 1934.)
In the caseof Commonwealth of the Philippines vs. Gloria Baldello, G. R. No. 45375, promulgated April 12, 1939, we heldthat a Filipinowoman,abandoned by her husbandwho was a native of Mexico but who was neither a Mexican nor American citizen, retained her Filipino citizenship, and inarriving at this conclusion, we said that, “our opinion findscorroboration in the ruleindicated in Roavs.Collector of Customs (23Phil., 315, 324-32-5), which is now a legal provision embodied in paragraph 7, Article I, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, to the effect that a Filipino woman does not lose her citizenship by marrying aforeigner belonging to a nation the lawsof which do not allow her to acquire the husband’snationality.” It should be noted that in this Baldello case we relied however indirectly onRoa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, andcited Commonwealth Act No. 63, which Act is but a partial expression of the modern tendency in theUnited States to accord distinctpersonalityto married woman by providing that the marriageof anAmerican woman to a foreigner does not operate loss ofAmerican citizenship.(Vide Act of Congressof September 22, 1922, 42 U. S. St-atr-L. p. 1022, ch. 411, sec. 3, 8U. S.C. A. sec. 9; Act of Congress of March,1931, 46 U. S. St.-at-L. p. 1511, ch. 442,sec. 4.)
In Yu Ching Po vs. Gallofin, R. G.No. 46795, promulgated onOctober 6, 1939,we held that a person born in the Philippines ofa Filipino-mestizofatherand amestiza Chinesemother,notwithstandingvagueness in point of paternity and maternity,because according to our decision, “no dicen si es hijo de padre filipinoy de madre china, 6 si la es de padre chino y de madre filipina”, is a Filipino citizen, for the reason that under Article 17, paragraph 1 of theCivil Code, which was in force in that year, he was a Spanish subject, which nationality he conserved. Our attention has been called to the case of Paz Chua vs.Secretary ofLabor,R. G.No. 46451,promulgated September 30, 1939, where we affirmed the decision of the Court ofFirstInstanceof Manila denying the writ of habeas corpus and holding that the applicants therein were not entitled toenter and reside in the Philippines on the basis of Philippine citizenship.Perusal ofour decision in that case will show that the factual and legal environment there was wholly different from that in the case at bar, as may be seen from the concluding paragraph of our decision in that case:
“Siendo Chua Uang de padres chinos y teniendo la misma nacionalidad que estos por ser entonces menor de edad, es indudable que cuando fue a China a la edad de 13 anos, que debid haber sidoen 1927,ella continuaba siendo ciudadanaChina(Articulo 2,parrafo2, Capitulo II, de las Revised Nationality Laws of China, editada por FlournoyHudson,publicada por Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace, citada enlapagina 9 del alegato del Procurador General). Cuandocontra jo matrimonio cuatro anosdespuesconYao Tian,otrociudadano de la Republica de China, ella, en el supuesto de que tenia nacionalidad distinta, siguio la de su esposo, a tenor del parrafo 1 de la citada compilation de leyes de China. Chua Uang nopuedeinvocarlanacionalidad filipinapor solo hecho de habernacido en el paisporque no le alcanzanlas disposiciones del articulo 2 de la Ley Jones, Ley del Congreso de los Estados Unidos del29de agosto de 1916, porque no era subdita espanola el 11 de abril de 1899.”
We have not failed to reflect on the far-reaching consequences of our decisioninthis case, but considering the fact that the mother of Alejandro Tan Bangco, who is the father of the hereinapplicant, is aFilipina, and, under our Constitution, Alejandro Tan Bangco wouldhave the option, upon reaching majority, to adopt Filipino citizenship (par. 4, sec. 1, Art. IV, Constitution) ;considering the benignpolicy of giving greater politicalrecognition to women, to the extent that in the United States marriage of an American woman to aforeigner doesnotoperate loss of her citizenship; and in view of Commonwealth Act No. 63, which is indicativeof thispoliticalrecognition, however partial, accorded to Filipino women;considering, further, the limited number of people who would be benefited by the application of the doctrineas qualified in Roa vs. Collector of Customs; and the reasonatthe bottom of Commonwealth vs. Gloria Baldello,and Yu Ching Po vs. Jose Gallofin, supra, we are of the opinionand sohold that the applicant, being a minor child of AlejandroTan Bangco who was a Filipino citizen at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, is a Filipino citizen. The judgment of the Court of Appeals isaffirmed, without pronouncement regarding costs.So ordered. Avanceña, C.J., Diaz, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.