[ G. R. No. 45291. March 30, 1937 ] 64 Phil. 301
[ G. R. No. 45291. March 30, 1937 ]
ANTONIA ZAFRA DE ALVIAR AND PAULINO ALVIAR, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OP FIRST INSTANCE OF LA UNION, PRESIDED OVER BY JOSE R. CARLOS, AND CHUA LIN AND KEH IT, KNOWN BY THE FIRM NAME OF PHILIPPINE LUMBER COMPANY, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
IMPERIAL, J.:
In this petition for certiorari, the petitioners seek to set aside the judgment ‘‘rendered, against them by the Court of First Instance of La Union.in civil case No. 1762, and the writ ordering, the execution thereof. Upon petition of the petitioners, who had filed the necessary bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued directing the respondent judge to refrain from ordering: the execution of the judgment in question until further orders.
In the said ease, Attorney Francisco I. Ortega appeared for the petitioners and Eduardo. Zafra Amor, as defendants, the latter being the debtor and principal obligor. The action was brought against the, petitioner Antonia Zafra de Alviar as surety and mortgagor, and her husband Paulno Alviar was joined as matter of form. When the case was called for trial in courti, the then, plaintiffs, now respondents, and the principal debtor, assisted by their respective attorneys, agreed to make a compromise and in fact executed the so-called document, whereby the principal debtor and the petitioners admitted a debt in the amount of P1,250 in favor pi the plaintiffs-respondents. They mutually agreed to ask the court to render judgment for the sum in question, which shall not be executed until after the lapse of one year from July 29, 1935, the date of the compromise. On said date the court rendered judgment in accordance with the terms of the compromise. This document was subscribed by the plaintiffs-respondents, the. principal debtor and “their respective attorneys. The signature of the principal obligor appears at the bottom thereof in the following manner: “Eduardo Zafra Amor, Antonia Zafrade Alviar, Paulino Alviar, by: (Sgd.) Eduardo Zafra Amor.” In fact the petitioners did not sign the document. Under the signature of Attorney Ortega, the following inscription appears: “Attorney for the defendants. San Fernando, La Union.” On July 28, 1936, the plaintiffs-respondents requested the clerk of court to issue a writ of execution of the judgment and it was only then that the petitioners were informed for the first time of the existence of a judgment against them. They opposed the execution applied for and asked for the annulment of said judgment. They supported their petition by their affidavit stating that they had not subscribed the compromise, that they had not authorized the principal debtor to sign it in their name, and that they had no knowledge of the existence thereof nor of the trial of the case, having been absent therefrom. They likewise supported it by the affidavit of Attorney Ortega wherein the latter stated under oath that the compromise was made only by the plaintiffs-respondents and the principal debtor, that he was not authorized by the petitioners to compromise the case or to sign the compromise for them, and that in reality he signed the document merely as a witness. In spite of all this, the court, on August 17, 1936, overruled the opposition and denied the petition of the petitioners and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment, upon the opinion that the judgment could not be annulled without evidence and that the evidence could not be taken in the incident so raised, but in another proceeding. The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order and upon denial thereof, they excepted and instituted this proceeding. Before going further, it is advisable to state that in this proceeding the petitioners presented their affidavit and that of Attorney Ortega in support of the allegations contained in their petition also under oath. The respondents have presented no similar prima facie evidence to counteract them.
In view of the facts briefly stated above, this court does not hesitate to hold that the judgment in question is null and void ab initio. It is not binding upon and cannot be executed against the petitioners. It is evident that the compromise upon which the judgment was based was not subscribed by them (Exhibit D of the petitioners; Exhibit 1 of the plaintiffs-respondents; Exhibits G-l, H and K). Neither could Attorney Ortega bind them validly in the compromise because he had no special authority and because, as stated by him in his affidavit, Exhibit H, he really was not authorized to that effect (section 27, Code of Civil Procedure; Sons of I. de la Rama vs. Estate of Benedicto, 5 Phil., 512; Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil., 613; Tan Lua vs. O’Brien, 55 Phil., 53; Rodriguez vs. Santos, 55 Phil., 72i; Monte de Piedad vs. Fernando Rodrigo and De Yupangco, 56 Phil., 310). A judgment for a sum of money rendered by a competent court, based upon a compromise agreement in writing, is conclusive and is legally binding only upon the parties to the suit who have subscribed it by themselves or by special attorney (section 306, subsection 2, Code of Civil Procedure; articles 1280, subsection 5, and 1713, subsection 2, of the Civil Code; Balatbat vs. Tanjutco, 2 Phil., 182; Palanca Tanguinlay vs. Quiros, 10 Phil., 360; Manila Railroad Co. vs. Arzadon, 20 Phil., 452; Andres vs. Pimentel, 21 Phil., 429; Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; Compania General de Tabacos vs. Sheriff of Occidental Negros, 27 Phil, 41; Solano vs. Salvilla, 29 Phil., 66; Isaac vs. Padilla, 31 Phil., 469; Rubiso vs. Rivera, 41 Phil., 39).
It cannot be assumed that the petitioners were present when the case was called for hearing and that they actually took part in the compromise merely because it is stated in the judgment that the parties were present when the compromise was submitted, for the following reasons: First, because it clearly appears from the petition under oath and the affidavits in support thereof that they were not really present and, second, because it irrefutably appears from the compromise that they neither took part therein nor signed the document executed to that effect. Inasmuch as the judgment is based upon the compromise and the compromise incorporated into the judgment, this court must base its conclusions upon the real contents of the compromise. It should not be understood, however, that the statement of facts contained in the judgment is ignored. In this case, it is the duty of this court to reconcile and complete the facts in order to do justice to all the parties.
As the judgment in question is null and void ab initio, it is evident that the court acquired no jurisdiction to render it, much less to order the execution thereof. Consequently, certiorari lies in favor of the petitioners as it is clear that against said judgment there is no longer any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (section 217, Code of Civil Procedure; Springer vs. Odlin, 3 Phil., 344; Gala vs. Cui and Rodriguez, 25 Phil, 522; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Judge of First Instance of Iloilo and Bantillo, 34 Phil., 157).
Inasmuch as the judgment in question is null and void ab initio, the petitioners were entitled to impugn it when the execution thereof was sought and it was the duty of the court to hear the evidence tending to disclose and determine its validity. A judgment, which is null and void ab initio, rendered by a court without jurisdiction to do so, is without legal efficacy and may properly be impugned in any proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced (Rich vs. Mentz, 134 U. S., 632; Kansas City, etc., R. Co, vs. Morgan, 76 Fed., 429; Hatch vs. Ferguson, 68 Fed., 43; Oswald vs. Kampmann, 28 Fed., 36; Carter vs. Atkinson, 77 S. E., 370; Hawk vs. Day, 126 N. W., 955; In re Phillips, 122 N. W., 554; Condit vs. Condit, 168 Pac, 456; Puckett vs. Wynns, 178 S, W., 1184; Alexander vs. Montpelier, 71 A., 720; Ferrell-Michael Abstract, etc., Co. vs. McCormac, 184 S. W., 1081).
For the foregoing reasons, the remedy prayed for is granted the decision of July 29, 1935, and the order of August 17, 1936, in question are declared null and void and are set aside in so far as they affect the petitioners, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued becomes final, with costs to the plaintiffs-respondents Chua Lin and Keh It. So ordered.
Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.