[ G. R. No. 42633. March 23, 1937 ] 64 Phil. 245
[ G. R. No. 42633. March 23, 1937 ]
ALFREDO A. SANSON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VALENTIN DIGNADICE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
AVANCENA, C.J.:
The appealed judgment declares the plaintiff Alfredo A. Sanson absolute owner of the land described in the complaint, entitled to one-third of the palay produced thereon and deposited in the hands of the provincial sheriff of Iloilo, and orders the defendant Valentin Dignadice to deliver the possession of said land to the, plaintiff.
On March 20, 1923, the defendant sold the land in question to Leonardo Soriano for the sum of P7,200 with pacto de retro for a period of ten years (Exhibit 2). It was also stipulated in the deed of sale that said land would be leased by the defendant, who agreed to pay one hundred cavans of palay annually as rent therefor. Leonardo Soriano died on July 20, 1927, and his intestate proceedings having been instituted, the land was adjudicated to his widow Joaquina Ganzon, in accordance with the partition made to that effect in June, 1929.
Shortly afterwards, the defendant applied for the registration of various parcels of land, including the one now under consideration, designated as lots Nos. 1 to 9. Joaquina Ganzon opposed the application as to said lots, alleging that they belonged to her, having been adjudicated to her in the intestate proceedings of her husband Leonardo Soriano, In said registration proceedings, the defendant confirmed the sale of said lots to Soriano, as well as the fact that he later leased them, agreeing to pay rent therefor. In the decision rendered in said case, the court stated: “It appears that parcels Nos. 1 to 9 have been sold with pacto de retro for the sum of P7,200 to Joaquina Ganzon Viuda de Soriano, as successor in interest of the deceased Leonardo Soriano, subject to a right of repurchase expiring on March 20, 1933, said parcels being in the possession of the applicant, as lessee, in consideration of an annual rent of one hundred provincial cavans of palay.” The dispositive part of said decision reads:
“Wherefore, parcels or lots Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, which are the subject matter of the application, together with all the improvements thereon, are ordered adjudicated and registered in favor of Valentin Dignadice, widower, of age, resident of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands; it being understood that this adjudication is subject to the right of repurchase in favor of Joaquina Ganzon Viuda de Soriano for the sum of seven thousand two hundred pesos (P7,200) expiring on March 20, 1933/’ Pursuant to the terms of this decision, the certificate of title was issued in favor of the defendant with said right of repurchase annotated thereon.
As the period for repurchase had expired on March 20, 1933, without the vendor’s having exercised said right, the certificate of title issued in favor of the defendant was cancelled and another issued in favor of Joaquina Ganzon.
On March 24, 1933, Joaquina Ganzon sold the land to Concepcion Araneta. The latter, in turn, sold it to Alfredo Sanson, the herein plaintiff, who, by virtue of said sale, instituted the present action for recovery of possession against the defendant.
The defendant’s entire defense in this instance is based upon the ground that the contract entered into between him and Leonardo Soriano relative to the land in question, was not a sale with pacto de retro but a mere loan. However, as this same question had been raised in the above-cited registration case and the decision rendered therein has already become final, the entire question is reduced to what was the decision rendered in this respect. Examining the decision rendered in said case, it clearly appears that it was held by the court that the contract entered into between Leonardo Soriano and the defendant was a sale with pacto de retro. The terms of said decision are clear and unequivocal in this sense. The fact that the court used the word gravamen in stating that the purpose of Joaquina Ganzon’s opposition was merely to have a lien on the property recorded in her favor, does not affect the clear sense of the decision, inasmuch as this lien, in the opinion of the court, evidently consists in the contract of sale with pacto de retro entered into between Leonardo Soriano and the defendant. Furthermore, the word gravamen in its broad sense includes pacto de retro in so far as it is a limitation of ownership of the property affecting the vendor as well as the purchaser.
While the clearness of the language used in the dispositive part of the decision ordering the adjudication and registration of the land in favor of the defendant leaves much to be desired, there is no doubt that said adjudication and registration refer only to the remaining right of the defendant after the sale and during the period of the right of repurchase, because the law (section 19 [e], of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 2164), which permits the vendor under pacto de retro to apply for the registration of the real property sold, requires as condition the annotation of the sale for the purposes thereof.
Therefore, if the finding of the court in the registration case that the contract entered into between Leonardo Soriano and the defendant was a sale with pacto de retro and not a loan constitutes res judicata, this question cannot again be raised now.
The fact that after the decision! in the above-cited registration case had been rendered, Joaquina Ganzon, who was not the one who had entered into the contract of sale with pacto de retro, wrote letters wherein she called the defendant’s obligation to refund the purchase price a debt, cannot affect the sense given by the court to its decision. Furthermore, it cannot be alleged that what Joaquina Ganzon meant by debt in said letters is an obligation arising from a loan, because she clearly stated in one of them that the contract between the defendant and her deceased husband was a sale with pacto de retro. This conclusion arrived at by this court disposes of all the other alleged errors assigned in this case.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs to the appellant. So ordered.
Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Laurel, JJ., concur.