[ Per. Rec. No. 714-A. July 26, 1937 ] 64 Phil. 483
[ Per. Rec. No. 714-A. July 26, 1937 ]
MARIA BERMUDEZ, COMPLAINANT, VS. LEODEGARIO D. CASTILLO, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
DIAZ, J,:
In the course of the investigation which was being conducted by the office of the Solicitor-General against the respondent, in connection with this administrative case, said respondent filed, in addition to other evidence in support of his defense, the six letters which, for purposes of identification, were marked as Exhibits 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37. He then contended, as he now continues to contend, that said six letters are the complainant’s, but the latter denied it while she was testifying as a witness in rebuttal. She admitted, however, that the letters marked as Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were in her own handwriting.
As the respondent believed that the three letters admitted by the complainant to be hers were insufficient for purposes of comparison with those questioned in this case and as he was determined to show that said Exhibits 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37, as well as Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 were the complainant’s, he required her to copy them in her own handwriting in the presence of the investigator. The complainant, upon advice of her attorney, refused to submit to the trial to which it was desired to subject her, invoking her right not to incriminate herself and alleging that Exhibits 38, 39 and 40 and the other letters already in the respondent’s possession, were more than sufficient for what he proposed to do. The investigator, upholding the complainant, did not compel her to submit to the trial required, thereby denying the respondent’s petition. As the respondent did not agree to this decision of the investigator, he instituted these proceedings praying that the investigator and the Solicitor-General in whose representation he acted, be ordered to require and compel the complainant to furnish new specimens of her handwriting by copying said Exhibits 32 to 37 for that purpose.
The question raised before this court is not new. In the case of Beltran vs. Samson and Jose ([1929], 53 Phil., 570), a similar question was raised before this court. The respondents therein desired to compel the petitioner to write by hand what was then dictated to him. The petitioner, invoking the constitutional provision contained in section 3, paragraph 3, of the Jones Law which reads: “* * * nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, refused to write and instituted prohibition proceedings against the therein respondents. This court granted the petition and ordered the respondents to desist and abstain absolutely from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation by hand for the purpose of comparing his handwriting. The reasons then adduced therein can and must be adduced in this case to decide the same question ; and all the more so because Article III, section 1, No. 18, of the Constitution of the Philippines is worded in such a way that the protection referred to therein extends to all cases, be they criminal, civil or administrative. The Constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It should be noted that before it was attempted to require the complainant to copy the six documents above-stated, she had sworn to tell the truth before the investigator authorized to receive statements under oath, and under said oath she asserted that the documents in question had not been written by her. Were she compelled to write and were it proven by means of what she might write later that said documents had really been written by her, it would be impossible for her to evade prosecution for perjury, inasmuch as it would be warranted by article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
“The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
“Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer the respective penalties provided therein.”
The respondent invokes in his support the doctrine laid down in Ex Parte Crow (14 Pac. [2d series], 918), to the effect that “* * * a witness may not arbitrarily refuse to answer a question on the ground that his answer might incriminate him when the court can determine as a matter of law that ’no direct answer which the witness may make can tend to criminate him.’ " It must be taken into account that the question asked the petitioner in said case, as stated by the prosecuting attorney, was only a preliminary question, as it was simply attempted to learn from her who was with her on a certain occasion, and on what date, to the best of her recollection, had she visited Dr. Grosse. She refused to answer said questions alleging that her answers might incriminate her. The court upheld her saying:
“We are therefore of the opinion that the trial court erred when it determined as a matter of law that petitioner’s answers to the questions propounded could have no tendency to incriminate her. They clearly might have such tendency, and it was petitioner’s right and privilege to decline to answer any of the above-mentioned questions upon the ground stated. We fully realize the difficulty encountered in the prosecution of cases under section 274 of the Penal Code when those present and capable of establishing the facts are unwilling to testify because of fear of subjecting themselves to prosecution. But the constitutional and statutory guaranties accorded to petitioner cannot be swept aside merely because they may result in making difficult, or even impossible, the conviction of the accused.”
The respondent likewise invokes in his support the doctrine laid down in in re Mackenzie (100 Vt. Rep., 325). This court is of the opinion that what had been said in the above-cited case is not applicable to the case under consideration. The petitioner Mackenzie, upon being required after he had pleaded guilty of intoxication to disclose the person or persons who had furnished him the liquor, said that they were strangers to him, whom he met late in the evening in Barre. The court, considering his alleged disclosure unsafisfactory, ordered him committed to jail until he should tell the truth or until further orders. He instituted habeas corpus proceedings in his favor alleging in his pleading that as he had already made a truthful disclosure, the result of his commitment would be to compel him to deny his former statements and make others which would make him guilty of perjury. The court, deciding the question, said:
“The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. * * * But the privilege is an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on the stand, and a self-criminating act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may be asked, and then it is for the witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege, for it cannot be known beforehand what he will do.”
It further states that “the proper place in which to claim the privilege is in the trial court, when the question is propounded, not here.” This is exactly the case of the herein complainant. She opportunely invoked the privilege when it was desired to subject her to trial by copying the six letters in question, which Mackenzie failed to do.
It is true that in said case of Mackenzie, it was likewise stated that “No reason appears why the examination on disclosure should not be subject to the ordinary rules of cross-examination. The person making the disclosure is in the position of a witness called by the State, and is subject to the rule permitting the impeachment of such a witness. It is no invasion of the constitutional guaranty against self-crimination to compel the witness to answer questions relating to the truthfulness of his previous testimony.” This court, however, is of the opinion that the foregoing is not applicable to the case of the herein complainant, firstly, because she has made no disclosure; she confined herself to denying that the letters in question were hers when the respondent, appearing in court with them, said, rather than insinuated, that they were hers, presenting, in support of his statement, other letters which, by reason of the handwriting, were to all appearances similar thereto; and, secondly, because her testimony, denying that she was the author of the letters in question, may be attacked by means of other evidence in the possession of the respondent, which is not precisely that coming from the complainant herself.
The reason for the privilege appears evident. The purpose thereof is positively to avoid and prohibit thereby the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to do so legally, or he should be asked, once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without any condition. This court is of the opinion that in order that the constitutional provision under consideration may prove to be a real protection and not a dead letter, it must be given a liberal and broad interpretation favorable to the person invoking it.
In view of the foregoing considerations and holding, as it is hereby held, that the complainant is perfectly entitled to the privilege invoked by her, the respondent’s petition is denied. So ordered.
Avancena, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.