[ G. R. No. 45237. October 28, 1936 ] 63 Phil. 644
[ G. R. No. 45237. October 28, 1936 ]
MARIANO MOLO, PETITIONER, VS. A. L. YATCO, COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANGEL S. GAMBOA AND JOSE V. CABRERA, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by Mariano Molo against A. L. Yatco, Collector of Internal Revenue, Angel S. Gamboa and Jose V. Cabrera, praying, for the reasons alleged therein, for the issuance of a writ addressed to the above-named respondents ordering them to return and deliver the documents stated in the petition to the herein petitioner immediately, as well as any other orders which the court may deem just and equitable. The pertinent facts necessary for the resolution of the legal question raised in this petition are as follows:
By virtue of a search warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal for an alleged violation of the Usury Law, the special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, Jose V. Cabrera, on June 15, 1935, seized a trunk containing various documents, note books, lists, contracts and other papers belonging to the petitioner Mariano Molo, issuing the corresponding receipt in favor of the latter (Exhibit A). After the necessary investigation, said board, not having found sufficient evidence to warrant the prosecution of said petitioner, dismissed the case. On November 16, 1935, the petitioner Mariano Molo wrote a letter to said board requesting the return of the documents seized by it, but, it having been discovered during the examination of the documents in question that the petitioner was engaged in the money lending business without the necessary privilege tax receipts required by sections 1453 and 1464 (x) of the Administrative Code, notice thereof was sent to the Collector of Internal Revenue who assigned one of his agents to examine the documents and papers in question. It was found during the examination that the petitioner had engaged in the money lending business in the years 1929, 1931, 1932 and 1934, without being provided with the necessary privilege tax receipts. In view of this the Collector of Internal Revenue imposed upon said petitioner a privilege tax in the sum of P350 corresponding to the first quarter of the year 1931, the first, second, third and last quarters of the year 1932, and the third quarter of the year 1934, which sum was paid under protest by the petitioner. In as much as the act committed by the petitioner constitutes, in the opinion of the Collector of Internal Revenue, a violation of section 2722, in connection with sections 1453 and 1464 (x) of the Administrative Code, which makes him amenable to criminal action, said Collector of Internal Revenue, availing himself of the authority conferred upon him by section 1582 of the Administrative Code, offered the petitioner the privilege of settling the case extra-judicially by payment of P10. As the petitioner had refused to make a compromise, said collector, in the exercise of the authority granted him by section 1434 of the Administrative Code, in connection with the Bookkeeping Law, Act No. 3292, and section 12 of Rules No. 58 of the Department of Finance, asked the chairman of the Anti-Usury Board to retain possession of the documents and papers seized by his office from the petitioner until the latter’s case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue is finally settled. In view of the above-stated facts the question arises whether or not the writ of mandamus herein applied for should be issued. Section 515, in connection with section 222, of the Code of Civil Procedure, authorizes this court to “render a judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant, commanding him, immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff who has been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of said rights.”
According to section 95 of General Orders, No. 58, “a search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court,” and the last part of the form of the search warrant prescribed in section 99 of said General Orders, No. 58 reads: “you are, therefore, commanded * * * to bring it forthwith before me * * * It is clear that, under the above-cited sections of General Orders, No. 58, the officer charged with the execution of a search warrant must make a return thereof to the court or judge who, issued it, delivering to said court the personal property seized under the warrant in question. It appears from the present case that the documents and other papers belonging to the petitioner Mariano Molo, which were seized by a special agent of the Anti-Usury Board by virtue of a warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, came into the possession of said board, and while it does not appear how said board came to have them in its possession, it is presumed that it was by virtue of an authority given by said court (sec. 334, No. 31, Act No. 190). By virtue of said authority the board became an agent of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the custody of the documents in question, with the obligation to return them to said court upon the termination of the investigation for which the board needed them. As the Anti-Usury Board had found no sufficient evidence to warrant a criminal action against the petitioner for violation of the Usury Law, and as said board had dismissed the case under investigation, it was duty bound to return said documents and papers to the Court of First Instance of Rizal so that the latter might order the return thereof to their owner. Although the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized by section 1434 of the Administrative Code to make seizures for the violation of any penal law or regulation administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, inasmuch as the documents and papers in question are in the custody of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, through its agent the Anti-Usury Board; said Collector of Internal Revenue could not seize said documents and papers without authority of said court because it would amount to an undue interference by an administrative official in the affairs of a judicial official. Neither could the Anti-Usury Board keep said documents for itself because, being a mere agent of said court, it was not authorized by its principal to dispose of them. Therefore, while the retention of the documents in question by the Anti-Usury Board, upon petition of the Collector of Internal Revenue, is illegal, it not being authorized by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in whose legal custody the documents in question are, neither the Collector of Internal Revenue nor the Anti-Usuary Board can be ordered to return said documents to the petitioner on the ground that the one having the legal custody thereof is the Court of First Instance of Rizal which had ordered their seizure and which is the only one authorized by law to return them to their owner. Wherefore, without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to ask the Court of First Instance of Rizal for the return of the documents in question, the petition for a writ of mandamus is denied and it is dismissed, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered. Avanceila, C. J., and Diaz, J., concur.