[ G. R. No. 44896. July 31, 1936 ] 63 Phil. 249
[ G. R. No. 44896. July 31, 1936 ]
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL V. MORAN, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed against him. In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines. This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 DalL, 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton’s International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one of jurisdiction. 1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the Government of the Common- wealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to that great instrument, and derives all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.” In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision. 2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but merely provides that “the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.” It then goes on to provide that the original jurisdiction of this court “shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.” In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive. The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads as follows: “The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law.” Jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also con- ferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, sees. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive. The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Supreme Court shall have “original jurisdiction” in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional provision the Supreme Court of the United States held that the “original jurisdiction” thus conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not an exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bdrs vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.) 3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which; a penalty of more than six months’ imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution, until amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusive by any law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend, alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. v8. Insular Collector of Customs, U. S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.) We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the petitioner, and that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Vlla-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.