[ G. R. No. 44447. July 31, 1936 ] 63 Phil. 231
[ G. R. No. 44447. July 31, 1936 ]
APOLINAR VELEZ, PETITIONER, VS. FELIX MARTINEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST, INSTANCE OF ORIENTAL MISAMIS, AND RAMON CHACON, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
DIAZ, J.:
This is a petition filed to seek the annulment not only of a certain order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental Misamis issued by the respondent judge in civil case No. 4282, on June 29, 1935 (Exhibit D), but also the effects thereof and the proceedings had for its enforcement. The petition is based upon the allegation that the respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction and abused his discretion in issuing said order, because the person against whom he rendered it was an entire stranger to the case, having had no interest therein except as judicial administrator of a estate. The order in question directed the issuance of an-alias writ for the execution of the judgment of February 15, 1935 (Exhibit B), rendered in said civil case No. 4282, after the return of the original writ issued on March 18, 1935 (Exhibit 1),“which had been only partially carried out. The alias writ of execution was issued on July 5, 1935 (Exhibit 7), and was carried out in accordance with its terms, attaching and selling at public auction, on August 29, 1935, with the petitioner’s opposition, a house and lot belonging exclusively to him. Filomeno Neri having been the highest bidder, took possession of said properties, paying therefor the sum of P4,100 (Exhibit 10-Chacon). From this amount, the sum of P1,326.54, for the collection of which said alias writ of execution had been issued, was paid to Ramon Chacon and on August 31, 1935, the sum of P474 was paid with the petitioner’s consent to his mortgage creditor Gotiaco Hermanos, leaving in the hands of the sheriff a balance of P2,299.46 less the execution fees which said officer is supposed to have already collected and the interest at 6 per cent per annum from March 30, 1930, to August 29, 1935, the date of the execution, to which the respondent Ramon Chacon was entitled under the judgment rendered in his favor and which is supposed to have been paid to him at the same time as said sum of P1,326.54. Case No. 4282 of Oriental Misamis was between Ramon Chacon, as plaintiff and Apolinar Velez as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ramona Rasines. The judgment rendered therein literally reads as follows:
“In view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered that the herein defendant give to the herein plaintiff Ramon Chacon the possession of the land described in the complaint heading this case and to turn over, furthermore, to the said plaintiff the amount of P1,326.54 with interest at 6 per cent per annum from March 30, 1930, until fully paid; without costs. It is so ordered.”
Relying on the terms of the judgment, the respondent judge and the other respondent named Ramon Chacon contend that the payment of the sum of P1,326.54 was the petitioner’s personal obligation; that if such had not been the purpose of the judgment it would have expressly stated that it was the petitioner’s obligation as administrator, or at least that the sum in question was to be paid by the estate of which he was administrator. Such contention seems to us untenable because the judgment authorizing the issuance of a valid writ of execution must not be read separately but in connection with the other portions of the decision of which it forms part. If the judgment expressly says that it is against the defendant it must be understood that it was he upon whom summons was served, who defended himself as such at the trial, and who, had said judgment been favorable, would personally receive the benefit, and no one else. The judgment in question formed part of a decision the title of which clearly states that the defendant is “Apolinar Velez as administrator of the testate estate of the deceased Dra. Ramona Rasines.” It appears from the very complaint which gave rise to civil case No. 4282 (Exhibit A) and from all the pleadings presented therein by the petitioner, as evidenced by the data of record, that his intervention therein was only that of a mere administrator. A complaint was filed against him expressly as such by the petitioner Ramon Chacon; and it appears from the title of the alias writ of execution (Exhibit 7) that he had theretofore been considered in said capacity; all of which shows that as he neither brought the suit nor caused the institution thereof because he harbored the desire to appropriate the land for himself, he was not personally, that is as Apolinar Velez, an interested party in said case. Consequently, inasmuch as the alias writ of execution (Exhibit 7), as well as the order of June 29, 1935 (Exhibit D or 6), under which the former was issued, was not based on the judgment rendered in civil case No. 4282, it could not and cannot prejudice the petitioner personally because he was not a party to the case and he could not for precisely the same reason be prejudiced by the judgment in question in the same manner that he could not have been benefited thereby. A writ of execution not warranted by the decision or judgment which gives it life or cause to exist has no validity (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Green, 48 Phil., 284; Silvestre vs. Torres and Oben, 57 Phil., 885). To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property, as in this case, without due process of law. This due process requires that in order that a writ and an order of the nature of those under consideration herein be issued against the petitioner, he should have been joined personally as party in case No. 4282. The respondents granting that the petitioner believed in good faith that the judgment was against the estate of which he was the administrator and not against him personally, they contend, however, that he should have made efforts to pay the amount of said judgment with the funds and property of the estate in his charge, and not having done so he became personally liable for said payment. In support of their contention they invoke sections 742 and 678 of Act No. 190 which read:
“When an order is made for the distribution of assets among the creditors the executor or administrator, after the time of payment arrives, shall be personally liable to the creditors for their debts, or the dividend thereon, as for his own debt; he shall also be liable on his bond.” (Section 742.) “When an administrator neglects, or unreasonably delays, to raise money, by collecting the debts or selling the real or personal estate of the deceased, or neglects to pay over the money he has in his hands, and the value of the estate is thereby lessened or necessary cost or interest accrues, or the persons interested suffer loss, the same shall be deemed waste, and the damage sustained may be charged and allowed against him in his account, and he shall be liable therefor on his bond.” (Section 678.)
The two sections above-cited are not applicable to the case under consideration because the action brought against the petitioner in case No. 4282 was only for the recovery of the land described in the complaint and the exclusion thereof from the inventory of the properties of the estate of which he was the administrator, not to demand responsibility of him for violation of the provisions of said two sections. The court which rendered the judgment of February 15, 1935 (Exhibit B), acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner or the subject matter of the litigation except as administrator of the estate oi the deceased Ramona Rasines and only for the purpose of determining whether, as such, he was obliged to return the land in question to the plaintiff therein and, furthermore, to pay him the fruits thereof. It acquired no jurisdiction to issue the order authorizing the alias writ of execution. in question by virtue of which the petitioner’s own properties were attached to be sold, as they were in fact sold, at public auction to pay the value of said fruits, because he was an entire stranger to the case and no action was ever brought against him for violation of the above-mentioned sections. On the other hand, no law has been cited in support of respondents’ contention that a judgment against an administrator must be satisfied personally by the latter if it is not expressly stated therein that it must be satisfied by the estate of which he is the administrator. On the contrary, there is section 676 of Act No. l£0 from which it may be inferred that the administrator of a testate or in- testate estate is not personally liable for the debts of the estate. Said section reads: “No executor or administrator shall be accountable for the debts due the deceased if it appears that they remain uncollected without his fault.” (Section 676.) According to the record the petitioner made it appear that the respondent Ramon Chacon could not be paid the sum of P1,326.54 without his fault because, as the respondent judge himself knew from the documents of record, the funds of the estate in his charge had been exhausted. It is true that the cases of Thompson & Lively vs. Mann (44 S. E., 246 [April 28, 1903]); Hanson vs. Blake (60 S. E., 589 [February 18, 1908]); and Hall vs. McGregor (64 S. E., 736 [February 2, 1909]), among others, have been cited as of persuasive value. We find, however, that they are not analogous to the one under consideration. In Thompson & Lively vs. Mann, the court that had cognizance thereof had to hold that “a judgment against T. G. Mann, administrator of Sherman Clarkson, deceased’, as shown in the caption—it not appearing that the recovery as to be levied of goods and chattels of Clarkson in the hands of Mann to be administered—is not a judgment against Mann”, because, as stated in the decision itself, only an extract of the decision rendered against Mann was presented and said extract simply read: “Thompson & Lively vs. T. G. Mann, Administrator of Sherman Clark, deceased. (As a caption) Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant for $250, and $67.10 costs.” In said case the court said: “If the full judgment were be- fore us, we might see that it was to be levied of the goods of the deceased in the hands of his administrator, but it is not before us.” It means nothing else than that said court was also of the opinion that the dispositive part of a decision or order must be interpreted in connection with the whole text thereof, not independently. This is exactly our opinion. In Hanson vs. Blake, the plaintiff Hanson brought an action against Blake as administrator of Charles Lomadew for the recovery of what the latter, in life, owed him for “board, house rent, fuel, and light furnished to Charles Lomadew, and for waiting on him as nurse during his last illness.” Judgment was rendered against the defendant stating simply: “Plaintiff do recover of and from the defendant the sum of,” etc. It was not stated that the amount of the judgment was to be paid with funds or property of the defendant as administrator. The defendant Blake appealed because it was insisted that the judgment was directed against him personally, not as administrator. Deciding the appeal the court said: “Whether such words as follow the name of defendant are to be deemed descriptive of his person or of the character and capacity in which he is sued is to be determined by the allegations of the declaration.” In the body of the decision rendered in case No. 4282 appears the court’s statement or conclusion of fact that the therein defendant and herein petitioner took possession of the land in question because it was included in the inventory of the properties of the estate of which he was administrator, which is equivalent to saying that had not his duty forced him he would not have taken possession of said land; in other words, he acted for the benefit of the estate. In Hall vs. McGregor, the defendant, who was then administratrix of the estate of David McGregor, engaged the services of the plaintiff attorney to act as such for said estate. The defendant not having paid the plaintiff’s services after the latter had rendered them, Hall brought an action against her as administratrix and obtained judgment against her for the sum of $300. A writ of execution was issued against the estate but nothing could be collected because no property could be found on which to levy the judgment. The plaintiff then brought an action to recover his judgment credit from certain lands of the deceased David McGregor which had been adjudicated to the defendant, and the court held that the original judgment was valid as against the defendant herself, stating that the phrase “executrix of the last will and testament of David McGregor, deceased” by which she was therein designated were merely descriptive of her person. In so doing it stated as follows:
“This is true, not only because of the form of the judgment and the statement of the account filed before the justice upon which it is based, but it is forcibly true by reason of the very substance of the cause of action. A personal representative is individually liable for compensation to an attorney for services, rendered at the instance of such representative, on behalf of the estate. The representative has recourse for reimbursement for reasonable expenditures in such behalf, in his settlement with the estate.”
The same rule exists in this jurisdiction (Escueta vs. Sy-Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405; and Piliin vs. Jocson and Agoncillo, 41 Phil., 26); and it is apparent that there is no analogy between the question settled in said case of Hall vs. McGregor and the one under consideration. The respondents likewise contend that inasmuch as the petitioner had failed to appeal from the order in question, having been able to do so, the remedy of certiorari invoked by him does not now lie. This contention is without merit as the petitioner, not having been personally a party to case No. 4282, had no cause to appeal from the order in question. Neither could he have done so for the simple reason that only those who are parties to a case may appeal therein. Furthermore, the respondent judge acquired no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner nor over the subject matter which he tried to decide by means of his said order. On the other hand, the then proper remedy was not an appeal but certiorari inasmuch as the purpose of this latter remedy is to correct acts in excess of jurisdiction, or manifest abuse of discretion of an inferior tribunal. The respondent judge, in issuing the order in question, undoubtedly acted in excess of his authority by sentencing somebody against whom he should not and could not render judgment on the ground that said person had not been a party to the case. The respondent Ramon Chacon finally contends that inasmuch as the order and the alias writ of execution in question have already been complied with, the remedy of certiorari does not lie because according to him both of them have already served their purpose and are functus oficio. We are of the opinion that the rule of functus oficio is not applicable to this case because, while it is true that the order and the alias writ of execution in question have already been complied with, the latter at least partly, it is no less true that they never had validity, not having been the result of a lawful exercise of a judicial or ministerial function. The case of Gutierrez vs. Court of First Instance of Romblon (58 Phil., 575); and that of Bataclan vs. Court of First Instance of Cavite and Santo Domingo (61 Phil., 428), invoked by the respondent Chacon have no bearing on the decision of this case because in the latter case an appeal was perfectly possible and it was the adequate remedy but the therein petitioner, however, failed to appeal; and in the former case, the court had jurisdiction to issue the order the effect of which was sought to be annulled through certiorari. In view of the foregoing, we hold that the respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or exceeded his authority in issuing the order of June 29, 1935, in civil case No. 4282 of Oriental Misamis and in authorizing the issuance of the alias writ of execution of July 5, 1935. Wherefore, we hold said order and alias writ of execution null and without effect, with costs to the respondent Ramon Chacon. So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.