[ G. R. No. 42821. January 18, 1936 ] 62 Phil. 912
[ G. R. No. 42821. January 18, 1936 ]
JUAN BENGZON, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE INSULAR AUDITOR, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
This case was brought by a former justice of the peace to test the validity of the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051, the Retirement Gratuity Law. In the trial court the petition for a writ of mandamus directed to the Secretary of Justice and the Insular Auditor was dismissed. Thereupon the losing party appealed. The facts, as stipulated disclose the following: Juan Bengzon, the petitioner was appointed justice of the peace for the municipality of Lingayen, Pangasinan, on March 7, 1912. Having reached the age of sixty-five, he ceased to hold this position on January 14, 1933, by reason of the provisions of Act No. 3899. On that date, acting pursuant to instructions received from the Judge of First Instance for the district, he turned over the office of justice of the peace to the auxiliary justice of the peace of the municipality. Subsequently the petitioner addressed communications to the Secretary of Justice, the Governor-General, and the Insular Auditor applying for gratuity under Act No. 4051, but all of these officials advised him that he was not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Accordingly, on March 7, 1934, the instant complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila. Act No. 4051 is entitled, “An Act to provide for the payment of retirement gratuities to officers and employees of the Insular Government retired from the service as a result of the reorganization or reduction of personnel thereof, including the justices of the peace who must relinquish office in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, and for other purposes.” The body of the Act provides in several sections for the officers and employees who may be granted gratuities thereunder, the rates of gratuities to be paid, and other matters. Among these sections, as the bill passed the Philippine Legislature, was section 7, reading: “The justices of the peace who must relinquish office during the year nineteen hundred and thirty-three in accordance with the provisions of Act Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and ninety-nine, shall also be entitled to the gratuities provided for in this Act.” Following this is section 10, reading: “The necessary sum to carry out the purposes of this Act is hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated/’ and section 12 reading: “If, for any reason, any section or provision of this Act is disapproved by the Governor-General or is challenged in a competent court and is held to be unconstitutional or invalid, none of the other sections or provisions hereof shall be affected thereby and such other sections and provisions shall continue to govern as if the section or provision so disapproved or held invalid had never been incorporated in this Act.” The Act was “approved” by the Governor-General, “section 7 excepted, February 21, 1933.” The Philippine Legislature accepted the veto. Section 19 of the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, established the practice for the enactment of a law, including the sanctioning of the veto power by the Governor-General. Specifically it provided: “The Governor-General shall have the power to veto any particular item or items of an appropriation bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object” The Constitution of the Philippines, article VI, section 11 (2) contains an exactly similar provision, except that the words “The President” are substituted for the words “The Governor-General,” and except that succeeding sentences in the Constitution prescribed the procedure for vetoing one or more items of an appropriation bill in a more explicit manner. The first thought that occurs to one in resolving the appeal of the petitioner is that, within the meaning of section 7 of Act No. 4051, on the assumption that it be restored to the law by the judiciary, he has not shown himself to be a justice of the peace who was forced to relinquish office during the year 1933. At least, he did not take steps to vindicate an alleged right as did the justices of the peace of the municipality of Malinao, Albay, and the municipality of Alabat, Tayabas. (Regalado vs. Yulo [1935], 61 Phil., 173; Tanada vs. Yulo [1935], 61 Phil., 515.) However, this point has not been advanced by the Government either in the lower court or on appeal, and so it would seem to be inappropriate to manufacture a defense for the respondents. Something might also be made of the proposition on which the trial judge relied for dismissal and which is brought info view by the first assigned error. In other words, since the duty which the petitioner claims is enjoined by law upon the respondents not only does not exist but would require the intervention of the Governor-General, who is not a party, to exist, no cause of action is made out. This, however, merely results in hiding behind a technicality to keep the parties from securing the opinion of the courts on the main issue. We prefer to satisfy the petitioner by ruling on the question suggested by the first sentence of this decision and which is raised squarely by the. second assigned error. The Governor-General purported to act pursuant to the portion of section 19 of the Organic Act which is above quoted. The key words of that sentence are “appropriation bill” and “item or items.” An appropriation is the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specified purpose. An item is the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. No set form of words is needed to make out an appropriation or an item. (State vs. Moore [1896], 50 Neb., 88; Callaghan vs. Boyce [1915], 17 Ariz., 433.) Within the meaning of these words, is Act No. 4051 an appropriation bill? Are there particular items in that bill which the Governor-General could constitutionally veto? We are led to answer both questions in the affirmative. The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must deter- mine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view. The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, put in this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Commonwealth vs. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L. R. A., 882; People vs. Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N. Y. S., 52; Fulmore vs. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. vs. State [1927], 53 A. L. R., 258.) In determining whether or not the Governor-General stepped outside the boundaries of his legislative functions, when he attempted to veto one section of Act No. 4051, while approving the rest of the bill, we are not without the aid of the construction placed on his .action by both legislative and executive departments. That the Philippine Legislature intended Act No. 4051 to be an appropriation measure with various items is apparent from a reading of section 12 thereof whereby the Legislature anticipated the possibility of a partial veto of the bill by the Chief Executive. Not only this, but after the Chief Executive took action, the Legislature made no attempt to override the veto or to amend the law to bring into being the section which the Governor-General had eliminated. Then the same question came again before the executive department, and all of its officials united in sustaining the validity of the Governor-General’s veto. While contemporaneous construction is not decisive for the courts, yet where a construction of statutes has been adopted by the legislative department and accepted by the various agencies of the executive department, it is entitled to great respect. It is our understanding that it has been the practice of the Chief Executive in the interpretation of his constitutional powers to veto separate items in bills analogous to that before us, and that this practice has been acquiesced in previously without objection, so that it would require a clear showing of unconstitutionality for the courts to declare against it. Since, therefore, legislative intent and executive purpose is evident, it devolves upon the judiciary to give deferential attention to the attitude assumed by the other two branches of the Government. Viewed from another direction, there can be no doubt that Act No. 4051 is an appropriation bill. That is manifest from its provisions, and particularly from section 10 by which the necessary sum to carry out the purposes of the Act was “hereby appropriated out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated.” It has, how- ever, been faintly suggested that by an appropriation bill is meant a general appropriation bill. We are shown nothing substantial to support this allegation. Unlike in other constitutions, the word “general” was omitted, and we presume intentionally, from the Organic Act and the Constitution. Under such conditions, the courts would not be authorized to insert a word and by so doing amend the law. The same considerations hold true with regard to the question of whether or not there was a particular item which the Governor-General could validly veto. No further action by the Legislature was contemplated. The accounting officers would have experienced no difficulty in setting up the different items provided for under Act No. 4051. It would have been a facile matter to eliminate the money needed to make section 7 thereof effective. The Chief Executive had the right to object to the expenditure of money for a specified purpose and amount without being under the necessity of at the same time refusing to agree to other expenditures which met with his entire approval, and that intention was unequivocably expressed. We have gone to the trouble to examine all of the authorities cited by the parties and other authorities not brought to our attention by them. It will be found that in practically all of these cases there was a conflict between the legislative and executive departments which the judiciary had to decide. Here there is no such conflict, but unison between the two. Here on the contrary the judiciary is asked to take the initiative and to restore a section to a law against the explicit confirmation of executive authority by the Legislature and against explicit action taken by the Chief Executive. In our opinion, it was never intended by a mere process of reasoning, however plausible, for the courts to breathe life into a portion of an Act which has not been given life by the other departments of the government acting in conformity with the Constitution. Deciding, therefore, the main issue as requested by the petitioner and appellant, we are constrained to rule against him and to hold that the veto by the Governor-General of section 7 of Act No. 4051 was in conformity with the legislative purpose and the provisions of the Organic Act. For this reason, the judgment brought on appeal will be affirmed, without special pronouncement as to the costs in either instance. Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.