[ G. R. No. 41947. January 15, 1936 ] 62 Phil. 859
[ G. R. No. 41947. January 15, 1936 ]
IN RE WILL OF THE DECEASED SILVESTRA BARON. VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. FAUSTINA BARON AND GUILLERMO BARON, OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga denying the petition of Vivencio Cuyugan for the probate of the will of Silvestra Baron. The petition which was filed on February 1, 1933, recites among other things that Silvestra Baron died on January 30,1933. The death certificate recites that she was eighty-six years of age and died of heart failure. The petition further recites that she left an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932; that she died single without forced heirs. The will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor and contains the following paragraphs which dispose of her estate:
“Que despues de pagados todos los gastos que se han de ocasionar desde que me caiga enferma hasta el entierro de mi cadaver, los bienes y propiedades que he de dejar se repartiran buenamente y en partes iguales mis hermanos llamados Guillermo Baron, Faustina Baron y los hijos de mi difunta hermana Antonia Baron, con excepcion de todo el dinero en metalico y mi casa de materiales fuertes construida en el barrio del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga, que actualmente habita mi hermano Guillermo Baron, porque estos los doy de una manera absoluta como herencia de mi sobrino Vivencio Cuyugan. “Que a la muerte de mis hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, todos los terrenos que en virtud de este testamento les dejo en herencia, los doy en herencia a mi sobrino VIVENCIO CUYUGAN, por lo que, encargo y prohibo a mis citados hermanos Guillermo y Faustina Baron, que graven o pongan cualquiera clase de obligation sobre los bienes que les dejo en herencia.”
The original of this will is signed “Silestra On” and the copy is signed “Silestra Baron” (t. s. n. pp. 170, 171). Both copies are written in the Pampanga dialect and consist of one sheet and are witnessed in due form by Vicente David, Valeriano Silva and Zacarias Nuguid (known to the testator). The petition for probate recites:
“9. That on the date of the execution of said will, that is to say, on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and was of sound and disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.”
The amended oppositions of Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege in substance first, that at the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained by imposition and undue influence of the said Vivencio Cuyugan and fraudulent confabulation between him and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto. Upon the issue thus drawn by the pleadings the judge of the Court of First Instance, after an extended trial and a full consideration of the evidence, came to the following conclusion:
“Opinamos que influyeron indebidamente e impropiamente en la voluntad* ya debilitada de dona Silvestra Baro6n por su avanzada edad la presencia de sus sobrinos Vivencio Cuyugan y Regino Cuyugan durante el otorgamiento del Exhibit A; la ausencia de Faustina Baron impedida de presenciarlo por algunos soldados de la Constabularia y el Jefe de Policia Municipal, Zacarias Nuguid; la oposicion de Regino Cuyugan a que ella flrmase el documento preparado por el abogado Narciso declarando que no habia otorgado testamento el dia anterior a su traslado forzoso a San Fernando para que no se hiciese firmar documento analogo y la presencia del cabo Morales y de algunos otros soldados, no solamente cuando se otorgd el testamento, sino cuando ella fue trasladada de casa contra su voluntad y cuando se le hizo firmar el Exhibit 10, y, por lo tanto, que ella no gozo de una completa libertad para disponer de sus bienes en testamento, o con pleno conocimiento del alcance de su contenido. Solo asi se explica el que ella haya dejado toda la propiedad de sus bienes a sus sobrinos, con quienes habia estado en pleito, con preterici6n de sus hermanos, especialmente de la opositora Faustina Baron, con quien habia estado conviviendo durante 40 aiios * * *. “Sentadas las premisas de hecho y de derecho que an- teceden, el Juzgado no puede menos de llegar a la conclusion de que el testamento de autos no puede, ni debe, ser legalizado como el testamento y ultima voluntad de la finada Silvestra Baron. Cuando existen pruebas suficien- tes para convencer al Juzgado de que se ha ejercido influencia indebida en el animo de la testadora y que como resultado de dicha influencia indebida esta ha otorgado el testamento que se presenta para su legalizacidn, la unica conclusidn que cabe es que el pretendido testamento no es expresitin de la voluntad de la supuesta testadora sino de los que sobre ella ejercieron la influencia indebida.”
An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passes to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law. The finding that the will was executed under undue influence or by the fraud of another presupposes testamentary capacity. In the present case the learned trial judge refused the probate of the alleged will on the ground that it was executed under the undue influence of other persons and we think the record warrants his findings in this respect. The trial court also made findings of fact tending to show actual lack of testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron and we have preferred to base our conclusion on that finding. The testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron having been put in issue and the burden of evidence resting upon the proponent, we think he has signally failed in affirmatively establishing the testamentary capacity of Silvestra Baron at the time she executed the said purported will. The evidence shows that the same morning when Silvestra Baron signed the alleged will she suffered a physical collapse of such a serious nature that a physician and a nurse were immediately called in. By reason of her advanced age and the gravity of her illness, she was unable to do anything for herself. Her grandniece, Epifania Sampang, who reached the house about an hour or so after the old lady’s collapse, telephoned a message to Vivencio Cuyugan at San Fernando, some fourteen kilometers dis- tant, that Silvestra had had an attack and was in a serious condition and requested that a doctor be sent immediately. Doctor Teopaco and a nurse arrived at about ten o’clock and treated the patient with a plaster on her back and ice packs over her heart and the doctor gave her a hypodermic injection in the arm. As the doctor and the nurse were leaving, Vivencio Cuyugan, with an attorney and three witnesses, entered the house prepared to obtain the will of Silvestra Baron. Neither the doctor nor the nurse were presented as witnesses by the proponent. Epifania Sampang, admittedly an intelligent young woman, who was the first to reach Silvestra Baron and remained throughout the morning and attended to her, testified that when she reached the house she found her grandaunt lying in bed, very pale and unconscious; that she called to her but she did not answer and only groaned; that her mouth was twisted and her lower lip, swollen. She went out to call a doctor but all the doctors in Magalang were out whereupon she telephoned as stated to San Fernando for a doctor. The subscribing witnesses stated that it was their belief that Silvestra understood the alleged will which she signed, but all of them admitted that although they were in her house about two hours not one of them exchanged a single word of conversation with Silvestra. The subscribing witness Zacarias Nuguid testified in part as follows:
“P.
Desde que los tres abogados Abad Santos, Silva y David y usted y Vivencio Cuyugan se acercaron a la cama de la finada, hasta que tanto ella como ustedes firmaron el testamento, £ha pronunciado ella alguna palabra? £ha dicho ella algo o no?—R. No recuerdo.
“P.
Pero, por lo que usted recuerda, £ha dicho ella algo o no ha dicho nada?—R. No recuerdo.
“P.
¿Usted ha dicho algo a ella?—R. Nada.
“P.
El sefior Quirino Abad Santos ile ha dicho algo a ella?—R. Nada. No he oido.
“P.
Los otros abogados Silva y David lie han dicho algo?—R. No he oido.
“P.
ÀElla ha dicho algo a cualquiera de esos tres o a los abogados?—R. No he oido que dijera algo.
“P.
Si ella hubiese dicho algo a los abogados, asf como los abogados hubieran hablado a ella, usted hubiera ofdo porque usted estaba cerca, £no es verdad?—R.Si, sefior, hubiera podido oir.
“P.
Cuando el senor Silva termino de leer el testamento, ¿dijo algo la vieja?—R. No he oido que dijera algo.”
There is no evidence that Silvestra Baron took any active part in the preparation of the alleged will except that when she was asked if she wished to include her sister Faustina in the will she said “Yes” in Pampango. There is no affirmative evidence that she understood the document when it was read to her. The person who read the will to her testified as follows:
“R.
Despues de leido el testamento, tuve que entregarlo a dona Silvestra, y lo miro algun rato.
“P.
¿Y ella, efectivaxnente, cogid el testamento de ma- nos de usted?—R. Lo entregue a sus manos.
“P.
¿Y ella lo cogi6 con sus manos?—R. Si, señor.
“P.
¿Y lo tuvo en sus manos leyendo, mirando?—R. Mirandolo asf.
“P.
¿Pero, no lo lefa?—R. Lo estuvo mirando por mucho tiempo asi.”
Standing at her bedside was the attorney with three witnesses and the chief beneficiary, Vivencio Cuyugan, and yet so far as this record shows, not a word was exchanged between any of them and the suffering old woman. We don’t know what drug the doctor administered but it is clear to us from the evidence that in her dazed physical and mental condition she had no adequate understanding of what she was doing at that time. She could not even sign her name to the original will properly or correctly, and when this defect was noted by one of the astute subscribing witnesses, he suggested that they have her sign another copy (t. s. n. page 109) which was done. She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had denied to several persons that she had made any will. This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary capacity. It has no application, moreover, where from the day of execution until the death of the testator his mental condition is such that he cannot judge the propriety of revoking the will. Nor obviously does it apply to a case where the alleged testator harbors the belief that he had not executed the will in question. In view of the premises, the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. Hull and Imperial, JJ., concur.