G. R. No. 41915

LA URBANA, SOCIEDAD MUTUA DE CONSTRUCCION Y PRESTAMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SIMEON BERNARDO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. THE INSULAR TREASURER, APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N

[ G. R. No. 41915. January 08, 1936 ] 62 Phil. 790

[ G. R. No. 41915. January 08, 1936 ]

LA URBANA, SOCIEDAD MUTUA DE CONSTRUCCION Y PRESTAMOS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SIMEON BERNARDO ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. THE INSULAR TREASURER, APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N

IMPERIAL, J.:

In the complaints filed in the two cases which were jointly heard and in which  only  one decision  was rendered, the plaintiff alleged two causes of action against the defendants. In  the first, it  stated that 16 transfer certificates of  title had been illegally issued over lands of which it was the sole and absolute owner and for which it had, in turn, obtained a transfer certificate of title, and prayed that said 16 titles be  declared null and void and cancelled.  In the second, it prayed that, should cancellation be  not in order, judgment be  rendered in its favor and against all the defendants and the assurance, fund, in particular, for damages to it resulting from the loss of the portions  of land included in the aforesaid titles. The court rendered judgment declaring the validity of the 9 titles included in the first case, and, consequently, the ab- solute ownership by the persons to whom they were issued, and allowed the plaintiff an indemnity of P7,297.26, either from  the assurance fund or from Juan T. Tabien and his wife.  The judgment in the second case found the 7 titles there  in question null and void, and,  consequently, declared the plaintiff the owner of the portions of land covered thereby, and awarded indemnity from the assurance fund to the persons to whom they were issued in the following proportion:  to Mateo  Buenaventura, P238.60; to Sebastian Gutierrez, P316.78; to Donato Lazaro, P769.16;  to  Liberato Alejandro, P426.80; to Anicia Cruz,  P2,808.22, and to Valentina de Jesus, P836.50.  Antonina Rodriguez, one of the defendants,  was not  allowed  any compensation, without prejudice to the right of action for warranty which she announced she would bring against her vendor, named Emilia Esguerra.  It was  likewise ordered with respect to the plaintiff that no execution of the judgment be issued against the Insular Treasurer until it  is shown that the indemnity allowed could not be paid partially or totally by the spouses Tabien.   The  defendants  Baens, the husbands who were joined with the defendants of the same surname, and the register of deeds were absolved, without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff, the Insular Treasurer, and Antonina Rodriguez appealed from the judgment. The lands involved in the two cases, aside from others, originally belonged to Lazaro  Baens, who  obtained the owner’s duplicate of the original certificate of title No. 322 on January 12, 1907.   This title covered five lots described as parcel  A, parcel B, parcel C,  parcel D and  parcel E. Their total area was 488 hectares, 66 ares, and 63 centiares. In his lifetime he executed deeds of sale of many portions to no less than 60 different persons, but the deeds did not give an exact description of each portion because there was then no plan by parcels approved by the Director of Lands. Notwithstanding these defects, the register of deeds of the Province of Rizal accepted the deeds of sale and proceeded to issue the following owner’s duplicate: No. 170 in favor of Simeon Bernardo, on January 12,1907; No. 171 in favor of Quiterio Victorino, on January 12, 1907; No. 251 in favor of Mauricio Gungon, on December 15, 1908; No. 252 in favor of Anastacio Laguerta, on December 15, 1908; No. 253 in favor of Cornelio  Bautista y Luzano, on December 16,1908; No. 254 in favor of Francisca Cabanas, on December 17, 1908; No. 255 in favor of Juan Cruz y de la Cruz, on December 17,1908; No. 256 in favor of Juan Cruz y de la Cruz, on December  17, 1908; No. 257 in favor of  Juan Cruz y de la Cruz, on December  17, 1908; No. 297 in favor of Arsenio  Cruz Herrera, on June 13, 1909;  No.  480 in favor of Sebastian Gutierrez Lazaro, on October 1,  1910; No. 481 in  favor of Donato  Lazaro Santiago,  on October 1, 1910; No. 482 in favor of Lorenzo Reyes,  on October 1, 1910; No. 483 in  favor of Mateo Buenaventura Lazaro, on October  1,1910; No. 484 in favor of Maximino Lazaro y Lazaro, on  October  3, 1910; and No.  485 in favor of Liberato Alejandro Agapito, on October 3,1910."  Due to successive transfers, the following  changes in the titles took place: Title No. 171  was cancelled And in lieu thereof Nos. 22492  and 22525 were issued, the latter in favor of Ambrosia Salao, married to  Silvestre  Pascual, on November 23, 1932; No. 251 was cancelled and in lieu thereof titles Nos. 3858 and 3859  were  issued, the latter in  favor of Sebastian Gutierrez, on December 20, 1917; No. 253 was cancelled and in lieu thereof title No. 3775 was issued in favor of Victoria Gono on  September 20, 1917; No. 257 was cancelled and in lieu thereof titles Nos. 3776, 22411 and 22412 were successively issued^the latter in favor of Moises Cruz, on October 24, 1932; No.  297 was cancelled and in lieu thereof titles Nos. 327, 776, 12423 and 12424 were issued, the latter in favor of Antonina Rodriguez, on July 16,1927; No. 482 was cancelled and in lieu thereof titles Nos. 14187 and 14188  were issued, the  latter in  favor of Valentina de Jesus, on August 14,1928, and No. 484 was cancelled and in lieu thereof titles Nos.  8551 and 8552  were issued, the latter  in favor of Anicia Cruz, on June 25, 1924. Lazaro Baens died in 1909, and his widow Ramona Roque was appointed judicial administratrix and guardian of their minor children.  As a result of the judgment rendered in the  case for the revision  of the  final  decree obtained  by Lazaro Baens, his title No. 322 was cancelled and No. 7678 was issued in lieu thereof.  In the intestate instituted relative to the estate  left by the deceased Lazaro Baens, his widow as administratrix, filed a motion alleging that due to a number of transfers made by the deceased in his lifetime, only five (5)  lots of the five (5)  parcels described in the title were left, and that it was necessary to amend the title so as to include only the lands left belonging to the intestate.  The petition was favorably acted upon, and after the segregations were made, the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title  No. 8509 upon  cancellation  of No. 7678.  In title No. 8509, all the lands that had remained in the ownership of the intestate, excluding the portions that had already been sold, were described as parcel A and lot No. 3 only.  On November 10, 1928, the register  of deeds noted on the books the sale executed  on October 12, 1928, by the  widow Ramona Roque and her children  of parcel A and lot No, 3 in favor of Juan T. Tabien and Ms wife Asuncion Noscal,  and the order  of adjudication  entered in the intestate on August 20, 1917, and on the same date cancelled title No. 8509 and  issued in  lieu thereof  in favor of the heirs of Lazaro Baens title No.  14621, which was  likewise cancelled and  in lieu thereof title No. 14626 was  issued in the name of the vendees, the spouses Tabien. On December 8,  1928, the spouses Tabien, as registered owners, mortgaged parcel A and lot No. 3 to the plaintiff to secure the sum of P23,000 which it had loaned  to them. This  mortgage  was noted on the title  No. 14625  of the Tabiens, which  showed no other transfer or  lien of any kind.  The Tabiens paid  neither the loan nor its interest and violated  the other conditions of the mortgage, where upon  the plaintiff  brought a foreclosure  suit and  after obtaining a judgment in its favor and upon failure of the Tabiens to satisfy its amount, the properties were sold at public auction to the plaintiff for P24,540. This  sale was later approved and after the registration thereof, the register of deeds issued transfer certificate of title No.  17950 in favor of the plaintiff. Independently of these two  cases and prior to their commencement, several persons who had purchased lands covered by parcel A and lot No. 3 which were mortgaged and later  sold at public auction to the  plaintiff, brought six separate actions for the annulment  of the deed of sale in favor of the Tabiens, of their title and of the mortgage which the latter executed in favor of the plaintiff La Urbana.  The said six (6) cases  were entitled and docketed in the office of the clerk  of  this court  as  follows: G. R. No. 34599, Potenciano Gabriel, plaintiff and appellee, vs. Alfredo Baens  et al., defendants, La Urbana et al., appellants; G. R. No.  34600, Benigno Gofio et  al.,  plaintiffs  and  appellees, vs.  Daniel  T.  Piamonte et al.,  defendants,  La Urbana et al., appellants; G. R. No. 34601, Exequiel Bautista,  plaintiff and appellee, vs. Daniel T.  Piamonte et al., defendants, La Urbana et al.,  appellants; G. R. No. 34602, Pantaleon  Gutierrez, plaintiff and  appellee,  vs.  Ramona Roque et al., defendants, La Urbana  et al., appellants; G. R. No. 34603, Marcelino Siochi,  plaintiff and  appellee, vs.  Rtfmona Roque et al., defendants,  La  Urbana et  al., appellants; and G. R. No. 34604, Anicia Cruz et al., plain- tiffs and appellees, vs. Ramona  Roque et al.,  defendants, La Urbana et al., appellants.1  It will be noted that La Urbana was joined  as defendant-appellant  in  all of them. Final judgment was rendered in those cases declaring the validity of the mortgage executed and registered in favor of La Urbana, after and as a result of which the parties who had possession  of lands covered by the mortgage had  to redeem them  by paying  La  Urbana  the  total sum  of P41,780.70.   (Exhibit O.) The plaintiff appealed contending  (1)  That the  court should not have cancelled the  portion of its  title affected by the titles involved in the first case which were declared valid and subsisting; (2) that should its theory not prosper, the court should have assessed the  lands at the rate of P3 instead of P2 a square  meter; and  (3) that  the  court should have awarded it the costs. The Insular Treasurer imputes  the following errors  to the appealed judgment: “(I) The lower court erred in overruling the demurrer of the defendant  Insular  Treasurer; (II) The lower court erred in not holding that the assurance fund is not liable for alleged loss  or damage because the same has not resulted from any perversion of the process of the original registration; (III)  The lower court erred in not holding that the plaintiff has not suffered any damage, and if it had,  the same has been compensated; (IV) The lower court erred in finding that the value of the lands, for which the alleged loss  or damage was awarded to the plaintiff, is two pesos per square meter; (V) The lower court erred  in not holding that the assurance fund is not liable for alleged loss or damage because the same was occasioned by a breach of trust;  (VI) The lower court erred in not finding that the plaintiff was negligent; (VII) The  lower court erred in not finding that the cross-plaintiffs Mateo Buenaventura, Sebastian  Gutierrez, Donato  Lazaro, Liberate  Alejandro, Anicia Cruz, and Valentina de Jesus are negligent, and  in absolving the defendants Baens from the complaints; (VIII) The lower court erred in not holding that the result in the former suits cannot have any bearing on the present cases as far as the liability of the assurance fund is concerned; (IX) The lower court erred in sentencing the Insular Treasurer to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P7,297.26, jointly and severally with the defendants Juan T. Tabien and Asuncion Noscal; and in sentencing the  Insular Treasurer to pay to the defendants Mateo Buenaventura, Sebastian Gutierrez, Donato Lazaro, Liberata Alejandro,  Anicia Cruz, and Valentina de Jesus the sums of P238.60, P316.78,P769.16, P426.80, P2,808.22, and P836.50, respectively; (X)  The lower court erred  in not  dismissing the complaints and cross-complaints, and in denying the motion for a new trial of the defendant Insular Treasurer.” Antonina  Rodriguez,  in turn,   imputes the  following errors to the judgment: “(I) The  lower court erred in declaring  null  and void the certificate of title  No. 12424, Exhibit L-14, issued by the register of deeds of Rizal in favor of  the  defendant-appellant Antonina Rodriguez, and in ordering said official to cancel said  certificate de oficio;  (II) The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff La Urbana acquired the lands described in the transfer certificate of title No. 17950 in good faith; (III)  The trial court erred in not ordering the defendant Emilia  Esguerra to pay the sum of P10,000 to the defendant Antonina Rodriguez under the latter’s  complaint for eviction, and in taking the view that the complaint for eviction had better been determined in a separate action; (IV) The trial court erred in not absolving  said defendant  Antonina Rodriguez  from  the complaint, with the costs to the plaintiff La Urbana, and in not granting her motion for a new trial.” In our opinion all the questions at issue may be simplified and reduced to a determination of which  of the titles issued are valid and should be respected, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to the indemnity claimed by it from the assurance fund.  In viewing the question thus, we assume, of course, the validity of the mortgage executed in favor of the plaintiff in connection with the portions of land not affected by the sixteen titles, which has already been acknowledged and approved by the final judgment rendered in  the aforesaid six cases, wherein it was affected by the lands then in litigation. To begin with we shall state that the lands in question are registered under the Torrens system and the titles thereto issued under its provisions,  consequently, all the  rights arising therefrom should be  governed by  the Land Registration Act (No. 496) and  its amendments.  Section 38 proclaims the indefeasibility of the original title registered as a direct result of the final  decree issued in a case after determining and decreeing  title in favor of a person,  and section 39 provides that every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate  of title for value and in good faith shall be deemed the indisputable owners thereof and  shall hold the same free from all incumbrance except those noted on the certificate  and those which are  understood  and enumerated in the said section.  Applying these provisions to the state of the titles involved in the two cases, except title No. 17950 issued to the plaintiff, the inevitable legal conclusion is that all of  them are valid notwithstanding the  fact that there were  irregularities in their issuance which would  possibly have justified the register of deeds in refusing to issue them until the defects had been corrected.  (Great Western Telegraph Co. vs. Burnham, 162  U.  S., 339; Manila  Railroad Co. vs. Rodriguez,  29 Phil., 336; Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31  Phil., 590; De la Cruz vs. Fabie, 35 Phil., 144; Bias vs.  De la Cruz and Melendres, 37 Phil., 1;  Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil., 901; Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres vs.  Municipality of Tabaco, 46 Phil., 271;  Reyes and Nadres  vs. Borbon and. Director of Lands,  50 Phil., 791.)  The fundamental reason  in  support of our  conclusion is, that those registered  owners were  purchasers in good faith and for value, and  in the duplicates for the owner which they accepted from the grantors it  did not appear that the lands were  registered in the name of other persons, under  which circumstances they had  a right to rely entirely on what appeared in  the aforesaid  titles.   We have excepted the title issued to  the plaintiff because, as we shall hereafter show, it  was not an innocent purchaser in the sense that the phrase is used by the law.   It is true that some of the titles  which we hold  valid were issued subsequently to that of the  plaintiff, but this circumstance alone is not sufficient to vitiate them inasmuch as they came directly from former titles  and the persons who conveyed the lands were registered owners  prior to the plaintiff. We, therefore, conclude and hold that the sixteen titles, subject matter of the two cases, are valid and that the defendants in whose name they were issued are their registered owners under the Land Registration Law  and cannot be deprived of the property therein described.   As to title No.  14625 issued  to the spouses Tabien, we likewise  hold that the same is invalid as to those portions affected by the sixteen titles formerly issued, although we are of the opinion that there was really no need to pass on its validity inasmuch as whatever right they had acquired had been  lost by virtue of the  mortgage  which they  executed and  the public sale, judicially  approved, which  subsequently took place. We now pass to consider the claim of the plaintiff against the assurance fund.  Its claim is  based on the  provisions of sections 101 and 102 of Act No.  496, reading:

“SEC. 101. Any person who without  negligence on  his part sustains loss or damage through any omission, mistake, or misfeasance of the clerk,  or register of deeds, or of any examiner of titles, or of any deputy or clerk of the register of deeds in the performance  of their respective duties under the provisions of this Act, and any person who is wrongfully deprived of any land or any interest therein, without negligence on his part, through the bringing of the same under the provisions of this Act or by the registration of any other person as  owner of such land, or by any mistake, omission, or misdescription in any certificate  or  owner’s duplicate, or in any entry or memorandum in the register or of her official book, or  by any cancellation, .and who  by the provisions of this Act  is barred or in any way precluded from bringing an action  for  the recovery of such land or interest therein, or claim  upon the same, may bring in any court of competent jurisdiction an action against the Treasurer of  the Philippine Archipelago, for the recovery  of damages to be paid  out of the assurance fund. “SEC.  102. If such  action  be for  recovery for loss  or damage  arising only  through any  omission, mistake,  or misfeasance of the clerk,  or of the register of deeds, or of any examiner of titles, or  of any deputy or clerk of  the register  of  deeds  in the  performance of  their  respective duties under the provisions  of this Act, then the Treasurer of the Philippine  Archipelago shall be the sole defendant to such action.  But if such action be brought  for loss or damage arising only through the fraud  or willful act of some person or  persons other than the clerk, the  register of deeds, the  examiners of titles, deputies, and clerks,  or arising jointly through the fraud or wrongful act of such other person or persons and the omission, mistake, or misfeasance of the clerk, the register of deeds, the examiners of titles,  deputies,  or  clerks, then such  action shall  be brought against both the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago  and  such person or persons aforesaid.  In all such actions where there  are defendants other than  the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago and damages shall have been recovered, no final judgment shall be entered against the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago until execution against the  other  defendants  shall be  returned  unsatisfied in whole or in part, and the officer returning the execution shall certify that the amount still due upon  the execution can  not be collected except by application to the assurance fund. Thereupon  the court having jurisdiction of  the action, being satisfied as to the truth of such return, may, upon proper showing, order the amount of the execution and costs, or so much thereof as remains unpaid, to be paid by the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago out of the assurance  fund.   It shall be  the duty  of  the  Attorney-General in person  or by  deputy to appear and defend all such suits with the aid  of the fiscal of the province in which the land lies or the city attorney of the City of Manila as the case may be: Provided, however,  That nothing in this Act shall be construed to deprive the plaintiff of any action which  he may have against  any person  for such loss or damage or  deprivation of land or of any  estate or interest therein without joining the Treasurer of the Philippine Archipelago as a defendant therein.”

The Solicitor-General, in behalf of the Insular Treasurer, interposed demurrers to the  complaints on the ground that under the law the plaintiff could not maintain at  the same time the actions which it commenced  because they were incompatible.   He likewise contended that it  could not  ask for  alternative reliefs because  section 101  requires as a condition precedent to the bringing of an  action for indemnity, in case of deprivation or loss of registered property, that the aggrieved party had not been negligent and had no other legal  remedy to recover the property  to  which it alleges to have an indefeasible title.   In view of the conclusions we have reached, we do not believe it necessary to pass on the question of law thus raised although the overruling of the demurrers by the court has been assigned as one of the errors of the appealed decision. It should first of all be noted that  the action for indemnity is based not on the rights which the  plaintiff acquired by virtue of the mortgage executed in its favor, but on those which it could have acquired by virtue of title No.  17950 executed in its favor wherein it appears as the registered  owner. According to the principles underlying our Torrens system, it is a condition sine qua non that the person who brings an action for damages against the  assurance fund be the registered owner, and,  as  to holders of transfer certificates of title, that they be innocent purchasers in good faith and for value.  Our inquiry, therefore, shall first be to ascertain if the plaintiff had all these  conditions when it acquired the lands at public sale and obtained its transfer  certificate of title.  It may be unhesitatingly conceded that it purchased  the  land  for  value because it cannot be denied that it paid  the price  above-mentioned which, in  turn, represented the amount of the judgment in  the foreclosure of the  mortgage obtained by it.  Is it an innocent  purchaser in good  faith as  contemplated by law?  The facts which we shall presently mention answer the question in the negative.  The complaints, some original and others amended  for the  third time, which gave rise to the six cases heretofore referred to, were filed and docketed in the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on March 18, 1929, on October 5 and  12, of the same year, and on March 18 and 19, 1930, respectively. Immediately  after the commencement of  those cases,  the plaintiffs succeeded  in  noting  on transfer  certificate of title No. 14625 of the spouses Tabien notices of Us pendens on  the following dates: February 23, 1929; April 2,  1929; July  9,  1929; September  12, 1929;  September 16,  1929; November  2, 1929; February 6, 1930, and  March 27,  1930. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered in the six cases, holding that the conveyance made by the Baens in favor of the Tabiens and the mortgage executed by  the latter in favor of the plaintiff were null and void, was promulgated on March 3, 1930.  The plaintiff purchased the lands  involved in these two cases at public sale on April 10, 1930, and the sale thus made was confirmed by the court on  July  19, 1930; and the transfer  certificate of title No.  17950 was finally issued in favor of the plaintiff on August 30,1930.  It appears from these data that when the plaintiff  purchased the lands at public auction, it had already direct notice or  advice that the property was in litigation and that  the title held by the Tabiens was judicially questioned.  In  view of this knowledge, it  is legally impossible  to hold that  the plaintiff acted  as an  innocent purchaser in  good faith in acquiring the property.  (Tuazon vs. Reyes and Siochi, 48 Phil., 844; Ignacio vs.  Chua Hong, 52 Phil.,  940.)   Consequently, not being the registered owner of the portions included in the sixteen titles and not having acquired any right  which may be protected in connection with  said lands, it is  evident that the plaintiff is not entitled to  any indemnity  for damages from the assurance  fund.   (Leung Yee vs. F. L. Strong  Machinery Co. and  Williamson, 37 Phil., 644; Martinez de Gomez vs. Jugo and Lopez  de Jesus, 48 Phil., 118; Rivera vs. Moran, 48 Phil.,  836; Angelo vs. Director of Lands, 49  Phil., 833; Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Tombis Trino, 50 Phil., 708; Cui and Joven vs. Henson,  51 Phil., 606.) To obtain a judgment for damages against the assurance fund, by  reason of the deprivation or loss of registered land, section 101 requires that the person who  claims  damages should not have been  negligent in acquiring the  property or in  obtaining the  registration  thereof in  his  name. (Heirs of Enriquez and Villanueva vs. Enriquez and Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, 44 Phil., 885; De la  Cruz vs. Fabie, supra.)   Plaintiff’s negligence is manifest in the instant case because with its knowledge of the pending litigations  and of  the notices of Us pendens it should not have taken the risk of purchasing the property if it had acted prudently. As it chose to run  the risk, it must suffer the consequences  of  its own acts. The case presents another aspect the  solution of which leads  us  to the  same result.  Under section 101 the  dam— ages given are for the deprivation or loss of registered lands or of  real rights over them.  Generally speaking the assurance fund has not been established to enrich the registered  owners.  There  are cases,  of course,  where  the registered  owner  might suffer damages, besides compensable injury, but the case before us is different.  Plaintiff claims damages because it has  been deprived of certain portions of land which were included in the title obtained by it.  But it has been established that by virtue of the favorable judgment obtained by it from this court in those six cases, the parties affected were compelled to redeem their property by paying the plaintiff the sum of P41,780.70. As its capital was P23,000 only, and  the price  it paid for the land at the  auction sale  did  not exceed P24,540, it is evident that it obtained a profit amounting to P17,240.70. In view of this notoriously lucrative transaction for the plaintiff, we do not feel inclined to hold that it still has the right to claim damages from the assurance fund. We would have closed the discussion on the rights of the plaintiff as mortgagee were it not for  the argument, which might be advanced, that as such mortgagee it should have some right under the law to recover the loan which it made in good faith to the Tabiens in view  of  the fact that the latter’s duplicate title was clear and free from any encumbrance.   However, it should not  be forgotten that the sixteen titles of the other defendants  being valid, the title of the Tabiens was without any legal value as to the portions affected, and,  consequently, did not  transmit  any  right founded on the mortgage guaranteeing the  loan.  Moreover,  as we have stated, its mortgage  credit had been paid by the former litigants who were compelled to redeem their property.   Under  these circumstances, if it still has any right of action, this should  have been directed against the Tabiens to recover its credit, with  interest, of against the assurance fund in case this action should prosper,  to  be indemnified for damages suffered resulting from the register of deeds having issued the duplicate  title of the Tabiens, while the lands were registered in the name of other persons as free from all liens and having subsequently registered its mortgage.   At first blush it would seem that the solution thus set out is unjust, but its legality will be easily understood by considering that in this jurisdiction the  maxim prior in tempore, potior in jure prevails in registration matters.  Inasmuch as the titles of the other defendants, with the exception already stated, were of prior dates, the same must prevail with all their effects.  (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, supra; Acantilado vs. De Santos, 32 Phil., 350.) In view  of the foregoing, .the appealed judgment is reversed, and the two causes of action in plaintiffs complaints, as well  as  the  cross-complaints of the defendants, are dismissed,  without express pronouncement as  to costs. We reiterate the validity of the sixteen  titles involved  in the cases and more particularly mentioned above.  So ordered. Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Recto, JJ., concur.