[ G.R. No. 44109. September 26, 1935 ] 62 Phil. 148
[ G.R. No. 44109. September 26, 1935 ]
IN RE INTESTATE OF THE DECEASED EUGENIO CASIMIRO. SILVESTRE C. PASCUAL, ADMINISTRATOR AND APPELLANT, VS. PETRA SANTOS ET AL., HEIRS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
This is a petition presented in this court by the attorney for the heirs of the deceased Eugenio Casimirowhich prays that the appeal interposed by the administrator-appellant be dismissed for the reasons (1) that the orders of the lower court dated February 2 arid March 3, 1935, are interlocutory in nature and not appealable, and (2) that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the period fixed by law. Although a copy of the motion was served on opposing counsel no opposition thereto has been entered. We have ascertained that the second ground of the motion is entirely devoid of merit. As to the first ground, something might be said in support of the proposition that since the basic decision of the trial court, affirmed by this court, has become final and executory, a subsidiary order of the trial court which merely has for its purpose the execution of the judgment of the appellate court is in nature interlocutory and non-appealable. We have preferred, however, to rest our judgment on a broader and more practical basis, namely, that the decree of this court operated as a termination of the controversy involved in an appeal settling the account of the administrator and accordingly the account should be stated and a settlement made in accordance therewith. It appears from the record in the case of the intestate of the deceased Eugenio Casimiro, Silvestre C. Pascual, administrator and appellant, vs. Petra Santos, et al., oppositors send appellees, G. R. No. 40053, to paraphrase the language of counsel for the administrator, that on June 21,1930, said administrator submitted to the Court of First Instance of Manila a statement of receipts and disbursements incurred in connection with the intestate estate of the deceased Eugenio Casimiro. The widow ancf the minor heirs entered opposition to the approval of the report. The court ordered that with the exception of the items disallowed the account be approved with a balance of P4,377.07. In a decision handed down in this court on March 28, 1934,1 the order of the trial court was affirmed with the correction of a mathematical error and the account of the administrator was allowed with a cash balance of P4,465.15. Subsequently the matter was brought before the court of origin which cited the administrator to appear before it on July 28, 1984, and to bring with him the amount of P4.465.15 or the certificate of a bank showing that the proper deposit has been made. Instead of doing so the administrator asked that many other expenses “inadvertently omitted from his statement submitted to the honorable court”, be allowed and the previous order vacated. The petition was objected to by the heirs and the matter came on for hearing before the court. It was then disclosed that some of the expenses for which the administrator claimed reimbursement were incurred by him in defense of the approval of his statement of accounts, that other items were previously involved in the case which went on appeal to the Supreme Court, and that other items could gain no standing on account of a lack of proof to substantiate them and on account of a lack of previous authorization of the court. As a result the court disallowed all the items set forth in the amended petition except the sum of P44.82 which was admitted by the oppositors. The administrator was given three days to deposit the balance of P4,420.33 with the clerk of the court or with a local bank to the credit of the estate. Thereafter the confiscation of the bond of the administrator furnished by the Philippine Guaranty Company was ordered. The first thought which suggests itself relates to the point of whether or not the account filed by the administrator and which later gained the attention of “this court was a partial settlement or a final settlement. That it could not be taken to be a partial settlement is evident because in that case no appeal would lie in favor of the administrator to this court. On the other hand, one fact demonstrative of the finality of the account is that the bondsman of the administrator has been cited to make good for the principal. Being a decree settling the account of the administrator, as expressly provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, “the decision of the Supreme Court thereon shall be final” (Sec. 778). If the decree is conclusive as to a final settlement of an account of an administrator it necessarily follows that the latter may not litigate the same questions or related or belated questions upon a second hearing. To permit an administrator to avail himself of such tactics would mean never ending controversy regarding the expenses of an estate and would place the heirs at the mercy of the administrator. If when an administrator loses on appeal he could thereafter attempt to rely on items, real or fancied, to offset the money due the estate, the heirs would be unable to enforce their rights against the administrator, for the reason that everytime he is required to comply with the order of the court, he could appeal from the said order and’ thus frustrate the administration of justice. To our way of thinking that was not the purpose of the law. In the instant case, for example, the heirs of the deceased have had to defend two appeals against the very administrator of the estate who is supposed to represent their interests. The administration of estates in the Philippines is carried on not by probate courts exclusively provided for the purpose, but by Courts of First Instance of general jurisdiction. With judges of first instance occupied with criminal and civil cases and shifted from one district to another, unscrupulous administrators and executors have it within their power, unless the judge is alert to the situation, to delay the final disposition of estates for years, in the meantime living off of the estate, at last to hand over a pitiful remnant of the property left by the deceased to his lawful heirs. The policy of the law should be to close an estate as promptly as possible and as economically as possible. It is with this paramount idea to the forefront that we are led to take the stand that the decision of this court, since relating to the final settlement of an administrator, had the force and effect of a judgment as between the parties thereto, which only needs to be enforced and not reopened in order that the estate may be closed. (See generally, Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada [1919], 40 Phil., 124; Wilson vs. Rear [1930], 55 Phil., 44; Sulit vs. Santos [1932], 56 Phil., 626; Butterfield vs. Smith [1880], 101 TJ. S., 570.) Let an order issue dismissing the appeal interposed by the administrator and appellant in this case, with the costs taxed against him. Villa-Real, Hull, Vickers, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.