[ G.R. No. 43605. September 30, 1935 ] 62 Phil. 218
[ G.R. No. 43605. September 30, 1935 ]
CHOA SIU, ON BEHALF OF CHOA KA, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
HULL, J.:
Choa Siu, on behalf of Choa Ka, brought habeas corpus proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila to set aside the action of respondent in denying admission into this country of Choa Ka, as the minor son of a resident Chinese merchant. The Court of First Instance having granted the writ, this appeal is brought. The case was heard and investigated by a board of special inquiry on March 4, 1935, which rendered the following decision:
“This is the case of Choa Ka, mala, 13 years old, ex steamship Ankingt arrived February 23, 1935, who is seeking admission into this country as a minor son of Choa Siu, a resident Chinese merchant, and holder of M. A. No. 32318 and M. A. No. 13500. But, altho, the alleged father is a holder of the last two mentioned documents wherein the name of the applicant appears, yet, the board believes that the applicant fails entirely to establish his right to admission into this country on the following grounds: “1. Alleged father not continuously engaged in business.—The alleged father of the applicant testified in this investigation, that he has been endorsed as merchant, and that he has been engaged in business since then until this time. In support of this, he presented privilege taxreceipts Nos. 10206 and 9803 for his business for the years 1934 and 1935 respectively. But, in spde of all this, the board could not give any credence to all these testimonies. The reasons are obvious. Privilege tax-receipt No. 10206 for the year-1934, does not show that he was continuously engaged in business until this time. It appears thereon, that the said license was issued to Choa Siu only last April 11, 1934 and further shows that he had paid only P2 for the tax of the year 1934, as shown by the internal revenue stamp tax attached thereto. (Noted by the Board on page 5 of the proceedings.) If his business was continued as alleged by him, he could have paid more taxes than what is shown in said license for that year. It could be suspected only, the said license was secured for purposes of facilitating the investigation of Choa Say, one of his alleged children and landed by the board of special inquiry just six days after said license was obtained or to be exact on April 17, 1934 (C; B. R. No. 4183-43). And again another attempt to cheat the members of the board is made in the investigation of this case, by presenting the same license and another business license No. 9803, which was issued to Choa Siu only last March 2, 1935, only to be used in this investigation which is two days only from the date of its issuance. The doubt of the board as to the business of the alleged father is more heightened by the fact that the business license presented for the years 1934 and 1935, both indicate that they are new, no previous tax-receipts having been noted thereon. Even the business license for 1935 which should have contained the previous receipts numbers corresponding to 1934, was not even noted. This, presupposing that the alleged father was not in business last year or 1934. It may be added further, that the contradicting testimonies of the alleged father himself as regards his own business as shown on page 5, lines 11, 16, 22 and 25 clearly prove that he was not continuously in business. His changing attitude gives the suspicion that he is testifying in something which is untrue and dishonest. For if he were telling the truth he could not be so changing and so contradicting in his own testimony with respect to his own business. This simply shows that he either has no. business or if he had before, he stopped and discontinued it. And that these privilege tax receipts he presented were simply secured for purposes of facilitating the landing of his alleged children thru false representation as explained above. It may be contended that Choa Siu is an endorsed merchant and by virtue of such status he is entitled to bring the members of his family into this country. Granting without conceding that his allegation is true, yet memorandum order op September 13, 1933, provides substantially as follows: “‘A merchant’s affidavit properly endorsed is a document to facilitate the reentry of the affiant and is intended for this purpose only. It does not give a Chinese who is not a merchant the status of merchant altho for purposes of his reentry this status is presumed unless evidence to the contrary is secured. It is directed that merchant’s affidavits be honored only in cases where the holder is applying for readmission after returning from a sojourn abroad. But, in the investigation before the board of special inquiry of the right to enter of the wives and minor children of persons claiming the status of Chinese merchants, the fact that they are merchants within the meaning of the Act of Congress of November 3,1893, on the date of the arrival of the alleged wives and children should be established by competent evidence, both parol and documentary, to the satisfaction of the board, any previous endorsement as merchant of the alleged husband or father notwithstanding. “And therefore, after considering all these facts in pursuance of the provisions of the above cited memorandum order, the board concludes arid so holds that the right of the applicant to enter into this country is not fully established by competent evidence to its satisfaction, hence he is refused landing. “2. Ignormce of applicant with respect to the members of his own family.—In the course of tine cross-examination of the applicant, he was asked to identify some of the pictures of his alleged brothers attached to C. B. R. Nos. 4092-81, 4183-43, 4137-32, and 4048-101, and which he utterly failed to do so, the applicant having mentioned other names. (Noted by the Board, see pages 2 and 3 of the proceedings.) Now, if he is a real and true son of his alleged father, it is inconceivable that he could not recognize his own brothers in the pictures. The applicant claims to be 13 years of age,—the age, which according to the rule of evidence, is already sufficient to have a mind competent to understand and remember things. Yet, the applicant has not the least idea as to the identity of those appearing in the pictures, presented to him, in spite of the fact that he only missed them for about a year or more, some of them having been landed only in this country last year. Of the four pictures of some of his alleged brothers which were presented to him, not one of them was identified. Any ordinary layman could not believe that a true brother could forget his own brothers. And if he does forget, he has not even the shadow of a brother nor related to them in anyway whatsoever. Therefore, the board concludes that the applicant is a foreign blood to the family—that he is fake and therefore he should be deported. “It may be stated in this connection, that after a careful perusal of the proceedings of this case, the board did not notice any minor or light contradictions in the testimony of the applicant. There is no wonder, however, that the applicant testified almost as perfectly as an angel from heaven could do so, simply because he has been released under personal guaranty. He must have been taught what to say and what to declare before the board. Kh had been released since February 23, 1935, until March 4, 1935, when he was put to trial for the determination of his status before the board of special inquiry— a time sufficient enough for a person to learn something injected into his head. In the ordinary course of events, a genuine and legitimate case would usually have some minor contradiction ^ind even sometimes material and relevant ones, yet in this case, the testimony of the applicant is almost perfect. This simply shows what transpired during the time of his release. There is a wide gap of difference between a detained immigrant and one who is released under bond or personal guaranty. It seems that Immigration Laws can be enforced only strictly if these Chinese immigrants should no longer be allowed to be released before they are subjected to investigation. “In view of the foregoing, the applicant is hereby not permitted to land. He and his attorney are informed of this decision and are given two days within which to appeal to the Insular Collector of Customs if they feel dissatisfied from this decision.”
When this appeal was heard in this court, the SolicitorGeneral admitted that Choa Siu was a resident Chinese merchant and withdrew that contention from our consideration. The Solicitor-General contends that the testimony of the father and son given before the board of special inquiry “tally so well and without the least discrepancy that it cannot but be attributed to a thorough coaching of the two. This circumstance renders their testimony incredible and unworthy of merit.” We believe the Solicitor-General is misapplying the doctrine enunciated in the case of Lee Chiu vs. Collector of Customs (59 Phil., 730). If witnesses are truthful, there will be an agreement in their testimony as to known facts. It is parrot-like agreement that raises a belief in the mind of an experienced and sensible person that the witness is not testifying from the facts but from memory of a story learned by rote. A general application of the doctrine contended by the Solicitor-General would make it very easy to handle all immigrant cases. If the witnesses agree, it is collusion and the immigrant should be rejected. If they disagree, the immigrant is an impostor and should be excluded. A hearing with such a predetermined result would be a farce. The other contention of the Solicitor-General, often repeated here but never followed, is: “So long as. there is any evidence, be it strong or weak, competent or incompetent, conclusive or inconclusive, to sustain the decision of the customs officials, their decision should not be disturbed.” To say that a scintilla of evidence coming from an incompetent source and inconclusive at best is sufficient to sustain the finding of fact of the administrative board seriously affecting the lives of ° individuals, is an extreme doctrine. Sensible men would not make decisions on weighty affairs of life affecting themselves on such an uncertain foundation. If such is the rule of law binding upon the courts, then it is illusory to say that the courts have a right to inquire whether in administrative proceedings the interested party has had a fair hearing and that the action of the officials was not arbitrary or capricious. In the instant case the major portion of the decision of the board of special inquiry was to the effect that the applicant is not a resident Chinese merchant, yet when the case reached this court, the Solicitor-General, reading the same evidence, was constrained to hold that it is clear that the applicant is a Chinese resident merchant and that the conclusions of the board to the contrary were unwarranted in fact and incorrect in law. The second question is whether Choa Ka is the son of the petitioner. In the decision of the trial court, he states: “It is not controverted that Choa Ka is the child of the applicant.” From this comment of the trial court, it would seem that in that hearing the attorney for the Government was relying upon the status of the father arid did not insist on the question of paternity. One of the grounds recited for the action of the board is the fact that the father and son agreed in their answers to the questions asked them by the board of special inquiry. We have discussed above the proper rule to be applied in such cases. An examination of the evidence given in this case does not show parrot-like language but does show an agreement such as honest witnesses can make in their answers to questions of fact such as were propounded to them. One of the tests they gave to applicant was to show him certain photographs of his brothers. As to the picture of Choa Ti, a brother of the applicant, the immigrant said: “I could not recognize very well”; and when shown the picture of his brother Choa Say, he answered: “It is like Choa Chong’s picture but I am not so sure.” When shown the picture of Choa Siat he said: “It looks like Choa Ti’s picture”, and when shown of a picture of Choa Kian, the applicant said it was the picture of Choa Ti. When shown a picture of Lao Yao, who is not a member of his family, he was not trapped by the question but answered that he did not know him. The photographs were not made a part of the record, sc we cannot state whether they are new or old, good or bad in their likeness to the living persons. The ages of his brothers run from 23 to 15 years. With the exception of the eldest, all the brothers were here in Manila, and the immigrant had been living with them for the two weeks prior to the hearing. Under such circumstances, the picture test has little or no probative value. The board also used the occasion of this case to urge the policy of detaining all immigrants in custody until the hearing and doing away with the release under bond or personal guaranty pending such hearing. Looking at the entire decision of the board, including as it does their views of the status of the father, we are convinced that the action of the board of special inquiry was arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the action of the Court of First Instance of Manila in granting the writ of habeas corpus was correct, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs ,de oficio. So ordered. Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Goddard, and Recto, JJ., concur. Malcolm, J., concurs in the result.