[ G. R. No. 39810. August 31, 1934 ] 60 Phil. 464
[ G. R. No. 39810. August 31, 1934 ]
BENITO TAN CHAT ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ILOILO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
IMPERIAL, J.: On December 14, 1931, the municipal council of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, passed the following ordinance:
“ORDINANCE No. 10—AMENDING ORDINANCE No. 7, SERIES OF 1931.
“Be it enacted by the Municipal Council of Iloilo, Province of Iloilo, by authority of Act 2711, known as the Revised Administrative Code:
“Ordinance No. 7, series of 1931, is hereby amended so that the same will read as follows:
“Section 1. The storing and sale of lumber and the keeping of lumber stores are prohibited on the following streets: Jose Ma. Basa, Andres Bonifacio, Iznart, Ledesma (from Gay Square to Mabini Street), P. Arroyo, General Hughes, General Blanco, Rosario, Progreso, General Luna (from Iznart to Jalandoni), Aldeguer, Zamora, Delgado, Rizal (from Zamora to Iznart), Marina, Sto. Nino, Arsenal, Ortiz and Cotta Drive: Provided, That the lumber stores on said streets Jose Ma. Basa, Andres Bonifacio, Iznart, Ledesma (from Gay Square to Mabini Street), P. Arroyo, General Hughes, General Blanco, Rosario, Progreso, General Luna (from Iznart to Jalandoni), Aldeguer, Zamora, Delgado, Rizal (from Zamora to Iznart), Marina, Sto. Nino, Arsenal, Ortiz and Cotta Drive, which this municipal council considers as public nuisance, are given six (6) months to move, from the date this ordinance takes effect;
“SEC. 2. Violation of this ordinance shall be punished with a line not to exceed two hundred pesos (F200), or imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months or both penalties in the discretion of the court;
“SEC. 3. This ordinance shall take effect on January 1, 1932.
“Approved by the Municipal Council in its special session held on December 14, 1931.—Adopted unanimously.”
The plaintiffs, merchants residing in said city, instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of the province for the purpose of annulling said ordinance, alleging that the same is illegal and in violation of their rights. Upon a bond duly filed by them a writ of preliminary injunction was issued which continues in force up to this time.
In its answer the defendant interposed the following special defenses:
“3. That the streets named in ordinance No. 10, series of 1931, referred to in the fourth paragraph of the complaint constitute the most important commercial and residential zone and the most thickly populated section of the downtown district of this municipality of Iloilo, capital of this Province of Iloilo; and particularly Iznart Street is of the greatest importance because on said street are located numerous and important commercial establishments and beautiful and costly commercial and residential buildings, besides being the principal thoroughfare used by the residents of the downtown district of Iloilo in going to various public offices, centers of learning and charitable institutions, and to many of the municipalities of this province and vice versa.
“4. That in its ordinances No. 1, series of 1911; No. 14 (15), series of 1913; No. 9, series of 1914; and No. 6, series of 1920, the defendant following a plan of expansion, urbanization, beautification and the public safety of its inhabitants, has declared the streets enumerated in ordinance No. 10, series of 1931, referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint, as zones for strong material and fire-proof buildings.
“5. That in violation of the ordinances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the plaintiffs residing on Iznart Street and other persons and entities residing on the other streets referred to in the ordinance mentioned in paragraph 4 of the complaint, have constructed ugly and unsightly buildings, without protection against fire and the spread thereof, wherein they have operated and are operating sawmills and have piled and are piling large quantities of lumber and sawdust, thus marring the beauty of said streets and creating a public nuisance and a source of fire which constantly threatens with destruction and loss of valuable business and individual properties, particularly, as far as this case is concerned, those properties mentioned in paragraph 3 of this answer.
“6. That in accordance with the plan of urbanization and public safety mentioned in paragraph 4 of this answer, and in order to abate the public nuisance caused by the plaintiffs and others as described in the preceding paragraph, and in pursuance of the powers conferred by sections 2238, 2242 (h), and 2243 (c), of the Administrative Code, Act 2711, this last section as amended by Act 3259, the municipal council of Iloilo has passed ordinance No. 10, series of 1931, referred to in paragraph 4 of the complaint and consequently said ordinance is legal and valid.
“7. That the defendant has given the plaintiffs ample and reasonable time to enable them to remove and transfer their lumber stores and sawmills above mentioned, to some other place not prohibited by the ordinance, but they refused and still refuse to do so without legal excuse or justification.”
The defendant appealed from the judgment rendered holding null, illegal and unconstitutional said ordinance, and declaring final and perpetual the preliminary injunction theretofore issued, with costs.
It appears from the evidence that the plaintiffs are lumber merchants with their place of business on Iznart Street, some of them having opened their business previous to the year 1931, and consttucted their buildings of strong material with galvanized iron roofing, some of them built on their own land and others on leased land. Inside said buildings sawed lumber is stored and on the premises blocks and big pieces of lumber are deposited, which are sawed by means of a small sawmill run by petroleum belonging to the plaintiff Benito Tan Chat. The loading of sawed lumber sold by these merchants is usually done within said buildings without annoyance to the neighbors nor to passers-by.
The defendant alleges that the following errors were committed in the judgment:
“I. The lower court erred in holding that ordinance No. 10, series of 1931, of the municipality of Iloilo is null and void.
“II. The lower court committed error in holding that defendant-appellant was not empowered to regulate and prohibit plaintiff-appellees’ lumber business and yards, and by not declaring them as a nuisance within a certain area of the townsite of Iloilo.
“III. The lower court erred in denying defendant-appellant to establish the fact that on both sides of Iznart Street of the municipality of Iloilo there are costly and beautiful large buildings for commercial or store and residential purposes immediately adjoining the saw-mills, lumber business and yards belonging to plaintiff-appellees.”
In our opinion the only question to be determined is whether or not the ordinance in question was enacted by the defendant in the exercise of the powers conferred upon it by the Legislature, in other words, in the exercise of its police power including the power to abate public nuisances and to divide its territory into commercial and residential zones.
Such powers are enumerated in sections 2238, 2242, and 2243 of the Revised Administrative Code. The provisions applicable to the instant case are as follows:
“SEC. 2238. General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.—The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein.”
“SEC. 2242. Certain legislative powers of mandatory character.—It shall be the duty of the municipal council, comformably with law:
“(h) To declare and abate nuisances.”
“SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary diameter.—The municipal council shall have authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
“(c)‘To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or repaired within them, and issue permits for the erection or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall accrue to the municipal school fund.”
By virtue of the police power and the express provisions of section 2242 (h) of the Revised Administrative Code, there is no question that the municipalities have power to enact ordinances for the purpose of abating public nuisances. (Switzer vs. Municipality of Cebu, 20 Phil., Ill; Iloilo Ice & Cold Storage Co. vs. Municipal Council of Iloilo, 24 Phil., 471.)
The question which now arises in connection herewith is whether or not the sawmill and lumber stores of the plaintiffs constitute nuisances per se or per accidens. Bearing in mind the nature of such business and the indisputable fact that the conduct thereof necessarily disturbs and annoys passers-by and the neighbors, we do not hesitate to declare that said business constitutes nuisance per accidens or per se.
In the case of State vs. Rosenstein (181 N. W., 107), the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:
“It cannot seriously be doubted that the matter of the location, and to an extent the condition and care of lumber yards, where large quantities of lumber and building material are accumulated in piles and tiers of piles are matters proper for appropriate police regulation and control. The location of such yards may, even though properly cared for by the owner, become a fire menace and a source of danger to and destruction of surrounding property, a rendezvous for thieves and other violators of the law, and their location at least should be within control of the proper municipal authorities of every city and village having a population and built-up district sufficiently large to render them or their use a menace to public order and safety. The Legislature could itself by appropriate statutory provisions regulate the subject, and may delegate the authority to local municipalities. That the authority is fully vested in the city of Minneapolis by the quoted provisions of its charter is clear. It is there granted in clear terms and is in no way restricted by the proviso added thereto, as above quoted, except perhaps that regulations imposed by city ordinances existing at the time the present charter power was granted may not be changed. But whether the earlier regulations may be changed or modified is not here involved. The authority thus conferred upon the city is full and complete and sustains the ordinance in question.”
The ordinance clearly states that the sawmill and the sale of lumber by the plaintiffs on Iznart Street constitute public nuisances; and although the question of fact herein involved may properly be reviewed by the courts, the evidence of record sufficiently justifies such conclusion. The power of the municipalities, in the exercise of their police power, to regulate and abate public nuisances is indisputable, when the measure taken to that end is sound and reasonable, and redounds to the benefit of the locality. Such power has been expressly delegated by the Legislature according to the section above cited.
“One of the most usual powers enjoyed by municipal corporations is that of suppressing nuisances. The abatement of nuisances by municipal corporations is a governmental function. The legislature may, and often does, confer such power upon them. The power may arise by express grant or by necessary implication. It usually is enjoyed as part of the police power, especially that part of the police power dealing with the protection of the health of the inhabitants of the municipal corporation. And the exercise of the power is generally considered as a proper municipal function which it is the duty of municipal corporations to exercise. The power to abate nuisances may extend to abate nuisances created by public utilities.
“Primarily .it is within the power of municipal authorities to determine and declare what shall constitute a nuisance. A large discretion rests with the municipal governing body in determining what constitutes nuisances. But the power must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily. The declaration by municipal authorities that a thing is a nuisance is not a final determination of the question; it is subject to review by the courts both as to its reasonableness and as to the thing inveighed against being in fact a nuisance. A municipal corporation cannot make a thing a nuisance by merely declaring it to be such. Even though the corporation is empowered to declare what shall constitute a nuisance, it cannot declare that to be a nuisance which is not so in fact; it cannot arbitrarily and without support of reason or fact declare that which is harmless a nuisance. The power is limited to such things as the common law or statute declares to be nuisances. But the power may extend to those things which in their nature may be nuisances but as to which there may be honest differences of opinion in impartial minds. Things which are not in their nature nuisances but which may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings, or the manner in which they may be conducted, managed, etc., may, and can only, be declared nuisances by municipal corporations when they are such in fact. The power does not extend to include the power to suppress acts merely vicious or immoral. But the power of a municipal corporation over nuisances may tend to authorize it to prevent a condition likely to become detrimental to the public health as much as it is to abate such conditions after the evil consequences appear. In so far as the legislature may declare nuisances, a municipal corporation nra*y be empowered to declare by ordinance or by-law things or acts nuisances, although they may not be such in the absence of such ordinance or by-law. The power to regulate does not authorize entire prohibition.” (43 C. J., pp. 401-404.)
The next question relates to the establishment of industrial, commercial, and residential zones. This power of municipal corporations is recognized in almost all jurisdictions. It is derived from the police power itself and it is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents of a locality.
“The power of municipal corporations to enact zonin regulations may be derived from constitutional or statutory provisions. Within its constitutional limitations the legislature may authorize such enactment. The power may also be derived directly from the constitution of the state; and state constitutional provisions conferring the power have been upheld as against the objection that they violated the federal constitution as a denial of the equal protection of the law, or discrimination. Also, the statutes conferring the power have been upheld as against the objection that they were violative of the federal constitution.” (43 C. J., pp. 333, 334.)
“It has been suggested that the police power residing in the state legislature is sufficient to authorize the enactment of zoning statutes, if done wisely; that zoning under the power of eminent domain is unwise; and that there is no necessity for constitutional amendment to provide for zoning.” (Ibid., p. 334.)
“As a general rule, subject to the limitations to be noted hereinafter, municipal corporations may enjoy the right or power to enact reasonable zoning regulations. Regulations to that effect have been upheld as against the objection that they were unconstitutional, as denial of due process or equal protection of the law, and that they were discriminatory. The power is not an inherent one; it can be exercised only when it is expressly conferred on the municipal corporation or rises by necessary implication. While it has been held that the power to enact certain zoning regulations cannot be exercised as an incident of the municipal police power, the weight of authority is to the effect that reasonable zoning regulations may be proper exercise of the municipal police power. * * ?” (Ibid., pp. 334, 335.)
In the case of People vs. Cruz (54 Phil., 24), this court said:
“It has been definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases that in the exercise of their police power, municipal corporations may enact ordinances and regulations on zonification, (43 Corpus Juris, 334.) Within the powers granted to municipal councils by section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the zonification ordinance here in question.
“If the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to establish said zone, it was likewise authorized to determine the kinds of machinery that might be installed therein. In prohibiting the installation within the zone of all kinds of machinery save those excepted in the ordinance, the municipal council has done no more than regulate their installation.”
In the case of Seng Kee & Co. vs. Earnshaw and Piatt (56 Phil., 204), in discussing the power of the City of Manila to enact ordinances establishing industrial and residential zones, this court said:
“There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to prescribe that offensive and unwholesome trades and occupations are to be established exclusively in the latter zone.
" ‘The benefits to be derived by cities adopting such regulations (zoning) may be summarized as follows: They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship; they foster pride in and attachment to the city; they promote happiness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value of property and promote the peace, tranquillity, and good order of the city. We do not hesitate to say that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate field for the exercise of the police power. He who owns property in such a district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for the purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated. That he shall not be permitted to use it to the desecration of the community constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and results in no unjust burden.’ (State ex rel. Carter vs. Harper, 182 Wis., 148.)
" ‘It is a matter definitely settled by both Philippine and American cases, and the defendant-appellant so admits, that municipal corporations may, in the exercise of their police power, enact ordinances or regulations on zonification (43 Corpus Juris, 334). Within the powers granted to municipal councils in section 2238 of the Revised Administrative Code, the municipal council of Cabanatuan was authorized to enact the zonification ordinance with which we are now concerned.’ (People vs. Cruz, 54 Phil., 24, 27.)
“Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it is now situated, which has been declared residential, without providing for any compensation; these provisions of the Revised Ordinances do not in fact deprive Manila residents of their property without just compensation, for it deprives them neither of the ownership nor of the possession thereof, but simply restricts them from the use of such property at certain places for the good of the majority of inhabitants.
" ‘The 14th Amendment protects the citizen in his right to engage in any lawful business, but it does not prevent legislation intended to regulate useful occupations which, because of their nature or location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public’ (Murphy vs. California, 225 U. S., 623.)
" ‘Police regulations are not a taking under the right of eminent domain or a deprivation of property without due process of law. Thus, a prohibition on the use of property, for purposes that are declared by valid legislation to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community cannot, in any sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit, as such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it. It is only a declaration by the state that its use by any one for certain forbidden purposes is prejudicial to the public interests, the exercise of the police power by the destruction of the property, which is itself a public nuisance, or the prohibition of its use in a particular way, whereby its value becomes depreciated, is very different from taking property for public use, or from depriving a person of his property without due process of law.’ (Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623; 8 Sup. Ct, 273; 31 L. ed., 205.)”
In the case of Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co., 71 Law. ed., 303, 310 et seq., the Supreme Court of the United States said:
“Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this country about twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution, of course, must fall.
“The ordinance now under review and all similar laws and regulations must find their justification in some aspect of the police power, asserted for the public welfare. The line which in this field separates the legitimate from the illegitimate assumption of power is not capable of precise delimitation. It varies with the circumstances and conditions. A regulatory zoning ordinance, which would be clearly valid as applied to the great cities, might be clearly invalid as applied to rural communities. In solving doubts, the maxim ‘sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,’ which lies at the foundation of so much of the common law of nuisances, ordinarily will furnish a fairly helpful clew. And the law of nuisances, likewise, may be consulted, not for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining the scope of, the power. Thus the question whether the power exists to forbid the erection of a building of a particular kind or for a partic ular use, like the question whether a particular thing is a nuisance, is to be determined, not by an abstract consideration of the building or of the thing considered apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality. Sturges vs. Bridgman, L. R. 11 Ch. Div., 852, 865—C. A. nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place,—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. (Radice vs. New York, 264 U. S., 292, 294; 68 L, ed., 690, 694; 44 Sup. Ct. Rep., 325.)
“There is no serious difference of opinion in respect of the validity of laws and regulations fixing the height of buildings within reasonable limits, the character of materials and methods of construction, and the adjoining area which must be left open, in order to minimize the danger of fire or collapse, the evils of overcrowding, and the like, and excluding from residential sections offensive trades, industries and structures likely to create nuisances. (See Welch vs. Swasey, 214 U. S., 91; 53 L. ed., 923; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 567; Hadacheck vs. Sebastian, 239 U. S., 394; 60 L. ed., 348; 36 Sup. Ct. Rep., 143; Ann. Cas. 1917 B, 927; Reinman vs. Little Rock, 237 U. S., 171; 59 L. ed., 900; 35 Sup. Ct. Rep., 511; Thomas Cusack Co. vs. Chicago, 242 U. S., 526, 529, 530; 61 L. ed., 472, 475; L. R. A., 1918 A, 136; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 190; Ann. Cas. 1917 C, 594.)
“Here, however, the exclusion is in general terms of all industrial establishments, and it may thereby happen that not only offensive or dangerous industries will be excluded, but those which are neither offensive nor dangerous will share the same fate. But this is no more than happens in respect of many practice-forbidding laws which this court has upheld, although drawn in general terms so as to include individual cases that may turn out to be innocuous in themselves. (Hebe Co. vs. Shaw, 248 U. S., 297, 303; 63 L. ed., 255, 258; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 125; Pierce Oil Corp. vs. Hope, 248 U. S., 498, 500; 63 L. ed., 381, 382; 39 Sup. Ct. Rep., 172.) The inclusion of a reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity. Such laws may also find their justification in the fact that, in some fields, the bad fades into the good by such insensible degrees that the two are not capable of being readily distinguished and separated in terms of legislation. In the light of these considerations, we are not prepared to say that the end in view was not sufficient to justify the general rule of the ordinance, although some industries of an innocent character might fall within the prescribed class. It cannot be said that the ordinance in this respect ‘passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of merely arbitrary fiat.’ (Purity Extract & Tonic Co. vs. Lynch, 226 U. S., 192, 204; 57 L. ed., 184, 188; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 44.) Moreover, the restrictive provisions of the ordinance in this particular may be sustained upon the principles applicable to the broader exclusion from residential districts of all business and trade structures, presently to be discussed.”
In the case of In re Montgomery (163 Cal., 457), the Supreme Court of California said:
“An ordinance of the City of Los Angeles, dividing the territory included in the municipality into industrial and residential districts, and prohibiting the maintenance or conduct within the residential district of ‘any stone-crusher, rolling-mill, machine-shop, planing-mill, carpet-beating establishment, hay-barn, woodyard, lumber-yard, public laundry or wash-house,’ is a legitimate and constitutional exercise of the police power of the city.”
And in the case of State vs. McDonald (121 So. R., 613, 614), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said:
“Provision of zoning ordinance requiring that businesses in affected area must liquidate within one year and remove from area held not harsh, arbitrary or unreasonable.
“Discretion of municipal authorities in enacting zoning ordinances under Const. 1921, art. 14, sec. 29, and Act No. 27 of 1918, and Act No. 240 of 1926, to order removal of business establishments from residential districts, and to fix time limits, will not be interfered with by courts, unless its exercise is found to be manifestly and palpably hostile and unreasonable.”
The argument that the provision of ordinance givin the plaintiffs a fixed period, to move their sawmill and lumber stores to some other adequate place is unconstitutional, on the ground that said measure is confiscatory and does not provide adequate compensation, is untenable, for the reason that in this case the city of Iloilo does not take over the ownership of said business but simply prohibits the conduct of said industry or business within the limits established in the ordinance, and said prohibition is within the powers conferred upon the municipality. In enacting the ordinance in question the city of Iloilo has done nothing but to safeguard the health, safety, and welfare of its inhabitants, and it is perfectly fair that the herein plaintiffs should abide by the provisions thereof which are in accordance with the old and well-known maxim: salus populi suprema, lex.
In view of the foregoing, the above quoted ordinance is hereby declared valid and the judgment appealed from is reversed, with costs of both instances against the plaintiffappellees. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued is set aside. So ordered.
Avancena, C. J., Malcolm, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Diaz, JJ., concur.