[ G. R. No. 36701. March 28, 1934 ] 59 Phil. 809
[ G. R. No. 36701. March 28, 1934 ]
TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ORIENT INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT [No. 36702. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. [No. 36703. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ASSURANCE CORPORATION, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. [No. 36704. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CALEDONIAN INSURANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. [No. 36705. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. ATLAS ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. [No. 36706. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE CONTINENTAL INSURANCE CO., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. [No. 36707. March 28, 1934] TEAL MOTOR COMPANY, INC., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
HULL, J.:
These seven cases relate to insurance policies covering the goods, wares, and merchandise contained in the building in the Port Area in the City of Manila which was damaged by a fire of unknown origin the afternoon of Sunday, January 6, 1929. At the request of the insured, the companies gave additional time for the filing of the claims of loss. These claims were definitely rejected in writing by the insurance companies through their agents on April 15, 1929.
Among the special defenses of the insurance companies is one based upon a clause in the policies which, with the exception of those of the Atlas Assurance Company, Ltd., among other things provides:
“* * * if the claim be made and rejected, and action or suit be not commenced within three months after such rejection, * * * all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited.”
While these cases were under advisement here, we noticed that the provision relating to the Atlas policy reads:
“* * * if the claim be made and rejected and arbitration proceedings be not commenced in pursuance of the 18th Condition of this Policy within three months after such rejection; all benefit under this Policy shall be forfeited.”
No such arbitration proceedings were instituted within the three months’ period. Both in the lower court and here attorneys for both sides, although they knew that all of the policies were not uniform, treated these two clauses as having the same practical effect. The majority believe that we should take this case as made and submitted to us and not attempt to make any differentiation on points on which we have not had the assistance of counsel. Nor are we concerned over the fact that these clauses were in small print on the back of the policies as both the president of plaintiff corporation and the attorney for plaintiff testified that they were fully conversant with the terms of the policies.
The seven suits were filed between the 3rd and the 15th day of August, 1929, or more than three months after the rejection by the defendant companies of plaintiff’s claim. Suits were brought on the policies covering the building, the first week in June. From March until June at various times, Bachrach, the president of the Teal Motor Company, and Teal had informal conversations principally with Elser, the general agent of a number of the insurance companies, looking to an extrajudicial settlement. Elser was receptive but stated that the Royal Insurance Company, Ltd., represented here by Selkirk, having the largest policies, would have to take the lead in any such negotiations. Selkirk took the position that as the claims had been rejected by the adjusters and that as the matter was in the hands of the attorneys, conversations were of no moment and he would consider nothing but a formal statement. It is presumed that he meant by “formal statement” a definite, concrete proposition in writing.
On May 31, 1929, an article appeared in the daily press, whereupon Elser telephoned plaintiff that any negotiations they might have looking to an extrajudicial settlement were at an end and that they might as well sue. Bachrach testifies that Elser asked him not to sue and places such a request after the 1st of June. This is denied by Elser, and Elser is corroborated by the whole record. What negotiations there were for a settlement were at the request of plaintiff, were of the most informal and inconsequential kind, and could not have had the objective of lulling a shrewd and active business man, advised by competent attorneys, into a confident belief of an extrajudicial settlement so that he would sleep upon his rights.
The trial court held that even at best only the negotiations for compromise that took place some time after the 15th of April and terminated on the 31st of May could be considered and also held that there was ample time from the 1st of June to the 15th of July for plaintiff to formulate and file in the Court of First Instance of Manila its complaints.
Plaintiff was given such time as it deemed necessary to formulate and present its claim of loss. That claim was investigated by the adjusters for several months, and under the contract of insurance, the insured had three months after rejection in which to bring suit. The issues were virtually joined on the presentation of the claims and their rejection by the companies in writing, and three months thereafter is not an unreasonably short time to draft and file in court an appropriate complaint on a contract of fire insurance.
“A provision requiring presentation of claim within three months after fire, and the bringing of action within three months after refusal of claim is valid.” (Miller vs. Northern Assur. Co., 1 Porto Rico Fed., 420. See also E. Macias & Co. vs. China Fire Insurance & Co., 46 Phil., 345.)
Concurring with the view of the trial court that these cases were not brought within time, it is unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the question whether or not there were overinsurance and false claims of loss in these cases.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur.
Justice Vickers voted to affirm the decisions of the lower court in these cases, with modification, but was absent at the time of the promulgation of the opinion and his name does not appear signed thereto.—STREET, Acting C. J.