[ G.R. No. 38850. December 11, 1933 ] 59 Phil. 67
[ G.R. No. 38850. December 11, 1933 ]
ANTONIO ESTIVA AND ANGELA REYES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. GONZALO CAWIL, FELIX A. GESMUNDO, ESTANISLAO ALINEA, ROMUALDO BANATLAO, ALEJANDRO M. PANIS, AND ELADIO R. ALDECOA, DEFENDANTS. GONZALO CAWIL, ROMUALDO BANATLAO, ALEJANDRO M. PANIS, AND ELADIO R. ALDECOA, APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
Assignments of error: Fifty-eight for one appellant, the same number plus three additional ones for another appellant, forty for another appellant, and fifteen for the fourth appellant—or one hundred and sixteen in all.
Briefs: For one appellant, one hundred and seventy-eight pages, for another appellant, six pages, for another appellant, twenty-eight pages, for the fourth appellant, ten pages, and for the appellees, two hundred and fifty-six pages.
Stenographic record: Six hundred and eighty-five pages and numerous exhibits.
Oral argument of the permitted time, with a citation of additional authorities.
We have read the bill of exceptions, the specified errors, the briefs, and the record, and have listened to the arguments, as indeed it was our duty to do, but we have not done so in a gracious mood, for it has seemed to us that counsel could have lightened the burden thrown upon the court. It is doubtful if the United States Supreme Court would have countenanced the presentation of briefs relying on so many errors and of such length, and simply because a more tolerant attitude has been adopted by this court does not imply a willingness to see such a practice continue.
The Rules of this court do not attempt to limit the number of assigned errors or the length of the briefs. At the same time, counsel could voluntarily assist in the prompt disposition of the business of the court by making only an assignment of the errors alleged to have been committed in the trial court which are prejudicial and reversible, and by plainly and concisely presenting their cases in well ordered briefs to the court. We proceed on the assumption, as did one Federal Judge, that it is “not fair to assume from the number of assignments that all of them are without merit” (Whitehead vs. U. S. [1917], 245 Fed., 385). Nevertheless in a case of this character it could hardly be expected of us to rule on more than one hundred specified errors. As to the briefs, let it be recalled that the word “brief is derived from the Latin brevis, and the French briefe, and literally means a short or condensed statement. The purpose of the brief, as all law students and lawyers know, is to present to the court in concise form the points and questions in controversy, and by fair argument on the facts and law of the case to assist the court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion. The brief should be so prepared as to minimize the labor of the court in the examination of the record upon which the appeal is heard and determined. We feel free to insert these observations bluntly presenting the viewpoint of the court for the benefit not particularly of the lawyers in this case but of the Philippine bar in general.
The issue on appeal is simple and consists in determining if the evidence is sufficient to support the findings of the trial judge leading to the annulment of Exhibits A, B, and C. Exhibit A, it should be explained, is the document by which Mr. and Mrs. Antonio Estiva purported to grant to Gonzalo Cawil a broad and absolute power to sell their property, but which the spouses claimed was not their purpose, their necessities simply requiring the securing of a loan and not an absolute transfer of property. Exhibit B is the deed by Gonzalo Cawil of the property to Alejandro M. Panis for the sum of P17,000. And Exhibit C executed on the same day as Exhibit B is the mortgage of the property by Alejandro M. Panis to Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, a cousin by marriage. As can be surmised, the issue presented almost entirely questions of fact. In first instance, Judge Recto accepted as veracious the testimony of the plaintiffs, rejected as fallacious much of the testimony for the defendants, found present numerous circumstances to sustain the thesis for the plaintiffs, and found present numerous circumstances to undermine the thesis for the defendants. As before intimated, we have studied carefully all the record and having done so we are entirely unable to say that a preponderance of the evidence does not support the trial judge in his findings. Accordingly, to save the time of the court we are content to make the decision of the trial judge[1] the decision of the appellate court.
Wherefore, deciding the issue in the manner hereinbefore indicated, accepting the findings of fact substantially as made by the trial judge, and noting in the record no reversible or prejudicial error, the result will be the affirmance of the judgment, the costs of this instance to be paid jointly and severally by the appellants.
Villa-Real, Hull, Imperial, and Diaz, JJ., concur.