[ G.R. No. 37320. August 15, 1932 ] 57 Phil. 52
[ G.R. No. 37320. August 15, 1932 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, AND ISIDORO ARAGON AND TEODORICA RUIZ, OFFENDED PARTIES AND APPELLANTS, VS. VICENTA GUIDO AND HONORATA AGUIRRE, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
VILLAMOR, J.:
This appeal is an incident of criminal case No. 43226 ofthe Court of First Instance of Manila in which Vicenta Guido y Crisologo and Honorata Aguirre were prosecuted for the crime of qualified theft of certain jewelry. The accused were found guilty and sentenced, the former to ten years and one day of presidio mayor with the accessaries of article 57 of the Penal Code, to indemnify the offended party, Levy Hermanos, Inc., in the amount of P7.405.45, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and.to pay one-half of the costs; and the latter to one year and eight months of presidio correctional, with the accessaries of article 58 of the Penal Code, to indemnify the offended party, Levy Hermanos, Inc., in the amount of P7,405.45, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third the duration of the principal penalty, and to pay one-half of the costs.
The court further ordered that the stolen jewels that were recovered be restored to the owner, Levy Hermanos, Inc.
The appellants appealed from that part of the sentence ordering the return of the jewels to the owner, without making provision for the indemnification of the owners of the pawnshops where they were pawned.
Leaving aside the merits of the present appeal, and confining ourselves to deciding the motion to dismiss said appeal, we believe the appellants, alleging as they do that they have been prejudiced by the judgment of the court ordering the return of the jewels to the owner without making provision for the reimbursement of the value of the pledges, may validly appeal from said judgment in accordance with section 44 of General Orders, No. 58, providing:
“Either party may appeal from a final judgment or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. The people of the Philippine Islands may also appeal from a judgment for the defendant rendered on a demurrer to an information or complaint, and from an order dismissing a complaint or information.” (As amended by section 4, Act No. 2886.)
The word “party” used in the law must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceedings. In accordance with this interpretation it has always been recognized in this jurisdiction that the sureties of the defendant are interested parties in the civil question of the forfeiture of the bond, and may take an appeal from any order entered against them in the criminal action. No one has disputed their right to appeal in such cases and the files of this court abound with proceedings of this nature.
In the present case no attempt is made to decide whether there is any merit in the appeal; it is not incumbent upon us to decide now whether the grounds alleged by the appellants are in conformity with the law or not. The only question raised by the motion for dismissal is whether the appellants are entitled to appeal from the aforementioned order.
In order to decide said question one need but ask whether the appellants were prejudiced in any substantial right of theirs with relation to the jewels. That they were prejudiced, there can be no doubt, because, if the order appealed from were carried out, they would be deprived of the possession of said jewels without the corresponding compensation, equivalent to the amount for which they were pledged. Inasmuch as they are thus prejudiced, it is evident that they are interested and necessary parties to the incident and are therefore entitled to intervene directly therein.
It is immaterial that the appellants may bring a civil suit against La Estrella del Norte, Inc., to recover the amount for which the jewels were pledged, in case such an independent action could be maintained. If the appellants have two remedies within the law, they should not be compelled to resort to the very one th§y have not chosen, there being no legal provision prohibiting their choice.
The question raised is not entirely new in this jurisdiction. In the case of United States vs. Bruhez (28 Phil., 305), Joaquin Lorenzo Uy had been convicted of the illegal importation of opium and the sum of P3,500 in the form of seven P500 bills was confiscated by the customs authorities and presented to the court during the trial. This amount, according to the evidence, had been delivered to Bruhez, at that time a customs inspector, as a bribe, so that he would allow the entry of smuggled opium. Subsequently, Ignacio Velasco, a third party to the criminal action, entered an appearance praying that the sum of money be returned to him, alleging that it belonged to him, and had been wrongfully obtained by Lorenzo by means of a forged cheque. The court denied the petition on the ground that it had no jurisdiction ove the money which had been already confiscated by the customs officials. This court, speaking through Justice Moreland in its decision, said:
“It is our opinion that the court below should have resolved all of the questions presented by the issues, among them being the ownership of the P3,500. If that money was owned by Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo and was by him used to bribe a customs official to permit the illegal importation of opium, it became an instrument used in the commission of that’crime and would be susceptible to the dispositions provided for in articles 25 and 62 of the Penal Code. Article 25 provides, among other things, that, as an accessory penalty, there shall be a forfeiture of the instruments and proceeds of the offense’ and article 62 provides that ’every penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instrument with which it was committed. Such proceeds and instruments shall be forfeited unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense.'
“These articles constitute the law which governs the disposition of the money in question. If Joaquin Lorenzo Uy Yjo had been convicted of the crime of bribery, then. the money paid as a bribe would have been forfeited by virtue of article 389. The crime charged and prosecuted, however, being that of illegal importation of opium, the money became an instrument used in the commission of the crime and, therefore, became subject to the articles of the Penal Code already referred to.
“Under these articles of the Penal Code the court trying the cause has jurisdiction to determine the ownership and disposition of the instrument used in the commission of the crime, and any person claiming this instrument has a right to take his proceeding in that court for the purpose of determining his rights in the premises.” (Pages 309 and 310.)
A careful reading of the decision in the case above cited will show not only that the right to intervene and to appeal of the person claiming to be the owner of the confiscated money in connection with the crimes of illegal importation and bribery, was recognized, but that it clearly and expressly decided that the ownership of said money and other similar incidents should all be determined in the criminal action in pursuance of the provisions of articles 25 and62 of the old Penal Code, or articles 25 and 45 respectively, of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, the offended party, be he the owner of the property stolen or misappropriated, or the owner of the pawnshop, may appeal from the judgment of the trial court with reference to the indemnity to be paid resulting from the commission of the offense. The pawnbrokers, herein appellants, are deemed to have been prejudiced by the commission of the crime, because by reason of the fact that the jewels pledged to them had been stolen they will now be deprived of their possession without first having a declaration of indemnity for the amount of the pledges.
By virtue of the foregoing, without passing upon the merits of the appeal, in order that the appellants may file their briefs, the motion for dismissal is hereby denied, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
I concur in the result.
HULL, J.:
I concur in the result.