[ G.R. No. 34194. February 20, 1932 ] 56 Phil. 542
[ G.R. No. 34194. February 20, 1932 ]
BENIGNA CAUNAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
IMPERIAL, J.:
Benigna Caunan, mother and next of kin to the deceased Gregorio Afable, brought this action under the Workmen’s Compensation Act to recover a certain sum of money from the defendant, a commercial company duly organized and registered in accordance with law, by way of compensation for the death of said deceased, which took place while he was working for said company. The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas dismissing her complaint, without costs.
The facts proven have been summed up by the trial court as follows:
“Before the incident in question occurred, the defendant maintained a branch house where rice and cigarettes were sold. Ten years before, the branch had been closed, and since that time the company had engaged in Mauban exclusively in the purchase of copra. While the house was being so used, the ground floor served as the office and the first story as the dwelling place of the employees. The actual operations and transactions with regard to the purchase of copra took place in a shed situated about seven meters from the house. However, the employees did not live in the house by way of partial compensation for their services, but as caretakers of the building.
“Under these circumstances, the roof of the house required repairing. The defendant had its employee in Lucena, Alejandro Maralit, look for a carpenter to undertake the repairs. He engaged carpenter Esteban Madeja, who needed additional men, and, among others, secured the services of Gregorio Afable, the plaintiff’s son. On October 3, 1929, Esteban Madeja, Gregorio Afable, and the other carpenters went over to Mauban, where they presented themselves to Quiterio Borgoiia, the defendant’s head buyer in that town. These carpenters worked from the 3d to the 5th of October. In the afternoon of the latter day, Gregorio Afable was employed in nailing down the iron roof of the house, when, stepping on a sheet of galvanized iron not yet nailed, he slipped and fell seven meters to the ground, dying the following day as a result of the accident.
That afternoon it had rained, but Afable wore rubber-soled shoes.”
Counsel for the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in his typewritten brief:
“1. The trial court erred in holding that laborer Gregorio Afable was guilty of notorious negligence.
“2. The trial court erred in not awarding to the plaintiff the compensation provided for in paragraph (d) of section 8 of Act No. 3428.”
In our opinion the only point in controversy requiring a careful and serious consideration is whether the injured workman was guilty of notorious negligence, as this phrase is used in the law. This is so because, according to section 4 of Act No. 3428 of the Philippine Legislature, notorious negligence is one of the three grounds for denying indemnity or compensation to the workman for an accidental injury, incapacity, or death. In view of the conclusions hereinafter stated, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other aspects of the case, relative to the nature of the building where the accident occurred, and the capacity in which the injured workman was rendering services.
The record shows, as the trial court correctly held, that on that afternoon, before the accident occurred which proved fatal to Gregorio Afable, it had rained and the galvanized iron roof was slippery. The deceased workman, who could not have been inexperienced, inasmuch as he had been following his trade for a number of years and had been working on that building for a month, in spite of that condition, in itself dangerous, wore rubber-soled shoes, and without taking the necessary and proper precautions that a careful workman would take, stepped on an iron sheet not yet nailed down, and because of his own weight, the angle of the roof, and its slippery condition, the sheet slid down seven meters to the ground, taking him with it, as a result of which accident he died the following day.
However much the deceased may be deserving of our sympathy, we cannot but adhere to the conclusion at which the trial court arrived, that the accident was caused directly or immediately by his own notorious negligence, so that his legal representative is not entitled to any compensation.
The deceased had been working upon the roof of that building for some time, and he knew which sheets were loose and had to be nailed down; with the exercise of ordinary care and precaution he could have avoided the fatal step that cost him his life. The negligence thus evinced is something more than mere carelessness or lack of foresight, and falls under the designation of evident and manifest, or notorious, negligence.
The appealed judgment is affirmed, without pronouncement of costs in this instance. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Ostrand, Rormuddez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.