[ G. R. No. L-35500. October 27, 1932 ] 57 Phil. 384
[ G. R. No. L-35500. October 27, 1932 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS.. JOSE RUBIO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying appellant’s motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have returned to him the books of account, invoices, and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The case was originally assigned to a Division of Five and was there decided, but subsequently, on representations being made that the interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the Division ordered its decision set aside and the transfer of the case to the court in bane.
The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power to internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to this authority, the chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave testimony under oath before Judge Revilla, in which they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle Juan Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, which it was desired to search. The witnesses, among other things, stated:
“It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in said premises there are fraudulent books, invoices and records.
“I have watched personally the foregoing house for several times in company of the complainant and I can assert positively and with a probable cause that the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices and records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the same keeps in his possession effects and devices to wit: fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation & to subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp.”
Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search warrant was issued in the usual form, reading as follows:
“UNITED STATES OF AMERICA “PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
“IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA
“THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff,
VERSUS
“JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading Corporation, Paramount Corporation and New York Trading Corporation, defendant.
“The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.
“GREETING:
“Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P. I., that the defendant Jose Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that he verily believes upon probable cause that the said books, invoices and records, at No. 129, Calle Juan Luna in the City of Manila, P. I., and the said (personal) property is now being used in the commission of felony.
“You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper assistance and to enter, in the day time or in the night time, into the said dwelling house and there diligently search for fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that you seize and bring them before this court, to be disposed of according to law. “Given under my hand this 26th day of December, 1930.
(Sgd.) “E. P. REVILLA “Judge, Court of First Instance”
On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in the warrant, searched the premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation of which Jose Rubio was the manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to secure a pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant, which motion, after receiving memoranda in support and in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.
The particular portions; of the Act of Congress which are relied upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights, being paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as the Philippine Autonomy Act. These portions of the Organic Act provide: “That the right to. be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated” (“sec. 3, par. 11); and “That no person shall * * * be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself” (sec. 3, par. 3). The applicable statutory provisions are sections ,95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reading as follows:
“SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
“Sec. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following grounds:
“1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
“2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a felony.
“SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
“SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing.
“SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant, which must be substantially in the following form:”
The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the order of the trial court, -the statement of the case, and the law as herein set forth, are the following:
“1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to observe the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issue.
“2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void appellant’s books and papers might be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure under a search warrant.
“3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of appellant’s books and papers was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was, therefore, unlawful.”
The point made in the first error was not originally pressed upon the trial court, and is plainly without merit. The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this case. Appellant’s contention that the search warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been examined, is untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also contended that the application and the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of the two internal revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the property sought to be seized as “fraudulent books, invoices and records”. While it is true that the property to be seized under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather, general, it is not required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under the warrant by seizing property other than that described in the warrant in question. The list of books, invoices, and records seized by said officers is the best evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing those things, and only those, described in the search warrant.
Under the second error, it is claimed that “the books, invoices, and records seized are property which one may lawfully possess; they were searched and seized solely for the purpose of using them as evidence to prove an offense supposed to have been committed by appellant against the internal revenue customs laws, which search and seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by law,” Reliance is placed on the Philippine cases of Regidor vs. Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real ([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first two cited cases reveals that the seizures made under the warrants issued therein were irregular and manifestly in violation of law. In the first case, for instance, the court observed:
“A casual examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit and the list of books, papers, and documents actually seized by the said officers, as represented by their signed statement, above quoted, will show that the officers, in executing the said search warrant, did not limit themselves, in seizing property, to that which was described in the affidavit or search warrant.” (Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)
In the second case, the court said:
“The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search warrant for opium, the officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having a remote or no connection with opium.” (Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures made were in excess of the authority given to the seizing officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly obeyed the command of’their warrant by seizing no other property than that described therein.
In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding was that no public officer has the right to enter the premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure against the will of the occupant and without the proper search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the point under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant, case a search warrant was issued. From the above, it will be seen that the three Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest upon different facts from those in the case at bar.
After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court of April 11, 1932, delivered in the case of United States of America vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris, was received, and it is now urged that this opinion is controlling. Of course, if the opinion, on examination, be found to support the views of the appellant, it would become our duty, even as against any pride which one might have in maintaining a position previously taken, to change front to conform to the pronouncements of the higher court. Turning to the opinion just mentioned, we find it said: “All the searches and seizures were made without a search warrant”-in contrast, the searches and seizures in the case at bar were made with a search warrant. Further, it was said: “The only question presented is whether the searches of the desks, cabinet and baskets and the seizures of the things taken from them were reasonable as an incident of the arrests”- an entirely different state of facts from those before us. Again, it was said: “The Fourth Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of privacy”-an admonition which should be respected in this jurisdiction where constitutional rights are as sacred as in the United States proper. Finally, a contrast was suggested between the search of one’s house or place of business made contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest and a search warrant, and it was said:
“Respondents’ papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime of which respondents were accused or suspected. They could not lawfully be searched for and taken even under a search warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such things and disclosing exactly where they were. (Gouled us. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)
“Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents’ guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime. Thdugh intended to be used to solicit orders for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves unoffending. The decisions of this court distinguish searches of one’s house, office, papers or effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from searches such as those made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take property that has been forfeited to the Government, to discover property concealed to avoid payment of duties for which it is liable, and from searches such as those made for the seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars’ tools, gambling paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission of crime.”
We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Gouled vs. United States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930], 282 U. S., 344). In the first case, it was said:
’ “* * * search warrants * * * may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man’s house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but * * * they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property to be seized, or in the right tp the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be taken. (Boyd Case, 116 U. S., 623, 624; 29 L. ed., 748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)
“There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit and warrant. * * * we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest in them which would justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly issued search warrant, for the purpose of preventing further frauds.
“As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the indictment. It is not difficult, as we have said, to imagine how an executed written contract might be an important agency or instrumentality in the bribing of a public servant and in perpetrating frauds upon the Government so sthat it would have a legitimate and important interest in seizing such a paper in order to prevent further frauds, * * *.”
As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a general exploratory search of premises, the seizure of papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence in a criminal proceeding cannot be sustained where made at a time when no crime was being committed and under a false claim of possession of a search warrant, by one making an arrest of persons on the premises under color of an invalid warrant, who required one of them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open, a desk and safe. It was further ruled that, there is no formula for the determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure, but each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
This brings us in logical order to the third error and the point often made that the seizure of appellant’s books, invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution. The question, in its final analysis, is, were appellant’s books, invoices, and records seized solely for use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or suspected?-or were the books, invoices, and records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud? In the first place, it is to be observed that the public has an interest in the proper regulation of appellant’s books. (Act No. 3292, section 4.) In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager. And in the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause-to adopt the language alike of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the search warrant-that “fraudulent books, invoices, and records” were “now being used in the commission of a felony”.
Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the purpose of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no support for this contention in the record. In the trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: “As we have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were made under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, and not for the purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the violation of said laws committed by the defendant.” On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its position that the seizure was made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the commission of further offenses or fraud against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to be found in the record to prove that the Government has used the books of account, documents, and papers as evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the intention of so doing. All we “know is, that an information was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000 On this showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers were wanted solely for use as evidence of a crime.
A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads us to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that the letter of the law was followed, and that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars. Wherefore, the judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Avanceña, C. J., Villamor, Ostrand, Hull, Viekers, Imperial, and Butte, JJ., concur.