[ G. R. No. 34782. February 13, 1931 ] 55 Phil. 627
[ G. R. No. 34782. February 13, 1931 ]
OTTO GMUR, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EULOGIO P. REVILLA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. [NO. 34798. FEBRUARY 13, 1931] F. E. ZUELLIG, INC., PETITIONER, VS. EULOGIO P. REVILLA, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
We have before us in these cases two separate applications for the writ of mandamus to compel the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila to permit the petitioners, Otto Gmur, Inc., and F. E. Zuellig, Inc., to intervene in certain cases now in their final stages in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the purpose of being heard upon the question of the fees earned by the respondent Jose P. Laurel, as attorney, in said cases. The two applications are now before us for resolution upon the petitions and answers of the several respondents, with the corresponding exhibits. The facts are fully stated in the dissenting opinion; and the cases involve in the main the simple question of the right of a person who has acquired the subject of litigation prior to the rendition of the judgment to intervene for the purpose of being heard in the supplemental proceedings for fixing the fees of the attorneys for the successful plaintiffs. The pertinent facts are briefly these: After Lim Cuan Sy & Co. had taken out several policies of insurance on a certain stock of goods in different insurance companies, a fire occurred which destroyed the insured merchandise. The insurance companies concerned refused to pay the policies on the ground of fraud on the part of the insured in submitting its claims of loss, whereupon the insured instituted six separate actions to recover upon as many different policies, and inasmuch as the issues in all the actions were identical, only one of the cases was tried, while the others were left pending under a stipulation that these actions should be disposed of in the end in conformity with the final judgment entered in the litigated case. The case thus tried was fought to a finish in the Supreme Court, where the judgment of the Court of First Instance favorable to the plaintiff was finally affirmed on November 13, 1930.1 At the conclusion of this litigation the attorney for the plaintiff filed a motion in the Supreme Court, asking that his fees as attorney in the case be noted as a lien of record. This motion was granted. When the record was finally returned to the lower court, the money due to the insured under all of the policies was paid into court by the insurers; and in natural course it became incumbent upon the court to fix the fees of the attorney for the successful plaintiff. At this stage the present petitioners sought to intervene, and the respondent judge having refused to accede to the motion of intervention, the present applications for the writ of mandamus were filed in this court. The only other fact of importance pertinent to the case is that Lim Cuan Sy & Co. had, in the mean- while, been forced into insolvency, Trinidad Jurado Te Kim Juan having been appointed assignee. In the light of these facts certain propositions present themselves to the mind which do not permit of the slightest doubt. The first is that one who renders service as an attorney in a litigated controversy is entitled to be paid for his services, in conformity with the stipulations of any reasonable written contract which he may make with his client. The second is that, where several actions are brought involving identical questions, and one case is litigated as a test case while the others are left pending under a stipulation making the issue in those actions dependent upon the issue in the test case, the value in controversy in such actions should bear its appropriate proportion of the amount due as fees to the attorney. It is a matter of common observation that where large sums in litigation are made to depend upon the result of a test case, such case is contested with an energy and diligence proportionate to the total interests involved. In such case it would be highly unjust to compel the parties interested in the test case to bear the entire expense of the professional talent engaged in the contest; and it would be no less unjust to the attorneys conducting the litigation to limit their compensation to a reasonable proportion of the amount involved in the test case. A tax case or an insurance case based upon a single policy of insurance may involve enormous value to the person or persons interested in the litigation, and the professional labor expended upon it may, as in the test case lately before us in this insurance controversy, out of all proportion to the amount technically involved. Upon the point whether the petitioners should be permitted to intervene in the matter of the determination of the fee to be paid to the attorney who successfully prosecuted the insurance claims in this case, it is clear upon fundamental principles governing procedure that such intervention should be permitted. In this connection it is enough to point out that when the insurance policies now held by these petitioners were assigned to them, they became the real parties in interest, and it is a statutory rule of procedure in this jurisdiction that litigation must be conducted in the name of the real party in interest. At common law, when an interest in litigation was transferred to a stranger, the action abated upon proof of this fact; and now certainly the assignee in such case has a right to be substituted in the place of the original plaintiff. In such a case as this, the assignee, upon making his rights known and applying to the court to be allowed to intervene or to be substituted, is not in the position of an intervenor as he usually presents himself in litigation between others. The true intervenor is a stranger to the litigation, and he usually asserts rights adverse to the actual litigants; while a person substituted in the place of the original parties by assignment to him of the interest in litigation is not adverse to his predecessor. He is a true successor in interest and as such has a right to be substituted in the record in place of the original party from whom or from which his interest is derived. Where such an assignment is asserted in court, there can be no question as to the right of intervention or substitution. But even if the rights of the petitioners in this case should be considered in relation to the ordinary rules governing intervention by adverse parties, their right of intervention would be no less evident; for intervention is here absolutely necessary to protection of their supposed rights. It is true that, as a general rule, the right of a stranger to intervene in an action as an active litigant is dependent upon the discretion of the court, but it is an abuse of judicial discretion to refuse to allow the intervention when the intervenor shows an interest in the subject matter of the litigation of such character that intervention is necessary for the reasonable protection thereof. (Joaquin vs. Herrera, 37 Phil., 705.) In the case before us, if the fee of the attorney representing the insured were to be fixed at an excessive amount, the petitioners, if not permitted to controvert the right to such fee in the proceeding to determine the amount due to the attorney, would have no remedy whatever. But they are entitled to their day in court, and they have a right to be heard upon the question of the amount of the fee. And what could be more reasonable than to declare, as we now do, that the person who must pay a fee has a right to be heard upon the question of its amount? It is suggested that the right to intervene should be denied to the petitioners because their motion to intervene was not presented until after the test case was decided and the money recovered upon the insurance policies had been paid into court. This suggestion loses its force when it is considered that an attorney’s fee cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue over the attorney’s fee only arises when something has been recovered from which the fee is to be paid. For the reasons stated the writs of mandamus will be granted and the respondent judge is directed to permit the petitioners, as assignees of the insurance policies held by them, to intervene, with leave to the assignee and Jose P. Laurel, as interested party, to answer the complaints in intervention.1 Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.