[ G.R. No. 33318. December 20, 1930 ] 55 Phil. 466
[ G.R. No. 33318. December 20, 1930 ]
SMITH, BELL & CO., LTD., PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE MUNICIPALITY OF ZAMBOANGA AND CARLOS DOMINGUEZ, MUNICIPAL TREASURER OF ZAMBOANGA, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS. D E C I S I O N
JOHNS, J.:
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In its opinion the lower court says:
“The powers of a municipal council to impose taxes are defined in sections 2625 and 2628 of the Administrative Code.
“The court, after studying these sections, finds that, although the defendant municipal corporation may issue licenses, fixing the fees to be paid therefor, for professions, businesses, and establishments classified in section 2625 of the Administrative Code, subsection (d), this power does not, in the judgment of the court, extend to the establishment and operation of steam engines, since subsection (c) of said section 2625 only authorizes the defendant corporation to regulate the establishment and operation of such steam engines. If the intention of the Legislature had been different, that is, if it had intended that municipalities might, through their municipal councils, collect license taxes for the establishment of steam engines mentioned in subsection (c) of the aforesaid section 2625, it would have included these activities in subsection (d) of that section.
“Wherefore, the court believes that the defendant municipal corporation has no authority to impose license taxes on the plaintiff company for the establishment in its office of a machine for baling hemp, and that ordinance No. 226 of the defendant municipal corporation, series of 1928, in so far as it imposes such a license tax, is null and void.”
In his. brief for the appellants the Attorney-General says:
“We agree with the above-quoted observations of the lower court. It, however, overlooked the existence of Act No. 3422 which took effect on January 1, 1928, that is, one year prior to the promulgation of municipal-ordinance No. 226, series of 1928, of Zamboanga. Section 1 of said Act says:
“‘Section 1. A municipal council shall have authority to impose municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in the municipality, by requiring them to secure licenses at rates fixed by the municipal council, and to collect fees and charges for services rendered by the municipality, and shall otherwise have power to levy for public local purposes just and uniform taxes other than percentage taxes and taxes on specified articles: Provided, etc’”
The Attorney-General then says:
“The above quoted provision authorizes a municipal council to impose municipal license taxes upon persons engaged in any occupation or business, or exercising privileges in the municipality. It is true it contains a proviso placing it beyond the power of the municipal council to impose taxes, charges, and fees on certain business, occupations and privileges enumerated therein, but the operation of a motor machine for baling hemp is not one of them.”
“4. That many years before this year (1929) the plaintiff has been and is still engaged in the said municipality of Zamboanga in the purchase and sale of hemp, having all the time duly paid all internal revenue taxes and imposts for conducting and in connection with said business.
“5. That as dealer in hemp, the plaintiff owns a machine operated by motor for baling hemp, which machine is located in the municipality of Zamboanga.”
That is to say, that it is agreed that when the ordinance was passed, the plaintiff was engaged in the purchase and sale of hemp in the municipality of Zamboanga, and that it has paid all of the taxes and imposts for that business, and that it owns a “motor for baling hemp,” which machine is located in the municipality. That is to say, the motor of the plaintiff upon which it was required to pay the license is connected with, incidental to, and a part of, plaintiff’s business in the sale and purchase of hemp, and that it has paid all taxes to the government for the operation and conduct of its business. It may be that a motor is not an incident to the purchase of hemp, but even so, it must be conceded that it is incidental to the sale and shipping of hemp.
The purpose and intent of the ordinance is apparent upon its face. It provides that no person, company or corporation shall commence or establish any business or enjoy any of the privileges hereinafter mentioned without first applying for the necessary authority from the municipal president and the payment to the municipal treasury of the taxes imposed upon such business or privilege, and that there shall be collected a day tax payable in advance before enjoying the privilege of the license—
“Section 2307 of Act Numbered 2711, and all Acts or parts of Acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.”
That is to say, to operate and enjoy its business in Zamboanga, plaintiff is required to pay P1.00 per annum as a condition precedent to the use of its engine for the baling of hemp in connection with its business. Again, it is conceded that the ordinance in question was not approved by the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Finance, and section 2 of Act No. 3422 expressly provides that without the approval of that official, the municipal council has no authority to impose municipal license taxes on a business covered by the provisions of this section, if the tax is in excess of P25 per annum. Again, the Attorney-General concedes that under subsection (d) of section 2625 of the Administrative Code, the municipal council does not have the power to levy the tax in question, but contends that it does have the power under Act No. 3422, which went into effect on January 1, 1928, one year prior to the passage of the ordinance in question. The appellee contends that Act No. 3422 does not repeal subsection (d) of section 2625, and that it is now in force in Mindanao and Sulu. It is true that section 3 repeals not only section 2307 of the Administrative Code, but also “all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.” But it will be noted that while specific reference is made to section 2307 of the Administrative Code, no reference whatever is made to subsection (d) of section 2625 of the Administrative Code, and, hence, it must follow that if subsection (d) of section 2625 is repealed, it is repealed by implication and by implication only, and such repeals are not favored by the courts. Again, all general laws of the Philippine Islands are not in force and do not apply to Mindanao and Sulu. Hence, it follows. that, for such reason, if the Legislature had intended to repeal subsection (d) of section 2625 of the Administrative Code, it would have also made specific reference in the repealing clause to that section. All things considered, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Malcolm, Ostrand and Romualdez, JJ., concur.