[ G. R. No. 31919. March 24, 1930 ] 54 Phil. 640
[ G. R. No. 31919. March 24, 1930 ]
VICENTE SANTIAGO, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DECEASED JUAN DIZON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CRISTINA CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
OSTRAND, J.:
h1 { } h2 { background-color:#cccccc; font-weight: bold; } h3 { font-weight: bold; text-transform: uppercase; } div#footer { }It appears from the record that one Juan Dizon died on July 20, 1927, in a house where he had lived for at least twenty years prior to his death. After his death, a petition for the appointment of a special administrator was filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The petition was opposed by Marta Dizon, a close relative of the deceased, but her opposition was overruled and on July 27, 1927, the plaintiff, Vicente Santiago, was appointed special administrator. As such, he took possession of the property left by the deceased, including the house above-mentioned. Two months later, Marta Dizon entered the house and made it her abode, against the will of the plaintiff. Three days later, Cristina Cruz, the herein defendant, also made the house her home on the invitation of Marta Dizon and remained there notwithstanding the objections of the plaintiff.
Trouble immediately ensued, and the plaintiff asserts that the other persons living in the house were insulted and annoyed to such an extent that they were compelled to leave. To prevent further alleged depredations on the part of Marta and Cristina, the plaintiff placed padlocks on most of the doors in the house, and on October 8, 1927, he obtained an order from the Court of First Instance authorizing him to employ sheriffs or Constabulary men to aid him in maintaining order in the house. Three days later, the court revoked said order but authorized the plaintiff to employ deputy sheriffs at his own expense.
Thereafter, Marta Dizon died, but Cristina Cruz still insisted on living in the house, and the plaintiff brought the present action against her for forcible entry and detainer. The justice of the peace rendered judgment in favor of the defendant and absolved her from, the complaint. Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance, that court rendered a judgment ordering the defendant to vacate the premises in question but absolving her from a claim presented by the plaintiff in the same case for expenses incurred by him in employing a deputy sheriff. The total amount of the claim was P2,116,71, Both of the parties appealed to this court, the plaintiff for the denial of his claim of the expenses and the defendant for ordering her to vacate the house.
In our opinion, neither appeal is well taken." The plaintiffs employment of deputy sheriffs seems to have been unnecessary, and we cannot hold that the court below erred in declining to allow him compensation for the resulting expenses.
The defendant-appellant claims that she has inherited an interest in the house and is a tenant in common with the heirs of Juan Dizon and that she therefore cannot be legally ejected from said house. This contention cannot be successfully maintained. The plaintiff held possession of the house before Marta Dizon and the defendant took possession They acquired such possession by force and against the will of the plaintiff, taking the law in their own hands. In these circumstances, the defendant must suffer the consequences of her lawlessness whether she is a part owner of the property or not. The fact that she was invited by Marta Dizon is immaterial; Marta had no greater right than the defendant.
The appealed judgment is affirmed without costs. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.