[ G.R. No. 27878. December 31, 1927 ] 51 Phil. 355
[ G.R. No. 27878. December 31, 1927 ]
CLARA GONZALEZ, FOR HERSELF AND AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF HER DECEASED HUSBAND, AGATON SANCHEZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. GIL CALIMBAS AND PEDRO POBLETE, PROVINCIAL DEPUTY SHERIFF OF BATAAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the court of the justice of the peace of the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, by Clara Gonzalez, in her own right and as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Agaton Sanchez, for the purpose of recovering from Gil Calimbas and Pedro Poblete, the latter as provincial deputy sheriff of Bataan, the lot bearing the number 1034 in the cadastral survey of Balanga, situated in the municipality of Balanga, with the residential building located thereon, and to recover rent and damages for the period during which the plaintiff claims to have been unlawfully deprived of possession. The cause having reached the Court of First Instance by appeal, his Honor, the trial judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff; and from this judgment the plaintiff appealed. It appears that on October 20, 1924, a judgment was rendered in the Court of First Instance of Bataan in a civil case, wherein the defendant Gil Calimbas, as administrator of the estate of Anselma V. Angeles, recovered a sum of money from Agaton Sanchez and wife, Clara Gonzalez. A few months thereafter execution issued from said judgment and was levied by the defendant deputy sheriff upon the house and lot in Balanga, Bataan, which is the subject of this action and which was at the time occupied by the plaintiff Clara Gonzalez, widow of the then deceased Agaton Sanchez. The sheriff’s sale occurred on March 27, 1926, and the property levied upon was purchased by Gil Calimbas, administrator, as the highest and best bidder, for the sum of P4,346.88. On August 11, thereafter, the defendant, as deputy sheriff, at the instance of Calimbas, ejected Anselma V. Angeles from the premises and delivered the property to Calimbas who remained in possession at the time this action was tried. It will be noted that ,the property was sold at sheriff’s sale on March 27, 1926, and that the plaintiff was ejected on August 11, 1926, or less than five months from the date of the sale. The case for the plaintiff supposes that she had the right to retain possession for the entire year allowed by law for the redemption of the property and that she was unlawfully dispossessed. On the other hand, the defendants suppose that the purchaser had the right to immediate possession upon the completion of the sale and consequently that it was the duty of the sheriff to turn the execution debtor out at once. The question here presented was mentioned in Aldecoa & Co. vs. Navarro (23 Phil., 203, 206), but was there left unanswered as unnecessary to the decision. In Velasco vs. Rosenberg’s, Inc. (32 Phil., 72), it was held that a judgment debtor in possession of real property sold under execution cannot be required to pay rent to the purchaser for such property during the period of redemption; and to the same effect is the earlier decision of De la Rosa vs. Revita Santos (10 Phil., 148). In Riosa vs. Verzosa and Bulan (26 Phil., 86), it was held that when real estate is sold under execution and the owner is in possession thereof, he is entitled to remain in possession and to collect the rents and profits during the period allowed for redemption. But in the same decision it was pointed out that by virtue of section 469 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a different rule prevails where the land is in possession of a tenant at the time of the sale. In the light of these and other decisions of this court, it is evident that our statute intends that the debtor shall have the use and occupation of the property during the period allowed for redemption except in the special case where the property is in the hands of a lessee at the time of the sale. It is true that the first paragraph of section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure declares in substance that the purchaser acquires all the right of the judgment debtor in the property, subject to the right of redemption. But that paragraph must be construed as conferring only the inchoate right and not the absolute property with all its incidents. This is in conformity with the interpretation placed by the Supreme Court of California upon section 700 of the Code of Civil Procedure of that State, from which the first paragraph of section 463 of our Code of Civil Procedure is taken. In the California Code said paragraph reads as follows:
“Upon a sale of real property, the purchaser is substituted to, and acquires all the right, title, interest, and claim of the judgment debtor thereto; and when the estate is less than a leasehold of two years’ unexpired term, the sale is absolute. In all other cases the property is subject to redemption, as provided in thi3 chapter.”
Under this provision the Supreme Court of California has declared that the judgment debtor is entitled to retain possession during the entire period allowed by law for redemption and that the purchaser cannot during that period have a receiver appointed to harvest the crops and impound the proceeds (Mau, Sadler & Co. vs. Kearney, 143 Cal, 506). In this connection the American decisions call attention to the difference between the effects of the delivery of the certificate of sale which is given to the purchaser at the time the sale is made and the deed which is delivered to him at the expiration of the period of redemption. The certificate issued to the purchaser under section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure is intended to be a mere memorial of the fact that purchase was made by the person named as buyer in the certificate. This document is not intended to operate as an absolute transfer of the property, but merely to identify the property, to show the price paid, and the date when the right of redemption expires. The effective conveyance of the land is accomplished by the deed which is issued only after the period of redemption has expired. The transfer is not perfect until the execution and delivery of the sheriff’s deed, though it must be understood that when the deed is executed it operates, by relation, from the time when the lien of the judgment was acquired (Foorman vs. Wallace, 75 Cal., 552, 556). As is said in Pike vs. Halpin (188 Mich., 447, 450), the rights secured by an execution purchaser at the sale are inchoate before the deed, and it is necessary for the purchaser to procure his deed to complete his title. The mere purchase and certificate of sale alone do not confer any right to the possession or beneficial use of the premises. In addition to the foregoing considerations it may be noted that section 468 of our Code of Civil Procedure implicitly, but clearly, recognizes the right of the judgment debtor to remain in possession during the year allowed for redemption. Diaz vs. Azcune (31 Phil., 213), is relied upon by the appellee as authority for the proposition that it is the peremptory duty of the sheriff to eject the judgment debtor and place the purchaser,in possession immediately after the land is sold under execution. But that was a case where the period of redemption had passed, and the court was not dealing with the situation that exists before the sale becomes final. On the other hand, the case of Pabico vs. Ong Pauco (43 Phil., 572), relied upon by the appellant, is also indecisive of the point now before us, for the situation there considered by the court was one where a person who was stranger to the judgment and who had long been in undisputed possession of the property was unlawfully ejected by the sheriff. The opinion in that case, however, directs attention to the fact that the official Spanish translation of section 463 of the Code of Civil Procedure is incorrect in indicating that the purchaser shall be placed in possession of property sold under execution. From what has been said it follows that the appealed decision is erroneous. The plaintiff in this case having been improperly turned out of possession before the expiration of the period of redemption, is entitled to recover damages from the sheriff and the execution creditor, as trespassers. If the cause had reached its conclusion prior to the expiration of the period of redemption, the plaintiff would also have been entitled to be restored to possession, but that period has now passed, and damages only can be awarded. The damages to be allowed will be determined by the value of the use and occupation of the property for the period during which the right of redemption continued. Unfortunately no transcript of the testimony submitted in the court below has been brought to this court, with the result that we are unable to assess the damages here; and it will be necessary to remand the cause for further proceedings in order that the trial court may ascertain the amount of said damages and give judgment to the plaintiff for the same. The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion, without costs in this instance. So ordered. Johnson, Malcolm, and Villamor, JJ., concur. Villa-Real, J., concurs in the result.