[ G.R. No. 26757. October 11, 1927 ] 51 Phil. 34
[ G.R. No. 26757. October 11, 1927 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CIRILO SANDAL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This appeal has been brought by the Attorney-General, in behalf of the Government, for the purpose of reversing an order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pampanga sustaining a general demurrer to the information. The fiscal intended in the information to charge an offense under section 45 of the Act of Congress of March 4, 1909, which reads as follows:
“Whoever shall go upon any military reservation, army post, fort, or arsenal, for any purpose prohibited by law or military regulation made in pursuance of law, or whoever shall reenter or be found within any such reservation, post, fort, or arsenal, after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter by any officer or person in command or charge thereof, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.”
The information in question runs thus:
“The undersigned provincial fiscal charges Cirilo Sandal with a violation of section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States, in relation with article 499 of the Revised Administrative Code, as follows: “On or about July 26, 1925, in Camp Stotsenburg of this Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, the above named accused, Cirilo Sandal, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally entered and penetrated within the Military Reserve of Camp Stotsenburg, without the permission or authorization of the authorities of said Camp, and notwithstanding the express prohibition made to the accused by said authorities that he should not enter or penetrate within said Military Reserve. “Act committed in violation of law.”
In sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the prosecution the court below proceeded upon the idea that section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States is not in force in the Philippine Islands: This is a mistake. It is true that in section 1 of the Philippine Bill and section 5 of the Philippine Autonomy Act it is expressly declared that section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 shall not apply to the Philippine Islands. This section provides generally for the extension of the constitution and laws of the United States to all its territories. It results that, as a general thing, Congressional legislation is not in force in these Islands unless expressly so declared by Congress. But this rule has more particular reference to territorial extension and is no obstacle to the enforcement in the Philippine Islands of Congressional laws which are inherently of general application to particular subjects. In Tan Te vs. Bell (27 Phil., 354), it was held that section 3748 of the Revised Statutes is in force in these Islands notwithstanding the fact that section 1891 of the Revised Statutes is not applicable here. Section 3748 confers upon United States Army officers the power to seize military equipment found in possession of other persons than soldiers when title has not been legally acquired through the Government of the United States. If this section must be considered to be in force in the Philippines as an incident of the presence of the Army establishment, no reason is discernible why section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code of the United States should not also be considered in force here. The purpose of the Statute is to confer a cerfcain police power upon the authorities in charge of military reservations, and this provision necessarily accompanies the military authorities wherever a military reservation may be lawfully established. The provision deals with a specific subject matter which is in no wise conditioned by the place of location of the reservation. In the last paragraph of section 75 of “Constitutional Law of the Philippine Islands,” written by Justice George A. Malcolm, of this court, it is said: “We therefore know that the laws of war, and at least one section of the Revised Statutes enacted for the protection of the Army, have followed this agency of national sovereignty to the Philippines, and have consequently inherent force and effect in these Islands without express extension by Congress. What other laws of Congress are in the same class is uncertain.” It is very evident, we think, that the provision now before us is of the character contemplated in the observation quoted. The trial court was therefore in error in supposing that the information was denxurrable for lack of a law denouncing the offense. But the demurrer to the information is in general terms; and a comparison of the provisions of section 45 of the Federal Criminal Code with the facts alleged in the information reveals, we think, a better reason for sustaining the demurrer than that given in the appealed decision. In this connection it will be noted that, under the statute, the first entrance which a person makes into a reservation—if not prohibited by law or military regulation—is lawful. It is the reentrance of a person upon the reservation, or being found therein, after he has once been removed or ordered not to reenter, which constitutes the offense. A first entrance is not an offense unless made for an unlawful purpose. In the case before us it is not alleged that the accused entered the reservation for any purpose prohibited by law or military regulation, nor is it alleged that he was found therein after having been removed therefrom or ordered not to reenter. The information merely charges that the accused entered the reservation without permission and notwithstanding the express prohibition made by the authorities to the accused that he should not enter. It is obvious, therefore, that the information fails to charge an offense. Among the papers brought up with the record is a written notification, dated July 23, 1925, directed to the accused by authority of the Brigadier-General in charge, informing the accused that he must leave the Camp and not again enter the same. This is precisely the kind of notification necessary to lay a basis for this penal prosecution of the accused upon regntering the reservation; but the fiscal who drafted the information failed to follow the language of the statute, and instead of charging a reentrance into the reservation after receipt of the notice, merely charges that the accused entered the reservation. That the statute is commonly understood in the sense of prohibiting a reentrance after removal ox order not to reenter—not a mere first entering upon the reservation—is shown by the annotation to section 45 contained in Federal Statutes Annotated, where it is said that it is the return of a person who has been ejected which constitutes the offense (7 Fed. Stat. An., 2d ed., p. 610). From what has been said it is apparent that though the information does not suffer from the defect imputed to it by the trial judge, the demurrer was nevertheless well founded for the reason that the information merely charges an entrance on the part of the accused into the reservation after he had been ordered to stay out, when it should have charged that he had reentered or was found on the reservation after receiving such an order. Moreover, the real defect from which the information suffers is in its nature amendable, and the court should have ordered that a new information should be filed, in accordance with section 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It results that the appealed order is affirmed in so far as it declares the information to be insufficient but reversed in so far as it orders the dismissal of the case and the cancellation of the bond of the accused; and the cause is remanded with directions to the fiscal to file a new information in conformity with the views expressed in this opinion, the accused meanwhile to be held for trial upon such information. So ordered, without costs. Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.