[ G.R. No. 21042. October 25, 1923 ] 45 Phil. 344
[ G.R. No. 21042. October 25, 1923 ]
DALMACIO COSTAS, AS PRESIDENT OF THE ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ENGINEERS, PETITIONER, VS. VICENTE ALDANESE, AS INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition for the writ of mandamus directed to this court by Dalmacio Costas, as president of the Association of Philippine Engineers, against Vicente Aldanese, as Insular Collector of Customs. Upon the filing of the complaint in this court an order was entered requiring the defendant to enter appearance and answer or demur to the petition. In obedience to this requirement the Attorney-General entered an appearance for the respondent and interposed a demurrer, and the cause is now before us for the resolution of the question presented upon petition and demurrer.
It appears from the complaint that there is a motor boat named the Ramago of Philippine register and pertaining to the port of Manila which is being used in these waters for the making of round trips requiring more than forty-eight hours to the voyage in the course of which it travels at night. It further appears that said boat is propelled by internal combustion engines using petroleum, with a total propulsive force of three hundred and fifty horse-power. The petitioner alleges that this motor boat is a “steamer” within the intendment of subsection (j) of section 1203 of the Administrative Code, as held by this court in Addenbrooke vs. Natividad (43 Phil., 1014), and that by the express provision of law it is required to carry three engineers, namely, one second engineer, one third engineer and one fourth engineer, as expressed in the provision cited. The petitioner, however, alleges that the boat referred to is being run without the proper complement of engineers in that it carries only two engineers, to wit, a first engineer and a second engineer, only one of whom has a license and that as third engineer.
The petitioner alleges that as a citizen of the Philippine Islands, as a naval engineer himself, and as president of the Association of Philippine Engineers, he is desirous of safeguarding the rights of engineers who have license as such; and he alleges that he has protested, though ineffectually, to the Insular Collector of Customs against the insufficiency in the complement of the engineers upon the Ramago. The prayer to the petition is that the respondent Insular Collector be ordered to require the owner, outfitter, consignee and captain of said boat to employ thereon the requisite number of qualified engineers.
We are of the opinion that the situation is not one that requires, or would justify, judicial interference; and the writ must be denied. It is obvious, upon the facts stated in the petition, that the duty the enforcement of which is here sought is of a public nature,—one resting on the respondent Insular Collector in the exercise of the ordinary functions of his office. Again, the petitioner does not have any special or individual interest in the subject-matter of the action which would enable us to say that he is entitled to the writ as a matter of right. His interest is only that of a citizen at large, coupled with the fact that in his representative capacity as president of the Association of Engineers, it is his duty to safeguard the interests of the members of his association.
Now, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that where the duty in question is of a public nature and the application for the writ of mandamus is presented by a stranger, or person having no special or individual interest to protect, the granting or refusing of the writ is discretionary with the court. (In re Rice, 155 U. S., 396; 39 L. ed., 198.)
In Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Hall and Morse (91 U. S., 343, 356), the same court said: “There is, we think, a decided preponderance of American authority in favor of the doctrine that private persons may move for a mandamus to enforce a public duty, not due to the Government as such, without the intervention of the government law officer.” But proceeding further in the same paragraph the same court explicitly stated that in such cases the granting of the writ is discretionary.
Upon the point of the propriety of granting the writ in the instant case, we are of the opinion that the public interest would not be thereby subserved in a degree commensurate with the inconvenience that would result. If we were to countenance this action the decision would be a precedent for judicial interference with the most minute details of the complicated service rendered by the Bureau of Customs and other similar administrative branches of the Government. If one public-spirited citizen can sue, so may others; and the decision in one case will not constitute a bar to another. We think it better to leave the responsibility for securing the fulfillment of duties like that now under consideration to the administrative and executive superiors of the respondent. The petitioner sues in the right of the public, but we see no public good to be attained by judicial interference.
A careful examination of the reports of the Supreme Court of the United States is convincing to the effect that the granting of the writ of mandamus in a situation like that now before us is unwarranted; and it will be sufficient in this connection to refer to the following additional cases on the subject, and particularly to the annotations in Rose’s Notes to these cases: Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr., 137; 2 L. ed., 60; Kendall vs. United States, 12 Pet., 524; 9 L. ed., 1181; Decatur vs. Paulding, 14 Pet., 497; 10 L. ed., 559; United States vs. Black, 128 U. S., 40; 32 L. ed., 354.
We note the fact that there appear to be certain class of cases in which, for one reason or another, the courts are more disposed to entertain the proceeding and grant relief than in others, as in election matters and in controversies arising under the tax laws. Reasons for this attitude on the part of the courts will readily suggest themselves in particular cases. But in the present case the act to be controlled is one within the exercise of the ordinary administrative faculties of the respondent officer, and no consideration occurs to us which demonstrates the necessity or propriety of controlling the respondent in the manner desired.
In conclusion we wish to say that we do not consider our ruling in this case at all inconsistent with the doctrine stated in Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil., 366); but rather the present decision is to be considered a qualification of the Severino case upon grounds consistent with its ratio decidendi. It was broadly stated in that case that when the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce a public duty of a government official, it is not necessary that the petitioner for the writ should demonstrate in himself the special personal interest which would be necessary if the action were brought to enforce or protect a private right. But it will be noted that even in that case the writ was denied upon another ground, and it was not there necessary for the court to consider whether the application for the writ might properly have been denied in the exercise of the discretionary powers of the court. The question of the discretion of the court in dealing with cases of this kind was therefore not involved in that decision.
The demurrer must accordingly be sustained, and unless within five days after notification hereof the petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause of action, an order absolute will be entered, dismissing the same, with costs. So ordered.
Avanceña, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur.