[ G.R. No. 20484. November 13, 1923 ] 45 Phil. 406
[ G.R. No. 20484. November 13, 1923 ]
GEORGE H. GANAWAY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE FIDELITY & SURETY COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES. D E C I S I O N
STATEMENT
Thomas Casey et al. commenced an action in the Court of First Instance, in which the plaintiff here was the defendant. It was founded upon a contract, and prayed for an accounting. In that action the plaintiffs applied for, and obtained, an order of arrest of the defendant under the provisions of Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order was granted upon the condition that the plaintiffs would furnish and approve a bond in the sum of P2,000. This bond was furnished with the plaintiffs in that action, as principals, and the defendant, Fidelity & Surety Company, as surety, and among other things it provides that the plaintiffs, as principals, and the Surety Company, as surety, “in consideration of the above and of the issuance of said order, hereby jointly and severally bind ourselves in the sum of two thousand pesos (P2,000), Philippine currency, under the condition that the surety and the plaintiff will pay all the costs which may be adjudged to the defendant, and all damages which he may sustain by reason of aforesaid order of arrest if the same shall finally be adjudged to have been wrongful or without sufficient cause.” Upon the strength of the bond, the warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued, and he was arrested and confined in Bilibid from the 14th of January, 1922, to the 4th of February, 1922. During the period of his confinement, he applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus upon which he was released.
April 1, 1922, this action was commenced against the Fidelity & Surety Company as defendant, in which after formal allegations it is alleged that on or about October 18, 1921, Thomas Casey and William A. Caldwell commenced an action against this plaintiff in which they sought to recover from him upon an alleged breach of contract; that on January 14, 1922, they applied for the order of arrest, which was granted upon the giving of a bond in the sum of P2,000, with the Surety Company as surety. The plaintiff alleges his confinement in Bilibid and the issuing out and the granting of the writ of habeas corpus, from which he “suffered damages and was forced to pay costs in securing his release from the said arrest and imprisonment in the amount of P4,600,” for which he prays judgment, with interest and costs.
For answer, the Surety Company admits all of the allegations of the complaint, except as to damages, which it specifically denies, and, as a separate defense, alleges that the action in which Caldwell and Casey were plaintiffs, and the plaintiff here was defendant, is still pending in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, and that no finding has been made in the court as to whether the order for the arrest was issued wrongfully and without sufficient cause, and for another defense, it alleges that it became surety in consideration of the signing of the bond by the defendants William A. Caldwell and R. G. Woods, who jointly and severally agreed in writing to pay and reimburse the defendant for any sums of money which it might pay or become liable to pay on account of having signed the bond as surety, and it prays that the complaint be dismissed, and that Caldwell and Woods be made parties defendant, and that in any judgment which may be rendered, the Surety Company shall have the same amount of judgment jointly and severally against Caldwell and Woods. The order was granted, and those parties were made defendants, and after making like admissions and denial as the Surety Company, they allege, in substance, that Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure mentioned in the complaint is unconstitutional, inoperative, null and void, and that every obligation arising therefrom is null and void, and that there is no consideration for the bond, and that the original action is still pending in the Court of First Instance, and that no final action has been rendered there.
Upon such issues, testimony was taken, and the lower court rendered judgment for the defendants and dismissed the complaint, from which the plaintiff appeals, specifying six different assignments of error, in substance that the trial court erred in holding that before the action can be maintained, there must be a final adjudication by the trial court that the arrest was wrongful or without sufficient cause, and in holding that there has been no adjudication by the Supreme Court that the order of arrest was wrongful or without sufficient cause, and in holding that an action for damages must wait the result of a suit in which the party was arrested, and in not deciding in favor of the plaintiff.
JOHNS, J.:
In its opinion the lower court cited and relied upon the decision of this court in Raymundo vs. Carpio (33 Phil., 395), which was an action brought upon an attachment bond under section 427 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in which this court held, in legal effect, that an action cannot be brought upon an attachment bond until after a final judgment has been rendered in the court in which the action was pending, to the effect “that the attachment had been obtained wrongfully or without sufficient cause.”
There is this distinction. In the instant case, a warrant of arrest, which is in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding, was wrongfully issued in the civil action, under which the defendant was arrested and thrown in Bilibid. To obtain his release, he applied direct to this court for a writ of habeas corpus, and in a well-written opinion, the plaintiff was released by this court upon the writ, for the plain, simple reason that his arrest was wrongful and without sufficient cause, and, .as this court held, that under the Jones Law “debtors cannot be committed to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu,” and that the action was founded upon contract. (Ganaway vs. Quillen, 42 Phil., 805.) That was a final adjudication of this court that the arrest of the plaintiff in the civil action was wrongful and without sufficient cause. It is true that in the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the warden of the prison was the only defendant. But it is also true that the defendants here were privies to that proceeding, and are bound by that decision. The plaintiff was confined in prison because the defendants gave the bond. In other words, in the habeas corpus proceeding, there was a final adjudication by this court that the arrest of the defendant was wrongful and without sufficient cause, and that decision binds the defendants as privies to the proceeding.
Upon the facts shown, we are clearly of the opinion that the instant action was not prematurely brought.
The rule in this class of cases is well stated in Corpus Juris, vol. 5, page 526, where it is said:
“Upon undertaking.—(a) In general.—Defendant’s right to maintain an action on the undertaking by plaintiff for defendant’s arrest accrues when it is judicially determined that plaintiff was not entitled to have him arrested, although the original cause is still pending, unless the undertaking is conditioned upon recovery of judgment by defendant, and, although the cause of action and grounds for the arrest are identical, because liability on the bond is fixed by the discharge from arrest.”
The remaining question is the amount of damages which the plaintiff has sustained.
It is conceded that he was confined in Bilibid for twenty-one days. To obtain his release, he was forced to employ counsel and file his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was argued and submitted to this court. There is also testimony tending to show that at the time of his arrest, he had a concession at the carnival grounds for the painting of signs upon the fence surrounding the grounds, for which he had already procured some contracts, and that in the ordinary course of business, he would have obtained a large number of other contracts, upon which he claims that there would have been profits to him and his partner for about P8,000, of which he would have been entitled to one-half.
The evidence as to the amount of damages from loss of business by reason of plaintiff’s arrest is not very clear or satisfactory, but it does tend to show that he sustained some damage from such loss.
The rule as to the measure of damage is well stated on page 528 in the Corpus Juris above cited, as follows:
“The items of damage that may be recovered include the taxable costs, counsel fees in proceedings to vacate the order of arrest, expenses in securing bail, and compensation for loss of earnings during imprisonment.”
We hold that the plaintiff’s arrest was wrongful and without sufficient cause, and that within the meaning of the bond, the question of his wrongful arrest was finally adjudicated in the habeas corpus proceeding in this court. All things considered, we find that the amount of costs and damages which the plaintiff sustained, by reason of his arrest, is P1,500.
The judgment of the lower court will be reversed, and one will be entered here jointly and severally against the Surety Company and William A. Caldwell and R. G. Woods for the sum of P1,500, with interest at the legal rate from this date, and for the costs on appeal and in the lower court, and judgment for a like amount will be entered in favor of the Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands against the defendants William A. Caldwell and R. G. Woods upon their bond to guarantee and protect the Surety Company and hold it harmless. So ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.