[ G.R. No. 19205. February 13, 1923 ] 44 Phil. 489
[ G.R. No. 19205. February 13, 1923 ]
EDUARDO REYES CRISTOBAL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE M. OCSON, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
The plaintiff in this case, Don Eduardo Reyes Cristobal, sues to recover an attorney’s fee, claimed to be due from the defendant, Jose M. Ocson, by virtue of a written contract alleged to have been executed by the parties on September 20, 1921. Upon hearing the cause, his Honor, the trial judge, awarded to the plaintiff the sum of P6,500, with lawful interest from November 14, 1921, and with costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
It appears that shortly prior to the date of the making of the contract upon which this action is founded, the defendant’s father, Don Lucio Ocson, a resident of the City of Manila, died intestate, leaving the defendant as his only son and heir; and it became desirable for the defendant to take out letters of administration, in order that the estate might be settled according to law. Having need of a lawyer to render advice and conduct the necessary proceedings through the courts, the defendant approached the plaintiff, with a view to obtaining: the professional services of the latter; and a written contract of employment was drawn up between the two in due form.
By this contract the plaintiff agreed to take upon himself as attorney the duty of conducting the intestate proceedings in the estate of Don Lucio Ocson, deceased, to a finality, including the effecting of the final partition, and the rendering of any professional service in the Supreme Court that might become necessary in case of an appeal. In consideration of the services thus to be rendered, the defendant agreed to pay to the plaintiff a fee equal to ten per cent (10%) of the amount which should be received by the defendant as heir in the intestacy aforesaid.
To this contract was appended a special stipulation, which we quote in the precise words used in the contract itself, namely, “With the understanding, nevertheless, that if by the desire and will of the first party [Ocson] the second party [Cristobal] should be relieved of his services as attorney before the division, the fee shall be as stipulated and agreed in the present contract and thenceforth shall be deemed due and payable.”
The plaintiff says that this contract was duly signed on the date shown therein by both parties in the presence of two subscribing witnesses, and so the trial judge found, notwithstanding the denial of this fact by the defendant. Upon this point we assume, without attempting to go into details, that the contract was made as stated.
It appears, however, according to the plaintiff’s version of the matter, that the defendant repudiated this agreement within two or three days after it was made and employed another attorney to conduct the proceedings in the intestacy to which reference has been made. Upon this the plaintiff instituted the present action to compel the defendant to pay to the plaintiff a sum equivalent to ten per cent (10%) of the amount which would pertain to the defendant as his share of his father’s estate.
Upon the evidence before him the trial judge found that the share of the defendant in his father’s estate was of the approximate value of P65,000; and upon this basis he estimated the plaintiff’s fee at P6,500, as already stated, assuming, of course, that the stipulation referred to above was valid.
As the case presents itself in this court, a question of law arises which we consider fatal to the plaintiff’s effort to recover the stipulated fee.
In section 29 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that a lawyer shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for the services rendered. (Italics ours.) The purpose of this provision, we may perhaps assume, is primarily to indicate that the compensation of attorneys shall not rest upon a purely honorary basis; but said provision also undeniably prohibits the courts from allowing more as an attorney’s fee in any case than reasonable compensation for the services rendered. This proposition is, however, modified by the closing sentence in the same section, to the effect that when the contract between the lawyer and client is reduced to writing, this shall control as to the amount of the fee to be allowed, if found by the court not to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
Section 32 of the same Code declares that a client may at any time dismiss his lawyer or substitute another in his place. This means that the client can dismiss his lawyer at any time with or without cause; and every lawyer who assumes to render service in a professional capacity in any particular case does so in full knowledge of the fact that his services may be dispensed with at any time. It follows that the dismissal of an attorney by a client cannot be treated as the basis of legal liability, so far as concerns the mere act of dismissal. In such a case any idea of breach of contract on the part of the client is wholly out of the question. Any loss occasioned by such act is damnum absque injuria.
In the case before us the stipulation upon which the action is based was reduced to writing; but this circumstance does not abridge the right of the client to dismiss his attorney, nor does it authorize the court to allow an attorney’s fee in excess of reasonable compensation for the services rendered. The closing sentence of section 29, with reference to written contracts, must be construed in pari materia with the related provisions.
Now, upon examination of the stipulation which is the subject of action here, it will be noted that it. attempts to save to the attorney the full fee contracted to be paid for the entire service, however trivial may be the value of the services rendered before the dismissal of the attorney; and if given the effect intended by the draftsman when said stipulation was inserted in the contract, it will secure to the plaintiff precisely the same benefit that would have accrued to him from a plain breach of the contract, if that conception of liability were here admissible. Obviously said stipulation imposes a condition upon the exercise of a right which the law unconditionally gives to the client.
It has been suggested that the purpose of the provision in section 32, to the effect that the client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, was intended merely to recognize the power of the client to terminate the authority of his attorney, leaving the effects of the violation of the contract, in case the dismissal is unjustified, to be determined by the same considerations that prevail in other cases of breach of contract. With this we are unable to agree. The provision in our opinion not only recognizes the power to dismiss, but gives the client the clear right to do so without thereby .incurring any legal liability whatever.
Under the doctrine prevailing in the United States, attorney’s fees have never been considered to be upon a purely honorary basis; and it is there universally held that even in the absence of special contract, they are entitled, like any body else, to reasonable compensation for the services rendered. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that the relation between attorney and client is one of trust and confidence and this impresses certain features upon contracts between the two which are peculiar. This idea is evidently at the basis of the provisions in our Code of Civil Procedure to which we have referred.
Upon the case before us, it is our opinion that, under the conditions stated, the stipulation upon which the plaintiff relies is unavailing; and he is remitted to his right to recover strictly upon a quantum meruit to the extent of the value of the services rendered, as in Montinola vs. Hofileña (13 Phil., 339).
A decision from the Court of Appeals of the State of New York rendered in the case of Martin vs. Camp (219 N. Y., 170; L. R. A. [1917F], 402), fully sustains the conclusion reached by us in this case. In that State there does not appear to be in force any express statutory provision giving the client the right to dismiss his attorney; but the highest court of that State has for a hundred years maintained the proposition that the client has such right, and in this connection, in the case referred to, the Court of Appeals said:
“That the client may at any time for any reason or without any reason discharge his attorney is a firmly established rule which springs from the personal and confidential nature of the relation which such a contract of employment calls into existence. If the client has the right to terminate the relationship of attorney and client at anytime without cause, it follows as a corollary that the client cannot be compelled to pay damages for exercising a right which is an implied condition of the contract. If in such a case the client can be compelled to pay damages to his attorney for the breach of the contract, the contract under which a client employs an attorney would not differ from the ordinary contract of employment. In such a case the attorney may recover the reasonable value of the services which he has rendered but he cannot recover for damages for the breach of contract. The discharge of the attorney by his client does not constitute a breach of the contract, because it is a term of such contract, implied from the peculiar relationship which the contract calls into existence, that the client may terminate the contract at any time with or without cause.”
Again says the court: “* * * The rule secures to the attorney the right to recover the reasonable value of the services which he has rendered, and is well calculated to promote public confidence in the members of an honorable profession whose relation to their clients is personal and confidential. What has been said declaratory of the rule that the attorney is limited to a recovery upon a quantum meruit does not relate to a case where the attorney in entering into such a contract has changed his position or incurred expense, or to a case where an attorney is employed under a general retainer for a fixed period to perform legal services in relation to matters that may arise during the period of the contract. The plaintiff’s right of action is limited to a recovery for the reasonable value of services rendered.”
We are aware that a number of cases can be cited from American courts where actions for breach of contract have been successfully maintained by attorneys against clients for unjustifiable discharge from service (6 C. J., 724, note 14), but upon examining these cases no reference will be found to any statute or rule of law like that contained in section 32 of our Code of Civil Procedure, recognizing the right of the client to dismiss the attorney; and we believe the rule applicable in this jurisdiction must be substantially the same as that which prevails in the State of New York. Of course where legal services are completely rendered by an attorney as per written contract, the provision contained in section 29 of our Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that the contract shall govern as to the amount of the recovery will have full effect.
Upon examining the record in the case before us, we find that the plaintiff, in reliance upon the contract in question, prepared a petition for letters of administration to be issued in favor of the defendant; and in connection with the preparation of this petition, it was necessary for him to make certain inquiries and secure accurate legal data relative to the death of the decedent. He is undoubtedly entitled to be compensated for this service; and upon taking into consideration the importance of the subject matter and other relevant considerations appropriate to the matter, the majority of the Justices who participate in this decision are of the opinion that the plaintiff should be allowed a fee of P200.
The judgment will accordingly be thus modified, and recovery will be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the amount of P200, with interest from November 14, 1921. So ordered, without special pronouncement as to costs.
Araullo, C.J., Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. Johns, J., concurs in the result only.