[ G. R. No. 19628. December 04, 1922 ] 44 Phil. 138
[ G. R. No. 19628. December 04, 1922 ]
LICHAUCO & COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER, VS. SILVERIO APOSTOL, AS DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, AND RAFAEL CORPUS, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition for the writs of mandamus and injunction, filed in this court by Lichauco & Company against the respondents, Silverio Apostol, as Director of Agriculture, and Rafael Corpus, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. An order having been issued by this court requiring the respondents to appear and show cause why the relief prayed for should not be granted, the Attorney-General presented a return, in the nature of a demurrer, in their behalf; and the cause is now before us for the determination of the questions thus presented.
It is alleged in the complaint that the petitioner is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands and that it has been engaged for several years in the business of importing carabao and other draft animals into the Philippine Islands and that it is now desirous of importing from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum but that the respondent Director of Agriculture refuses to admit said cattle, except upon the condition, stated in Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, that said cattle shall have been immunized from rinderpest before embarcation at Pnom-Pehn. The petitioner therefore asks for an order requiring the respondents to admit the contemplated importation of cattle into the Islands and enjoining them from the enforcement of said administrative order in the future.
The petitioner asserts that under the first proviso to section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3052 of the Philippine Legislature, it has “an absolute and unrestricted right to import carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands” and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner the restriction referred to above, requiring the immunization of the cattle before shipment.
The respondents, on the other hand, rely upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and upon Administrative Order No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated on July 29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture, in relation with Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as supplying authority for the action taken.
Such portions of the laws above-mentioned as are material to the present controversy will be set out in full, preceded by section 1762 of the Administrative Code, as originally enacted, to which will be appended the pertinent parts of the orders referred to and the communication of the Director of Agriculture of August 31,1922.
First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code in original form:
“SEC. 1762. Bringing of diseased animal into Islands forbidden.—Except upon permission of the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of Department first had, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or otherwise bring into the Philippine Islands any animal suffering from, infected with, or dead of any dangerous communicable disease, or any effects pertaining to such animal which are liable to introduce such disease into the Philippine Islands.”
First paragraph of section 1762 of Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 8052 of the Philippine Legislature:
“SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries into the Philippine Islands.—It shall be unlawful for any person or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department, prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.”
Section 1770 of Administrative Code:
“SEC. 1770. Prohibition against bringing of animals from infected foreign countries.—When the Department Head shall by general order declare that a dangerous communicable animal disease prevails in any foreign country, port, or place and that there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of domestic animals therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from such place, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture,”
Department Order No. 6, promulgated on July 28, 1922, by Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources:
“DEPARTMENT ORDER No. 6 } Series of 1922
“Owing to the fact that a dangerous communicable disease known as rinderpest exists in Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, it is hereby declared, in accordance with the provisions of section 1770 of Act No. 2711 (Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands of 1917), that rinderpest prevails in said countries, and as there is danger of spreading such disease by the importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs therefrom, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to ship or bring into the Philippine Islands any such animal, animal effects, parts, or products from Hongkong, French Indo-China and British India, unless the importation thereof shall be authorized under the regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture.
“The provisions of this order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.”
Administrative Order No. 21, of the Bureau of Agriculture, promulgated July 29, 1922, by the Director of Agriculture:
“ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 21. }
“Re importation of cattle, carabaos, and pigs from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India.
“1. Pursuant to the provisions of Department Order No. 6, series of 1922, of the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the present regulations of the Bureau of Agriculture governing the importation of livestock from French Indo-China and Hongkong are hereby amended to the effect that the importation of livestock of the species named in the aforementioned Department Order is hereby prohibited from French Indo-China, Hongkong and India. However, animals immunized against rinderpest, for which the importer before placing his order shall have obtained from the Director of Agriculture a written permit to import them from the above named countries, may be allowed entrance into the Philippine Islands.
“2. This order shall take effect on and after August 1, 1922.”
- Communication of August 31, 192%, from the Acting Director of Agriculture to Faustino Lichauco (in part):
“SIR: In reply to your application for permission to import from 300 to 400 carabaos immunized against rinderpest from Pnom-Pehn, French Indo-China, I have the honor to inform you that the permission is hereby granted, under the following conditions:
“1. Animals must be immunized by the simultaneous method before shipment. At least 10 c. c, of good virulent blood must be injected at the first injection simultaneously with the serum. Ten days after the simultaneous inoculation all non-reactors must receive another injection of not less than 10 c. c. of virulent blood (alone).
“2. The immunization must be done by a veterinarian designated by the French Government for the purpose, who must issue a certificate stating the fact that the animal has been immunized according to the requirements in number 1 and it must not be embarked until ten days after the second injection of virulent blood.
“* * * * * * *
“Very respectfully,
“SILVERIO APOSTOL, “Acting Director of Agriculture.”
Upon glancing over the matter above collated, it will be seen at once that section 1770 of the Administrative Code on its face authorizes the action taken by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in closing our ports (in the manner and to the extent indicated in Department Order No. 6) to the importation of cattle and carabao from French Indo-China, supposing of course, as everybody knows and as the petitioner does not deny, that the disease of rinderpest exists in that country.
It is claimed, however, that section 1762 of the Administrative Code, so far as it authorizes restrictions upon the importation of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, has been impliedly repealed by the amendatory Act No. 3052, which is of later enactment than the Administrative Code; and in this connection reliance is chiefly placed on the first proviso to section 1762, as amended by said Act No. 3052, which is in these words: “Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum.” This then is the first and principal question in the case, namely, whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum. We say repealed by implication, for it will be noted that that Act No. 3052 has no repealing clause, and it contains only one section, i. e., that amending section 1762 of the Administrative Code.
We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No,. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make them inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).
That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Islands at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.
We note that the argument for unrestricted importation extends only to the importation of cattle for draft purposes and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum, leaving section 1770 theoretically in full effect as regards the importation of cattle for other purposes, as where they are imported for slaughter; but the importation of cattle for draft purposes is the principal thing, and unless that can be regulated under the conditions and to the extent attempted by the respondents in this case, the power given in section 1770 is obviously worthless.
In our opinion section 1762, as amended, and section 1770 must be construed in pari materia as harmonious parts of the law dealing with animal quarantine; and section 1762, as amended, can be given effect only in so far as it is not restricted by section 1770. Here, as always, the general must yield to the particular.
If the Congress of the United States should this day repeal the Chinese Exclusion Law so far as it affects these Islands, and should declare that all persons of Chinese nationality shall be at liberty to enter the Philippine Islands without restriction, would anybody suppose that such enactment would have the effect of abolishing the power to maintain quarantine against any Chinese port where cholera or bubonic plague might hereafter be raging in epidemic form? Yet the question now before us is not fundamentally different from the one thus supposed.
The judicial precedents are conclusive to the effect that no implied repeal of a special provision of the character of the one now under consideration will result from the enactment of broader provision of a general nature. In other words, a general statute without negative words does not repeal a previous statute which is particular, even though the provisions of one be different from the other. (Rymer vs. Luzerne County, 12 L. R. A., 192; Petri vs. F. E. Creelman Lumber Co., 199 U. S., 487; 50 L. ed., 281.)
Wherever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in Its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken /to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply. (Sir John Romilly, Master of the Rolls, in Pretty vs. Solly, 26 Beav., 606, 610.)
The additional words of qualification needed to harmonize a general and a prior special provision in the same statute should be added to the general provision, rather than to the special one. (Rodgers vs. United States, 185 U. S., 82; 46 L, ed., 816.)
Specific legislation upon a particular subject is not affected by a general law upon the same subject unless it clearly appears that the provisions of the two laws are so repugnant that the legislators must have intended by the later to modify or repeal the earlier legislation. The special act and the general law must stand together, the one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the general law of the land. (Ex Parte United States, 226 U. S., 420; 57 L. ed., 281; Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S., 556; 27 L. ed., 1030; Partee vs. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 204 Fed. Rep., 970.)
Where there are two acts or provisions, one of which is special and particular, and certainly includes the matter in question, and the other general, which, if standing alone, would include the same matter and thus conflict with the special act or provision, the special must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general act or provision, especially when such general and special acts or provisions are contemporaneous, as the Legislature is not to be presumed to have intended a conflict. (Crane vs. .Reeder and Reeder, 22 Mich., 322, 334; University of Utah vs. Richards, 77 Am. St. Rep., 928.)
It is well settled that repeals by implication are not to be favored. And where two statutes cover, in whole or in part, the same matter, and are not absolutely irreconcilable, the duty of the court—no purpose to repeal being clearly expressed or indicated—is, if possible, to give effect to both. In other words, it must not be supposed that the Legislature intended by a later statute to repeal a prior one on the same subject, unless the last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and explicit in its words as to show that it was intended to cover the whole subject, and therefore to displace the prior statute. (Frost vs. Wenie, 157 U. S., 46; 39 L. ed., 614, 619.)
As stated in the pages of the two most authoritative legal encyclopedias, the rule is that a prior legislative apt will not be impliedly repealed by a later act unless there is a plain, unavoidable and irreconcilable repugnancy between the two. If both acts can by any reasonable construction stand together, both will be sustained. (36 Cyc., 1074-1076; 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 2d ed., 725-726.)
A masterly analysis of the decisions of the United States Courts pertinent to the matter now in hand will be found in the monographic article on “Statutes and Statutory Construction,” written by Chas. C. Moore and prefixed as a General Introduction to Federal Statutes Annotated. The discussion there given is too lengthy to be here reproduced in full, but some of the observations of the learned author are so appropriate to the case before us that we cannot forego the temptation to include the same in this opinion. Says the writer: “The various provisions of an act should be read so that all may, if possible, have their due and conjoint effect without repugnancy or inconsistency. The sections of a code relative to any subject must be harmonized and to that end the letter of any section may sometimes be disregarded. But where absolute harmony between parts of a statute is demonstrably non-existent, the court must reject that one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole, or if there be no such ground for choice between inharmonious sections, the later section being the last expression of the legislative mind must, in construction, vacate the former to the extent of the repugnancy.” (1 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 49-50.)
And speaking with reference to the rule by which special provisions are held to dominate over general provisions in the same or later laws, the author proceeds: " ‘It is an old and familiar rule said Mr. Justice Lamar, ’that where there is in the same statute a particular enactment, and also a general one, which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment.’ And the Justice proceeded to apply that rule in the construction of a statute upon which there had been much ingenious argument and a decided conflict of authority in the inferior federal courts. The statute was an act of Congress of 1876, declaring nonmailable ’every obscene * * * book, pamphlet, paper, writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character,’ and other enumerated articles, and making it a misdemeanor to deposit any of them for mailing. In a prosecution under the act, the Circuit Court certified to the Supreme Court the following Question: Is the knowingly depositing in the mails of an obscene letter, inclosed in an envelope or wrapper upon which there is nothing but the name and address of the person to whom the letter is written, an offense within the act?’ On behalf of the government it was contended that the word ‘writing’ comprehended such a letter, but the Supreme Court held otherwise. In the course of his argument in support of the view of the court, Justice Lamar pointed out that the statute, after enumerating what articles shall be nonmailable, adds a separate and distinct clause declaring that ’every letter upon the envelope of which * * * indecent, lewd, obscene, or lascivious delineations, epithets, terms, or language may be written or printed * * * shall not be conveyed in the mails,’ and the person knowingly or willfully depositing the same in the mails ‘shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,’ etc. ‘This distinctly additional clause/ continued the Justice, ‘specifically designating and describing the particular class of letters which shall be nonmailable, clearly limits the inhibitions of the statute to that class of letters alone whose indecent matter is exposed on the envelope.’” (1 Fed. Stat. Ann., 2d ed., 50-51; also at pp. 164-166.)
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the law-making power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. It is therefore idle to speculate whether in the case before us the Philippine Legislature may or may not have intended to modify or abrogate section 1770 of the Administrative Code at the time the amendment to section 1762 was enacted, for if any such intention was entertained, it was not revealed in a way that would justify a court in giving this intention effect. We may add, however, that, in the opinion of the majority of the Justices participating in this decision, the Legislature in amending section 1762 could not possibly have entertained a design to modify section 1770; for, as we have already shown, the abrogation of that provision, even as regards draft animals alone, would leave the animal industry of the Islands exposed to the danger incident to the unrestricted importation of infected animals from districts where rinderpest prevails. The unreasonableness of this interpretation of the amendatory law alone supplies sufficient warrant for rejecting it. The Legislature could not possibly have intended to destroy the effectiveness of quarantine as regards imported animals.
Our conclusion then is that section 1770 of the Administrative Code remains in full force; and the determination of this question is we think necessarily fatal to the petitioner’s case.
It is insisted, however, that even supposing section 1770 of the Administrative Code to be in force, nevertheless, the requirement of immunization at the port of embarcation is unreasonable, inasmuch as the immunization of the cattle at that port, under the supervision of the Government veterinarians of French Indo-China, is not unconditionally accepted as efficacious by the Philippine authorities, as shown by the fact that the latter further require tests to be made upon the arrival of the cattle here, consisting of inoculation with virulent blood of animals suffering from rinderpest—which involves additional expense and exposes the importer to the loss of his entire herd.
Considerations of this nature are we think more proper to be addressed to the authorities responsible for the regulations than to this court. About the principal fact that rinderpest exists in the regions referred to in Department Order No. 6, there is, and can be no dispute; and when the Department Head declared that the disease prevails in those regions and that there is danger of spreading it by the importation of cattle and carabao into this country, he was acting upon a matter within his province, and we are not disposed to review the conclusion.
It has been suggested that the regulative power vested in the Director of Agriculture under section 1770 of the Administrative Code with respect to the admission of cattle into the Philippine Islands attaches only when the importation has been effected; and that the said Director has no authority to dictate the measures to be taken by the importer before the cattle are embarked for transportation to these Islands. This contention, in our opinion, reflects a mistaken point of view with reference to the effect of the regulations; and the answer is to be found in the consideration that the regulation in question has prospective reference to the condition of the cattle upon their arrival here. In other words, the prior immunization of the cattle is made a condition precedent to the right to bring them in; as much as to say, that only animals conforming to the required type will be admitted. The importer is thus left at entire liberty in respect to the taking of the necessary measures to gain admittance for his cattle in our ports; and if he fails to do so, the penalty merely is that the cattle are not admitted.
Upon the whole we are of the opinion that the petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction. The demurrer interposed thereto by the respondents in their return to the order to show cause, dated October 7, 1922, is therefore sustained, and the temporary restraining order heretofore promulgated in this cause, dated September 21, 1922, is dissolved; and unless within five days after notification hereof the petitioner shall so amend his petition as to show a sufficient cause of action, an order absolute will be entered, dismissing the same, with costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.