[ G. R. No. 19355. October 14, 1922 ] 43 Phil. 930
[ G. R. No. 19355. October 14, 1922 ]
CENTRAL CAPIZ, PETITIONER, VS. FERNANDO SALAS, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE SEVENTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, TIMOTEO UNSON, CLARA LACSON DE UNSON, AND ISAAC ANDRADA, PROVINCIAL DEPUTY SHERIFF OF CAPIZ PROVINCE, RESPONDENTS. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This is an original petition for the writ of certiorari, to quash an attachment issued by the respondent judge, acting as judge of the Court of First Instance in the Province of Capiz. An order to show cause why the writ should not issue having been made by this court in usual course, the respondents have answered; and the case is now before us for a determination of the question presented by the petition and answer. It appears that an action is now pending in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Capiz wherein Timoteo Unson and wife, Clara Lacson de Unson, are seeking to recover from a corporation known as the “Central Capiz” damages to the extent of P163,643.88, for alleged breach of contract. When said action was instituted the plaintiffs applied for a writ of attachment against the property of the defendant on the ground that it was about to dispose of its property with intent to defraud, the plaintiffs. In response to this prayer for an attachment, an order for the issuance of the writ was made, and, bond having been given, an attachment was levied by the sheriff upon the property of the defendant company. Thereafter the attorneys for the corporation interposed a motion in the Court of First Instance for a discharge of the attachment on the ground that the same had been improperly or irregularly issued. This motion was denied by that court; and the present petition was thereupon filed in the Supreme Court. The points upon which the attorneys for the petitioner rely as grounds for the annulment of the order granting this attachment are not defined in the petition, and the only point which we deem it necessary here to discuss, as affecting the jurisdiction of the court or the irregularity of its action in issuing the attachment, is this, namely, whether the allegations of the complaint and the affidavit of Timoteo Unson in support of the application for the attachment are sufficient to justify the issuance of the writ. In section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure the judge or justice of the peace to whom application for an attachment is made is required to grant the writ whenever it is made to appear by affidavit of the plaintiff, or of some other person who knows the facts, that there is a sufficient cause of action, that one of the grounds for attachment specified in section 424 exists, that there is no other sufficient security for the claim, and that the amount due to the plaintiff above all legal set-offs or counterclaims is as much as the sum for which the attachment is sought. All of these requirements are, we think, sufficiently met in the case before us. The affidavit upon which the attachment was granted was made by the plaintiff himself, Timoteo Unson, and it states that he has knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint; that there exists a sufficient cause of action; that the case is one of those contemplated in section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure; that the plaintiffs have no security for their demand; and that the amount claimed, over and above all set-offs, is equal to the amount for which the attachment is sought; and all of these statements are made in almost the precise words of section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Moreover, upon referring to the complaint itself to which this affidavit is annexed, it is at once seen that the claim is one for damages alleged to have been sustained by breach of contract,—which in itself is a sufficient cause of action to justify the issuance of an attachment,—and, further, that the ground of attachment therein alleged is the ground specified in No. 5 of section 412,in relation with section 426 of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, that the defendant is about to dispose of its property with intent to defraud the plaintiff. Under these circumstances the authority of the court to issue the attachment must, in our opinion, be upheld; and this, notwithstanding the fact that in paragraph XI of the complaint it is said that “the plaintiffs are informed, and so allege, that the defendant is attempting and intends” to dispose of its property by mortgage, with the purpose of defrauding the plaintiffs. The allegation there stands out clearly that defendant is attempting to dispose of its property with the fraudulent purpose; and when the affidavit states, as it does, that the affailant, Timoteo Unson, has knowledge of the facts alleged in the complaint, this is sufficient. In our opinion the expression “the plaintiffs are informed” does not weaken the affidavit, which purports to be made upon personal knowledge. It is true that this affidavit may be criticized as being couched in terms that are too general, as for instance, where it is merely stated that the case is one of those contemplated in section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when it would have been better to say plainly that the cause of action arose out of breach of contract and that defendant was about to dispose of its property with intent to defraud the plaintiff, as contemplated in No. 5 of section 412, in relation with section 424 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But these facts are readily ascertainable from the complaint itself, and the mere generality of the statement in the affidavit is not fatal. We are not unaware that respectable decisions from American courts can be cited in which a stricter doctrine is announced than we are inclined to apply in this jurisdiction. The provisions of our Code of Procedure relative to attachment are expressed in very broad terms, and we see no sufficient reason for adopting a construction of those provisions which would interpose technical obstructions, of doubtful propriety, to the usefulness of the remedy. In this connection it may not be out of place to refer to the admonition contained in section 2 of our Code of Civil Procedure to the effect that the provisions of this Code, and the proceedings under it, shall be liberally construed in order to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining speedy justice. It must be remembered in cases of this kind that the bond which is required upon the issuance of attachment is intended to supply, and does in fact supply, a reasonable safeguard against the abuse of the writ. In passing upon this petition we are not concerned with the question whether the defendant was in fact attempting to dispose of its property with intent to defraud the plaintiff. That is a question of fact which in no wise affects the jurisdiction of the court or the regularity of its action in granting the attachment; and though proper to be ventilated, as it was ventilated at the hearing of the motion to dissolve the attachment in the lower court, that question cannot be reviewed in this proceeding. The petition in our opinion shows no sufficient ground for the issuance of the writ prayed for; and it is accordingly denied, with costs. So ordered. Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.