[ G. R. No. 18760. October 09, 1922 ] 43 Phil. 907
[ G. R. No. 18760. October 09, 1922 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. MEDARDO VALTE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
STATEMENT
The following information was filed against the defendant by the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan:
“That on or about the 14th of November, 1921, in the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, Philippine Islands, the accused herein, being the chief of police of the said municipality, with abuse of authority, and by means of intimidation, did wilfully, illegally, and maliciously threaten with a revolver, which he was then carrying, the municipal policeman Segundo Correa to compel the latter to release Pio Bernabe who had been arrested by him by virtue of a judicial order, and was under the custody of the said Segundo Correa; that the latter, having been threatened in the aforesaid manner by the accused with the revolver which the latter was carrying, released, for fear, the said Pio Bernabe, who succeeded in escaping.
“All within the jurisdiction of this Court of First Instance, contrary to law, and with the aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of superior strength, and of public position, and insult or disregard of the public authority.”
February 9, 1921, the defendant was arraigned, the complaint was read to him, and he entered a plea of not guilty when the following proceedings were had:
“The accused after having been informed of the complaint and of the contents thereof plead not guilty.
“BERNARDO. The accused respectfully asks for a reasonable time in order to answer the complaint, in accordance with section 19 of General Order No. 58.
“The COURT. The motion is denied for not having been presented immediately, and because the tendency is to delay the case, for the same attorney who now defends him has asked for a postponement of the case which was denied, and has not presented the demurrer which he announces now.
“BERNARDO. I want respectfully to state that the attorney for the defense does not intend to present any demurrer to the complaint, but that he wants only to exercise the constitutional right granted the accused to ask for a reasonable time, not less than one day, according to section 19 of General Order No. 58. I want also that it be stated in the record that the accused is not duly prepared to enter upon the trial, on the ground that his former attorney has just advised him that he is not prepared for the hearing of the case, and having taken charge of the defense in this case only this morning at 8 o’clock, his present counsel thinks that the time that elapsed from 8 a. m. to 3 p. m. is not sufficient for the due preparation of the defense, and, for this reason, defendant’s counsel submits that, if the trial of this case is carried on, it would injure the substantial rights of the accused.
“THE COURT. There does not appear in the record what the attorney has said, and the Judge who presides this court has seen with regret that many of the accused have tried and are trying to delay the criminal cases when they are set for trial, and the court is interested in disposing of the greatest number of cases possible. Moreover, the accused received notice of the hearing many days ago, and, consequently, he has had time to state to the court the reasons which he now alleges.
“BERNARDO. With my exception.”
Over his protest and objection, the defendant was then and there forced to trial, six days after which the court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to six months of arresto mayor, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and costs, to which the defendant duly excepted, and from which” he appealed and assigns the following errors:
“I. That the trial court erred in denying the motion of the defendant immediately after the arraignment that he be given a reasonable time to prepare for his defense.
“II. That the lower court erred in holding that the prosecution has at the trial of the case proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has committed the crime charged.”
Johns, J.:
The only question which we will consider is the first assignment of error, which does not involve the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Section 19 of General Order No. 58 says:
“If, on the arraingment, the defendant requires it, he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the complaint or information. He may, in his answer to the arraignment, demur or plead to the complaint or information.”
And section 30 says:
“After his plea the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial.”
There is no dispute about the facts. It is true that in the first instance defendant’s counsel stated that he “respectfully asks for a reasonable time in order to answer the complaint, in accordance with section 19 of General Order No. 58,” which was promptly denied by the court. It is also true that in his second appeal, the defendant again specifically mentioned section 19, but the language then used clearly points out that the defendant was not then ready for trial, and advises the court that the attorney who was making the objection was employed at 8 of that morning, and that his former attorney was not able to be present, and among other things says that Mr. Bernardo who had “taken charge of the defense in this case only this morning at 8, thinks that the time that elapsed from 8 a. m. to 3 p. m., is not sufficient for the due preparation of the defense, and, for this reason, defendant’s counsel submits that, if the trial of this case is carried on, it would injure the substantial rights of the accused.” Although in this statement the attorney specifically refers to section 19 of General Order No. 58, and does not mention section 30, it is very apparent from the language used that the defendant was urging the court to give him “a reasonable time not exceeding one day” in which to prepare for trial. The objecting attorney was employed that morning, and the defendant was arraigned and entered his plea of not guilty on the same day, and promptly appealed to the court to grant him time in which to prepare for his defense. This the court not only refused, but in substance reprimanded him and accused him of trying to delay the trial. The language used clearly brings, it within the terms and provisions of section 30 of General Order No. 58, under which, on demand, the defendant, as a matter of law and as a matter of right, is clearly entitled “to at least two days in which to prepare for trial.” He was denied that right and forced to trial upon the day in which he was arraigned, and had to use an attorney whom he employed at 8 a. m. of the day on which he was arraigned.
The defendant cites and relies upon the decision of this court in Schields vs. McMicking (23 Phil., 526), and the prosecution relies upon 238 U. S., 99,[1] in which that decision of this court was reversed. It is only upon principle that either decision is in point. In that case, the defendant was charged with the crime of larceny, and demanded two days in which to prepare for trial. His application was overruled, and he was forced to trial at once, convicted and sentenced. The opinion of this court says:
“He applied for a writ of habeas corpus upon the ground that the judgment was void as a matter of law as he had been convicted without due process of law.”
The writ was allowed, and after a hearing and argument of counsel, the defendant was discharged, Johnson, J., dissenting.
It will be noted there that the defendant applied to this court for a writ of habeas corpus based upon which after trial and conviction in the lower court, he was discharged by this court, as prayed for in the writ. The Attorney-General took the case to the Supreme Court of the United States where the decision of this court was reversed, holding that it was error to discharge the defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding upon the facts shown in the record. In its decision, among other things, this court says:
“Section 30 of General Order No. 58, provides that ‘after his plea the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial.’ The refusal of the time in which to prepare for trial and the consequent forcing of the defendant to his defense on the instant is, under the provisions of our law, equivalent, in our judgment, to the refusal of a legal hearing. It amounts in effect to a denial of a trial. It is an abrogation of that due process of law which is the country’s embodied procedure, without which a defendant has, in law, no trial at all.
“The courts must be the first to follow the law. Where the law is express and, therefore, clear, where it is imperative, and, therefore, with no discretion lodged anywhere, a court should never attempt to change it by interpretation or circumvent it by construction. The lawmakers realized fully the necessity of time to prepare for trial. They well knew that, without time to prepare, a trial was a mockery and a farce. They were fully informed that if they left that question to the discretion of the court, the trial itself would be rather a matter of favor than of right. It has never been the policy of constitutions or of statutes to permit the inalienable right of trial to be left to the discretion of any man. The makers of laws and of constitutions clearly foresaw the unbearable conditions’ which would ultimately prevail if the right to a hearing should depend upon the discretion of the judge or of the court. * * *
“There is no procedure known to the Philippine Islands wherein a defendant is refused time to prepare for trial.
There is no practice by which he is deprived of it. There is no law under which he can be denied it. On the contrary, the only procedure known to us is one embodied in the imperative law wherein the accused is expressly given two days in which to prepare for trial.”
In legal effect, this court then held that all of such questions could be raised and tried in a habeas corpus proceeding, and that, by reason of the fact that the court forced the defendant to trial, his conviction could not be sustained, and that he should be discharged. The United States Supreme Court held that was error, and that upon the record the defendant ought not to have been acquitted, and the syllabus of its opinion says:
“The denial of the accused’s request for time to answer and to prepare a defense, even if contrary to General Order No. 58, in force in the Philippine Islands, did not warrant his discharge on habeas1 corpus on the ground that he was thereby deprived of his right, under the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. at L., 691, chap. 1369, Comp. Stat. 1913, sec. 3804), sec. 5, to due process of law, but is at most a mere error of law, which cannot be revised by habeas corpus. * * *”
And among other things the opinion says:
“We are unable to agree with the conclusion of the Supreme Court that the judgment pronounced by the Court of First Instance was void and without effect. Under the circumstances disclosed denial of the request for time to answer and to prepare defense was at most matter of error which did not vitiate the entire proceedings. * * *
“The court of first instance placed no purely fanciful or arbitrary construction upon these sections and certainly they are not so peculiarly inviolable that a mere misunderstanding of their meaning or harmless departure from their exact terms would suffice to deprive the proceedings of lawful effect and enlarge the accused.
“Mere errors in point of law, however serious, committed by a criminal court in the exercise of its’ jurisdiction over a case properly subject to its cognizance, cannot be reviewed by’ habeas corpus. That writ cannot be employed as a substitute for the writ of error.” (Citing numerous decisions of that court.)
“The decree of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, granting the writ of habeas corpus, and discharging the prisoner, must be reversed and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”
Section 77 of General Order No. 58 says:
“Every person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty under any pretence whatever may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, in order to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.”
That is the general rule, and it is elementary law that where a defendant is convicted in a court of record which has jurisdiction of the offense that the conviction will not be set aside, and the defendant released in a habeas corpus proceeding. In all such cases, the defendant has an ample remedy by appeal or writ of error. It is only in a case where the court does not have jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the offense that a writ of habeas corpus should be granted. The distinction is clearly pointed out and the rule is well stated in Ruling Case Law, vol. 12, p. 1192, where it is said:
“The writ of habeas corpus is not designed to interrupt the orderly administration of the laws by a competent court acting within the limits of its jurisdiction, but is available only for the purpose of relieving from illegal restraint, and persons restrained of their liberty by virtue of the final judgment of any competent tribunal or by virtue of any execution issued thereon are excluded, generally speaking, from the benefits of the writ, as such persons are not illegally restrained, but are deprived of their liberty by due process of law. Proceedings on habeas corpus to obtain release from custody under final judgment being in the nature of a collateral attack, the writ deals only with such radical defects as render the proceeding or judgment absolutely void, and cannot have the effect of an appeal, writ of error, or certiorari, for the purpose of reviewing mere error and irregularities in the proceedings leading up to the final judgment or sentence of a court of competent jurisdiction by virtue of which the prisoner is committed.”
Cyc., vol. 21, p. 285, says:
“The writ of habeas corpus is not designed to fulfil the functions of an appeal or a writ of error. It is not intended to bring in review mere errors or irregularities, whether relating to substantive rights or to the law of procedure, committed by a court having jurisdiction over person and subject-matter. Such errors and irregularities do not affect the jurisdiction of the court or render its judgment void, and the remedy is therefore by appeal, exceptions, or writ of error.”
In Ex parte Watkins (3 Peters, 193; 7 L. ed., 650), Mr. Chief Justice Marshall qf the Supreme Court of the United States says:
“An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity, if the court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous.”
In the case of Schields vs. McMicking, supra, the court had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and of the subject-matter of the offense, and he was tried, and convicted, and because the trial court did have such jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of the United States, reversing the decision of this court, held that the defendant ought not to be acquitted and discharged in a habeas1 corpus proceeding.
In the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction of the defendant and of the crime charged, and upon which he was convicted, and the defendant appealed direct to this court, claiming that the court erred in not allowing him the time in which to prepare for his defense, as specified in section 30 of General Order No. 58.
Article 567 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the State of Texas gives the defendant two days after a copy of the indictment has been served upon him in which to prepare for trial. In construing that statute, the Supreme Court of Texas says:
“This we understand, under the law, to be a right guaranteed a defendant ‘in all cases/ and it is not necessary for him, in order to protect himself in this guaranty, that he make known to the court what character of written pleadings he may desire to present, or that he desires to present any written pleadings.”
In the instant case, over his protest and objection, the defendant was denied any time whatever after arraignment to prepare for trial. Section 30 is mandatory and unequivocal.
It is not the province of any court to set aside and nullify the plain language of a statute. The delay of which the court complains was the fault of the prosecution and not of the defendant. He could not enter his plea of not guilty until after he was arraigned and he was arraigned on the very day of his trial, and the law expressly says that after his plea is made the defendant shall be “entitled, on demand, for at least two days in which to prepare for trial.” Over the protest, objection and exception of the defendant, the court forced him to trial on the day in which he entered his plea.
We are not passing upon the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but it was the imperative duty of the court, upon his request, to allow the defendant the statutory time of two days to prepare for trial.
No decision of any supreme court based upon a statute, like section 30, General Order No. 58, will ever be found sustaining a conviction where the defendant, as in the instant case, was forced to trial over his objection, protest and exception upon the day of his arraignment.
There is a marked legal distinction between section 130 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 30 of General Order No. 58.
The last section says:
“After his plea the defendant shall be entitled, on demand, to at least two days in which to prepare for trial.”
Section 130 says:
“The court may, in its discretion, for cause, and with or without terms, postpone a trial from day to day, or to a stated time during the term of the court, or to the next succeeding term.”
Section 30 is mandatory, and, by its terms, the defendant, on demand, is entitled, as a matter of positive law, “to at least two days in which to prepare for trial.”
Under section 130, the postponement of a trial is discretionary with the court.
In the instant case, the application was made under section 30, and was a matter of legal right, and, hence, was not discretionary with the trial court.
The case of Schields vs. McMicking, supra, was a habeas corpus proceeding in which the defendant sought his discharge. The instant case is a direct appeal to this court from the decision of the lower court on a judgment of conviction of the crime charged.
Upon the question involved in this opinion, the defendant could not and will not be discharged. Therein lies the important distinction between a habeas corpus proceeding and an appeal or a writ of error.
Over his protest, objection and exception, the defendant was forced into trial upon the day of his arraignment. For the refusal of the trial court to grant the defendant delay under the provisions of section 30, General Order No. 58, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial, with costs de officio. So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.