[ G. R. No. 18619. February 20, 1922 ] 42 Phil. 805
[ G. R. No. 18619. February 20, 1922 ]
GEORGE H. GANAWAY, PETITIONER, VS. J. W. QUILLEN, WARDEN OF BILIBID PRISON, RESPONDENT. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original action in habeas corpus asks that he be released from Bilibid Prison because of imprisonment for debt in a civil cause growing out of a contract. The return of the Attorney-General alleges as the reason for petitioner’s incarceration in Bilibid Prison an order of the Hon. George R. Harvey, judge of First Instance of the city of Manila, issued under authority of Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. As standing alone the petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its own motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey et al. vs. George H. Ganaway.
The complaint in the civil case last mentioned is grounded on a contract, and asks in effect for an accounting. That this is true is shown by the phraseology of the complaint which repeatedly speaks of an agreement entered into by the plaintiffs and the defendant, by Exhibit A, relating to the publication of a book named “Forbes’ Memoirs,” and which describes itself as “this contract,” by the receipt attached to Exhibit A, which mentions “the contract,” and by the order of the trial judge on demurrer which says that “the plaintiffs allege a contract with the defendant and a breach of the contract by the defendant.”
The constitutional prohibition in effect in the Philippine Islands is in the same category as those States in which imprisonment for debt is absolutely prohibited. The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, unlike some States in the American Union, makes no exception in cases of fraud. The prohibition in the Philippine Bill, reproduced in the Jones Law, is “that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.” It should be given the same interpretation which similar provisions have received in the United States.
Abolition of imprisonment for debt was brought about by the force of public opinion which looked with abhorrence on statutory provisions which permitted the cruel imprisonment of debtors. The people sought to prevent the use of the power of the State to coerce the payment of debts. The control of the creditor over the person of his debtor was abolished by humane statutory and constitutional provisions.
One of the first States to adopt the constitutional provision in the absolute form appearing in this jurisdiction was Alabama. In the leading case of Carr vs. State of Alabama ([1895], 106 Ala., 35; 34 L. R. A., 634), the Supreme Court of Alabama held that a statute making it a misdemeanor for a person engaged an banking to receive a deposit of money or other thing of value knowing himself to be in failing circumstances or insolvent, and providing that upon conviction he shall be fined not less than double the amount of such deposit, one-half of which shall be paid to the depositor, but that payment to the depositor of the amount deposited with costs, before conviction, shall be a complete defense to any prosecution under the statute, was void. The court, speaking through the learned Justice McClellan, made the following observations:
“The elimination of the exception as to frauds was a pregnant omission, which left the guaranty of immunity from imprisonment to the debtor to apply to all cases of debt, whether they involved fraud or not. So that the statute we are considering can derive no aid from the idea that the receipt of a deposit by a banker under the circumstances stated is a fraud, and hence that the transaction would constitute ‘a case of fraud,’ since even in such cases there can be no imprisonment for debt.
“The ‘imprisonment for debt’ which the framers of constitutions embodying this provision doubtless had most prominently in mind was imprisonment upon process issuing in civil actions the object and sole purpose of which were the collection of debts. It was to remove the evils incident to the system of taking the debtor’s person upon a capias ad satis faciendum that this organic inhibition came primarily to be ordained. But the effect of its ordination has been to establish a public policy much broader in its influence upon legislation and operation upon judicial proceedings than would have sufficed for the eradication of the ills which attended upon the recovery, or attempted recovery, of debts by restraint of the debtor’s person. This policy is inimical alike to the incarceration of a debtor as a means of coercing payment, and to his punishment by imprisonment for a failure to pay, at least when such failure results from inability.”
The “debt” intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent the commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that the damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties, but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as a punishment therefor, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime. (Freeman vs. U. S. [1910], 217 U. S., 539.) In this connection, it may be said that the reason for the decision of .the Supreme Court of Georgia in the case of Harris vs. Bridges ([1856], 57 Ga., 407), mainly relied upon by the Attorney-General, will be found to be because the action was one in tort.
The Code of Civil Procedure took effect on October 1, 1901; that is, prior to the enactment of the Philippine Bill. Chapter XVII of the Code is entitled “Arrest of Defendant.” A comparison of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Philippines with the Code of Civil Procedure of California shows clearly that the Philippine provisions on the subject of arrest of defendants were taken bodily from the California Code. However, the constitutional provision in California differs from ours because it declares that “no person shall be imprisoned for debt, in any civil action on mesne or final process, unless in cases of fraud.” We are, therefore, not bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of California because, obviously, our basic constitutional provision must override any statutory provision in conflict therewith.
A quite similar question has been once before presented to this court. Two Chinese, under the firm name of Sang Kee, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Chinaman Tan Cong, to recover judgment for the sum of P30,000. The plaintiffs alleged in their petition, among other things, that on or about the first day of January, 1904, the defendant was employed by the plaintiffs as a general agent for their mercantile establishment; that the defendant had been requested to turn over the funds, personal property, stocks, etc., to the plaintiffs, but that he had refused to do so. The detention of the defendant was ordered by the Judge of First Instance. A petition for habeas corpus was presented to the Supreme Court, and in a learned decision, the vacation judge, Mr. Justice Johnson, held that the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill expressly prohibited the imprisonment of citizens of the Philippine Islands in actions for the recovery of money in a cause of action arising on a contract, and ordered the release from imprisonment of the petitioner. We would now make the decision, just described, the authoritative decision of the Court sitting in bane. (See Tan Cong vs. Stewart [1907], 5 Off. Gaz., 365.)[1]
It is clear that the action pending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in which Thomas Casey et al. are plaintiffs and George H. Ganaway is the defendant, is one predicated on an obligation arising upon a contract. Consequently, the imprisonment of the petitioner is in contravention of organic law. It is for us in the Philippine Islands to let no obstacle interfere with a reasonable enforcement of the enlightened principle of free government relating to imprisonment for debt. It may, however, be appropriate to remark that our holding need not be taken as going1 to the extent of finding’ Chapter XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure invalid and should be understood as limited to the facts before us and as circumscribed by the various exceptions to the constitutional prohibition.
This court has, heretofore, in a minute order, directed the discharge from imprisonment of the petitioner, and this decision is in explanation thereof. The minute order will, therefore, stand as the authoritative adjudication of the court. Costs de officio. So ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Johnson, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.