[ G. R. No. 18078. July 10, 1922 ] 43 Phil. 618
[ G. R. No. 18078. July 10, 1922 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. GERARDO P. BORJA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE. D E C I S I O N
STATEMENT
The information alleges that on or about the 21st of July, 1920, the defendant, with malicious intent to injure Juan B. Rañola, a councilman of the municipality of Lukban, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, and to maliciously expose him to odium, contempt, and ridicule, wrote an article in the municipality of Lukban, and caused the publication and circulation thereof in the said municipality and other municipalities of the. province on page 2 in the Ang Bansa, a newspaper in the City of Manila, and with general circulation in the municipality of Lukban and the Province of Tayabas, which article was false, injurious, and a malicious libel.
After four witnesses for the prosecution had testified, it appeared that the article was actually written by the defendant in Manila, for which reason the defense moved for the dismissal of the case, and the motion was granted, from which decision the prosecuting attorney appealed to this court. The fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the defendant was placed in jeopardy and acquitted, and that an appeal will not lie.
Johns, J.;
It will be noted that the information itself alleges that the libel was written in Lukban, Province of Tayabas, and that it appeared from the evidence of the prosecution that it was actually written by the defendant in Manila where it was published in a Manila newspaper, which has a circulation in the municipality of Lukban where Juan B. Rañola resided, and other municipalities of the Province of Tayabas, where it was seen and read by the people residing there. What purported to be a certified copy of an opinion of this court in banc promulgated February 21, 1921, and signed by all of the Justices but one, who was absent, was used and submitted to the trial court for its inspection and guidance, in which it is said:
“We lay down the rule that a criminal prosecution for libel lies only at the place where it is written or printed and published.”
Following that decision and relying thereon, the trial court sustained the motion to acquit the defendant. The plain truth of it is that the official records of this court show that the opinion in question was not a bane decision; that it was rendered in the case of United States vs. Perfecto[1]and was signed by only three members of one division, the fourth of whom dissented. Hence, it is very apparent that someone blundered, and that the trial court was misled.
Be that as it may, the fact remains that the defendant was acquitted by the trial court, and that, under the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Regala (28 Phil, 57), the motion of the fiscal must be sustained.
The case had gone to trial and four witnesses were called for the prosecution, and the defendant then filed his motion, which was sustained, and, as a result of those proceedings, he was placed in jeopardy and cannot be tried again on the same charge.
This is an important case, and the majority of this court do not agree with the decision in the case of United States vs. Perfecto, supra. The opinion in that case frankly says:
“The general rule announced by a large majority of jurisdictions in the United States is, that a criminal prosecution for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where such article was written or printed. This is also the common-law rule whereby the sale of each copy of the newspaper is a distinct offense. The prosecutor may consequently at least choose for which of the distinct offenses he will call the guilty party to account.”
We also agree with everything said in that opinion about the freedom of the press, but that does not give a newspaper or anyone else any right or license to publish a malicious libel, or to maliciously and wrongfully destroy any man’s character. No reputable newspaper will do that, and, where it is maliciously done, a crime has been committed, for which someone should be prosecuted. The law, as laid down in the case of Perfecto, in legal effect, would amount to a denial of justice, and would permit a newspaper in Manila with impunity to maliciously libel anyone in a distant province. If it be said that a prosecution in a distant province will work a hardship on a newspaper, the answer is that a newspaper ought not to publish a malicious libel about anyone, and if it does, it invites prosecution.
The courts always have been and always will be ready and willing to protect the freedom of the press, and will not suffer or permit frivolous prosecutions. It is only where the article is malicious and untrue, and that it is published with intent to injure and defame, that the prosecution will lie.
As to the venue of the crime, Cyc., vol. 25, p. 433, says:
“JURISDICTION AND VENUE.—The cause of action for slander is transitory, and action may be brought in any county or jurisdiction in which defendant may be found. In the case of libel it is held that it is not the jurisdiction in which the article is printed but the jurisdiction in which it is published and circulated that determines whether the words used are actionable. So the general rule is that an action for libel may be brought and tried in any county in which the libel was published or circulated.”
R. C. L., vol. 17, p. 464, says:
“JURISDICTION AND VENUE.—It is generally held that a criminal prosecution for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where such article was written or printed. If the libel be, at the request of the defendant, inserted in a newspaper published in an adjoining state, which usually circulates, and which, in fact, was circulated in a neighboring state, the defendant is guilty of a publication in the latter state. * * *”
We do not know of any valid reason why this court should not follow the decisive weight of authority which holds that in this class of cases, it is not a matter of choice with the defendant as to where he should be tried. There is no danger from frivolous prosecutions, and the courts have a right to, and always will, protect any person from vexatious prosecutions.
It often happens that the injured person is a poor man, and that his character and reputation for honesty are his only assets, and that they are sacred to him. To require that kind of a man to leave his own home and to go hundreds of miles to prosecute a case of libel would amount to a denial of justice. Under the authorities, libel is a continuous crime and is an untrue and malicious assault upon a person made with intent to injure and defame his character, which never ought to be made by a newspaper or anyone else without reasonable ground, and in the trial of any person charged with libel, the law affords ample protection to defendant’s rights.
In the instant case, the defendant resided in the same province as Juan B. Rañola, and it is very apparent that he left there and came to Manila and wrote the article in question to avoid prosecution for libel upon the very ground stated and decided in the Perfecto case.
If it be a fact that he wrote the article and caused its publication, and that copies of the newspaper in which it was published were distributed and in general circulation in the municipality of Lukban and adjoining municipalities of the Province of Tayabas, and that the article was malicious and untrue, and was published with intent to defame and injure Rañola, the defendant was guilty of the crime charged and should have been convicted, but, for the reasons above stated, the motion to dismiss is sustained. So ordered,
Johnson, Street, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Araullo, C. J., concurs in the result.