[ G. R. No. 15878. January 11, 1922 ] 42 Phil. 660
[ G. R. No. 15878. January 11, 1922 ]
ANTONIO GARCIA PALOMAR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE HOTEL DE FRANCE COMPANY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila by Antonio Garcia Palomar to recover of the Hotel de France Company a sum of money as damages for the alleged wrongful discharge of the plaintiff from the position of manager of the Hotel de France in the city of Manila., Upon hearing the cause, the trial judge found that the plaintiff had been wrongfully discharged, as alleged, but instead of allowing damages to the full extent of the sum of P23,100 claimed by the plaintiff in his amended complaint, awarded the sum of P6,000, less the amount of P328.88, admittedly due from the plaintiff to the hotel upon an account for tobacco. From this judgment both parties appealed, it being assigned as error on the part of the plaintiff that the award of damages made by the trial judge was inadequate, while on the part of the defendant company it is claimed that the trial judge erred in not absolving the defendant altogether from the complaint.
It appears in evidence that the defendant corporation, the Hotel de France Company, owns and operates a well-known hostelry in the city of Manila known as the Hotel de France, and that on July 15, 1916, the plaintiff, Antonio Garcia Palomar, became the manager of said hotel under a contract by which his compensation was fixed at the rate of P300 per month, with food and lodging in the hotel for himself and family. In January of the year 1917, the monthly pay of the plaintiff was by mutual consent of the parties increased to P400 per month. In the fourth paragraph of the contract it was provided that the plaintiff, as manager of said hotel, would be guided by the suggestions which Sr. A. M. Barretto, the president of the company, might make for the benefit of its business. The duration of the contract was fixed as from April 15 of the year then current, to December 31, 1920. On April 27, 1918, Sr. Barretto, in his capacity as president of the Hotel de France Company, by a communication in writing, relieved the plaintiff of his office of manager of said hotel and required him forthwith to surrender possession of the hotel and of all documents, keys, and household goods pertaining thereto. The plaintiff complied with this requirement, though under protest, and a few weeks thereafter instituted the present action to recover damages for the wrongful discharge.
There is no controversy as to the terms of the contract, or over the fact that on April 27 of the year mentioned the plaintiff was discharged. The principal questions therefore are two, namely, first, whether the discharge of the plaintiff from the position of manager of the hotel was wrongful; and, secondly, in case the foregoing question should be answered in the affirmative, what is the amount of the damages which should be awarded to the plaintiff? Upon the first point the burden of proof is clearly upon the defendant to prove that the discharge of the plaintiff was justified by the facts, while upon the second point the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, in the event he is entitled to recover any damages at all, to show the amount to which he is justly entitled.
We observe that the defendant company has, in its answer, specified the following grounds as justifying the discharge of the plaintiff, namely, first, his failure after March 23, 1918, to obey the reasonable orders given to him by the president of the company; secondly, the failure of the plaintiff after March 23, 1918, to comply with the obligations inherent in the office of manager, retiring to his quarters very early in the evening and remaining therein until the advanced hours of the succeeding day, and otherwise manifesting inattention to the guests and lack of vigilance in the supervision of the service in the dining room. It is furthermore alleged in the defendant’s answer that, after the date stated, it had come to the knowledge of the president of the company that the plaintiff had failed to show the proper consideration to the employees of the hotel under his charge, using to and in regard to them low, dishonoring, and insulting epithets. As will be thus seen, the delinquencies actually imputed to the plaintiff in the defendant’s answer as the reason for letting the plaintiff go, have relation to facts that occurred between March 23, 1918, and April 27, of the same year; but the proof covers the range of a much longer period of time.
It appears, then, that the discharge of the plaintiff, Sr. Antonio Garcia Palomar, from the position of manager of the Hotel de France is really rested on the ground of his supposed inefficiency and misconduct; and the charges against him may be summarized under the following heads: In the first place, it is claimed that the plaintiff, for some time prior to his discharge, had failed to make daily visits to the market, to buy the necessary foodstuffs for the hotel, as was the custom of his predecessor and as he himself had at first done. Secondly, it is claimed, that he was inattentive to the conditions and requirements of the hotel as regards the equipment of sleeping rooms, dining-hall, grill room, and kitchen. In this connection it is pretended that, at the time the plaintiff was displaced in the management of the hotel, the guest rooms were not adequately provided with bed linen, mosquito nets, and necessary articles of toilet; that there was a notable scarcity of table linen and table ware in the dining-hall and restaurant; and that the supply of kitchen utensils had become so far depleted that the cooking and cleaning operations in the kitchen were greatly hampered. Thirdly, it is claimed that the plaintiff had manifested a persistent attitude of discourtesy to guests and a querulousness over complaints about the service, both of which were in a marked degree prejudicial to the popularity and interests of the hotel. Fourthly, it is claimed that, under the plaintiff’s regime, the servants had become disaffected and that the plaintiff had shown so much lack of tact in managing them that nearly the whole force was on the point of quitting at the time the plaintiff was relieved. Fifthly, it is claimed that the plaintiff had failed to make out and publish in the hotel a written scheme, showing accurately and fully the duties of the different employees of the hotel, notwithstanding the fact that he had been especially requested by Sr. Barretto to prepare such a scheme. Lastly, we find it suggested in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the defendant—though the charge is not openly formulated in the defendant’s answer—that the plaintiff is addicted to drink; and it is intimated that indulgence in this vice supplies a reason for his supposed lack of attention to duty and especially for his alleged habit of remaining in bed until the hours of the day were far advanced.
Upon a considerate review of the voluminous proof, chiefly oral, adduced in the cause by the respective parties, we concur in the conclusion of the trial judge to the effect that no just or sufficient cause is shown by the defendant for the removal of the plaintiff from the position of manager of the Hotel de France, and we are accordingly constrained to hold that the act of Sr. Barretto in removing him summarily from that position was without justification in law or fact. Upon this issue, as already observed, the burden of proof is upon the defendant, and in our opinion the defense has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence any fact, or facts, which would constitute a sufficient ground for the action taken.
Among circumstances pertinent to the case, it may be mentioned that Sr. Barretto, the president of the Hotel de France Company, and himself the owner of far the greater part of the shares in that corporation, had lived in the hotel for much, if not all, of the time during which the plaintiff had been manager, and he was assuredly in a position to have had cognizance of many of the conditions which have been made the basis of complaint against the plaintiff; and yet Sr. Barretto says that his actual knowledge of these conditions was obtained from the reports brought to him by his son Jose A. Barretto, a young man of about 22 years of age, who for a considerable period of time had acted informally as inspector and observer of affairs in the hotel, and who on March 10, 1918, was appointed by the board of directors of the Hotel Company—ruled of course by his father—to the position of chief inspector, “to the end that he might keep watch over the entire hotel and correct anything he might discover wrong.” This looks very much as if the device of appointing a chief inspector had been adopted as a means of superseding the manager and as preparatory to the dismissal of the latter.
Reflection upon the anomalous position thus occupied by Jose A. Barretto, and consideration of his attitude towards the plaintiff, Antonio Garcia Palomar, lead to the conclusion that what the former probably saw and reported to his father concerning the conditions and management of the hotel was little likely to be favorable to Sr. Palomar. This conjecture is strengthened when it is recalled that Sr. Palomar, as manager of the hotel, at about the same time incurred the ill-will of Jose A. Barretto by forbidding the cashier to deliver money to Barretto on the vale of the latter only, without approval by himself or of Sr. A. M. Barretto. When to this is added the further circumstance that Jose A. Barretto was the individual who in fact succeeded to the position of manager of the Hotel de France after the plaintiff was discharged, it can readily be inferred that any reports which Jose A. Barretto might have made to his father were colored and misleading.
As regards the financial aspects of the plaintiff’s management of the hotel, it is undeniable that more money was made during the two years he was in charge of the hotel than had been made in any similar previous period which has been made the subject of proof. Thus, we find that in the years 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1914, no dividends whatever had been distributed to the shareholders of the Hotel Company, while in 1915 a dividend of 6 per cent only was distributed. On the other hand for the years 1916 and 1917, during which the plaintiff was manager, dividends of 11 per cent and 12 per cent respectively were declared. With right good cause then did Sr. A. M. Barretto, under date of March 23, 1918, say in a letter to the plaintiff that the results of the hotel’s business during the time of the plaintiff’s management had been highly satisfactory.
With these facts in mind we are in a position to appraise at its true value the proof upon the various charges of inefficiency and misconduct laid to the account of the plaintiff; and we shall accordingly pass a few words of comment upon these several charges. In regard to the first count it is true that the plaintiff had abandoned the practice followed by his predecessor, and at first observed by himself, of going daily in person to the markets for the purpose of laying in the necessary supplies of foodstuffs for the hotel. In explanation he says in effect that he had a competent and trustworthy employee—Estanislao Vergara by name—who could deal with the native stall-keepers and venders in the market more advantageously than he himself could; and he claims that it was in the interest of the hotel for him to send this substitute rather than to go in person. Sr. A. M. Barretto says that just before he discharged the plaintiff, he called the attention of the latter to this practice, which Sr. Barretto considered objectionable, and admonished him that he should resume the practice of going to market in person. The plaintiff, however, did not act in accordance with this suggestion and continued to send Vergara on this mission.
By the fourth paragraph of the contract under which the plaintiff was employed, the latter was bound to obey the orders of the president of the Hotel Company made in the interest of its business, but we are not convinced that this suggestion of Sr. Barretto that the plaintiff ought to go to the market in person was either intended as a peremptory order or was really made in the interest of the business of the hotel. At any rate we are of the opinion, as was the trial judge, that this act of insubordination on the part of Sr. Palomar—if such it be considered—was too petty to serve as a basis for discharging the plaintiff. The real motive of the action taken is, we think, to be found in other considerations, and principally in the desire to make room for the promotion of Sr. Jose A. Barretto to the position of manager of the hotel.
With reference to the charge that the plaintiff had failed to maintain adequate equipment in the bed rooms, dining room, and kitchen, it may be observed that, while the oral testimony is conflicting, the preponderance of the evidence is rather against than in support of this charge. Certainly, if this ground of complaint were true, a most natural thing would have been that expensive outlays would have immediately been made by Sr. Jose A. Barretto, as the plaintiff’s successor, to supply the deficiency, but this is not proved; and such testimony as appears in the record with reference to the matter would seem to indicate that few if any additions to the equipment were found necessary.
Again, it will be observed that if Sr. Palomar refrained from making expenditures for equipment, the amount thus saved contributed by so much to increase the revenue available for dividends, and the real beneficiaries of the economies thereby effected were the stockholders, not the manager of the hotel. If the depletion of the equipment had become as marked as some of the witnesses for the defendant would have us believe, it is surprising that knowledge of this condition did not sooner reach the president of the Hotel Company, himself an inmate of the hotel; and a few words from him addressed to the manager to the effect that lower dividends and better equipment for the hotel were desirable, a change for the better might probably have occurred. That there were some deficiencies in the equipment of the hotel—a condition more noticeable when the house was crowded—is doubtless true; and this feature of the service was of course offensive to persons accustomed to the conveniences and luxuries supplied in the high-grade hotels in the great cities of the world. But the Hotel de France has no pretension to rank among hotels of that sort.
The testimony of some of the witnesses for the defense tends to show that the plaintiff may have been guilty of occasional exhibitions of petulance over complaints from guests in regard to the hotel service, but this proof is not in our opinion sufficient to show a fixed attitude of discourtesy in him towards the hotel guests, such as would seriously impair his usefulness as manager, especially in view of the testimony of numerous other persons showing that the plaintiff is possessed of a courtesy and bearing appropriate to the place filled by him. We also are of the opinion that the charge of wilful and deliberate inattention to duty on the part of the plaintiff is not proved; nor is it shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff had formed the habit of sleeping until 10 or 11 o’clock in the day, though it is admitted that this did occur upon occasions when the plaintiff had been kept up until late at night attending important functions given in the hotel. “Not proved” is also the estimate that must be passed upon the insinuation that the plaintiff was excessively addicted to drink; and in connection with this charge, it may be observed that, if true, it relates to a matter which inevitably must have been within the knowledge of Sr. A. M. Baretto before March 23, 1918, yet upon that date he wrote the letter saying to the plaintiff in unqualified terms that his management of the hotel had been highly satisfactory.
A more serious indictment is found in the charge that the plaintiff was lacking in ability to manage the servants of the hotel; and it is shown that on April 25, 1918, a paper signed by more than thirty of the hotel’s employees was delivered to Sr. Barretto, as president of the hotel, in which the latter was informed that the parties whose names were signed to said paper would quit work on May 10, thereafter. No reasons for this step were assigned in the document itself, but reference was therein made to a written protest, dated December 13, 1917, which had been placed before Sr. Barretto. The author of this writing, admittedly somewhat antiquated upon the date when it was made the basis of this threat by the hotel employees, appears to have been one Jose E. Quintos, an electrician formerly in the employ of the hotel, and who notwithstanding his separation from the hotel as far back as May 5, 1917, had retained his position as a leader of the labor association formed by the employees of the hotel.
This document does, indeed, set forth certain grievances against Sr. Palomar, and alleges that the employees whose names are signed to it are dissatisfied with his management. What appears to be the capital ground of complaint from the point of view of the employees is. found in the statement that Sr. Palomar was maintaining the most rigorous regimen and discipline that had ever prevailed among hotel employees in Manila; and it is prayed that the board of directors of the hotel, of which Sr. Barretto was chairman, should take the necessary measures to bring back the conditions that had prevailed under an easier manager, one Sr. Luis Rodon. Among the irregularities imputed in this paper to Sr. Palomar are mentioned two of the items already referred to in this opinion, namely, his alleged proclivity for using disrespectful and insulting epithets to and concerning the servants, and his addiction to the vice of drink. Upon the whole we are of the opinion that his Honor, the trial judge, properly appreciated this incident with reference to the threatened strike and that he committed no error in attributing to it little weight.
It remains to comment on the failure of the plaintiff to prepare and publish a scheme for the internal regimen of the hotel, as requested by Sr. A. M. Barretto in his letter to the plaintiff of March 23, 1918. In this connection it appears that in making this request Sr. Barretto had in mind the drafting of a schedule which should define with particularity and precision the duties and hours of service of all the different classes of employees in the hotel. The idea appears to have been somewhat novel, and Sr. Palomar suggests that the promulgation of such a scheme would have produced embarrassment, for the reason that it would have made it less easy to shift the servants around from one thing to another. He says that after working for the time with the project he saw its manifest futility and after consultation with Sr. Barretto the matter was dropped with the consent of the latter. The explanation is credible, and we incline to the view that Sr. Barretto himself could not have attached much importance to this project, except as it affords some technical basis for the claim that Sr. Palomar had refused to obey orders.
Our conclusion upon the features of the case which we have just discussed is, as previously suggested, that the dismissal of the plaintiff from the position of manager of the Hotel de France was not justified, and such dismissal constituted a breach of contract upon the part of the Hotel Company.
In article 1586 of the Civil Code, it is declared, among other things, that workers hired for a stated time or for a specified work cannot be dismissed without sufficient cause; and this means that in case of the wrongful dismissal of the employee an action for damages will lie against the employer. (Hicks vs. Manila Hotel Co., 28 Phil., 325; Knust vs. Morse, 41 Phil., 184.) This rule, so manifestly consonant with the principles of civil law, has also of late years been accepted as an axiomatic doctrine of the English common law. (1 Labatt, Master and Servant, 2d- ed., sec. 343.) Under the law prevailing in this country the contract of employment is considered to be effectually ended in every case by the discharge of the employee, whether rightful or wrongful; and in conformity with this, the employer is given the right to dispossess the discharged employee at once of any property of which the latter may have had possession by virtue of the employment. (Art 1587, Civ. Code.)
Commenting upon article. 1586 of the Civil Code, the well-known author Manresa says that the obligation to indemnify is implicit in the prohibition to dismiss without cause; and in this connection he says that in strictness the employer who is proved to have dismissed his employee capriciously or unjustifiably should be considered a debtor in bad faith. Nevertheless, he adds, very justly we think, that the courts will do well to avoid a too rigorous application of this idea and instead they should take into consideration the particular circumstances of each case and be governed accordingly.
So much having been said with reference to the general doctrine, it will be helpful to state certain propositions deducible from this undeniable right of the employee to recover damages for a wrongful dismissal. Among such propositions it may be stated, first, that the cause of action accrues when the employee is wrongfully discharged; secondly, that for this discharge the employee may bring an action in which he can recover once and for all such damages -as he may have suffered by reason of the employer’s wrongful act; thirdly, that the action to recover these damages may be brought immediately upon the breach of the contract or at any time thereafter before the action is barred; fourthly, that the circumstance that the action is brought, or the trial had, before the term of the contract has fully passed does not affect the right of recovery, though practically the damages may be more precisely estimated if the trial in first instance takes place after the term of the contract has expired; fifthly, that the damages awarded should be such as to compensate for the breach of the contract, as of the date when the wrongful act was committed; sixthly, and finally, that in estimating the damages the tribunal should consider the contract as an entirely and take into account all of the elements of value pertaining to it, not omitting the consideration of the length of the term during which the employment should have continued.
In considering a problem like that now before us, it is important to bear in mind that while the right of the employee to recover full damages, assessed with reference to the whole term of the contract, is clear, and in estimating these damages account must sometimes be taken of the probable course of events after the action is tried, nevertheless the damages thus allowed are not damages which to legal intendment have accrued after the action is brought. The right to recover full damages accrues upon breach of the contract; and in estimating these the duty of the court is to give a pecuniary award sufficient to compensate for the wrong done, as of the date of the breach. Such damages are not speculative or prospective damages in an objectionable sense. They are the damages naturally resulting from the breach of the contract as an entirety, and being inflicted at the time of the breach of contract, they should be assessed as of that time.
Upon the question of the amount of damages to be awarded in an action of this character some helpful suggestions may be gleaned from the decisions of the American and English courts, though it is certainly necessary to make way carefully through the great mass of conflicting decisions which those courts have rendered on this subject. For this reason it is desirable here to call into requisition the services of a competent guide, whom we find in the person of Mr. Labatt, author of the most complete American treatise on the law relating to the relation of master and servant. From his pages we take the following passage in which he discusses the subject of the measure of damages in cases of the wrongful dismissal of the servant:
“As in other cases involving a breach of contract, the damages recoverable in an action for the wrongful dismissal of a servant are measured by, and limited to, the actual loss which he has sustained as a natural and proximate consequence of the dismissal. When viewed with relation to the rule stated in the following section [360], this principle implies that the amount of the stipulated compensation, or that portion of it which still remains unpaid at the time when the servant’s claim is determined, is not necessarily and in all cases the measure of damages, but merely an evidential element, which may properly be considered by the jury in estimating the extent of the resulting damages. The actual loss sustained by the servant may, it is manifest, be represented by a sum which is either larger or smaller than that amount. The stipulated wages do not constitute a sufficient indemnity for the master’s breach of contract in any case where special damage of some description is shown to be sustained by the servant. On the other hand, those wages will constitute an excessive indemnity in cases where the servant obtained, or might have obtained, other employment after his dismissal.” (1 Labatt, Master and Servant, 2d ed., sec. 359.)
Proceeding further to consider the problem involved in the estimation of damages for the prospective period of the contract, the same author says:
“In respect of the period between the trial and the end of the term, the servant is entitled prima facie to recover a sum sufficient to compensate him for the loss of the future benefits which he would probably have obtained if the contract had not been broken. The elements which enter into a computation of the damages on the footing thus indicated are the following:
“(1) The amount of the stipulated compensation for the residue of the term. * * *
“(2) The extent of the probability that the lives of the servant and the master would have continued to the end of the stipulated term of employment. * * *
“(3) The extent of the probability that the servant would have continued to be physically and mentally capable of performing his work to the end of the term. * * *
“(4) The extent of the probability that the servant will be able to earn money in other employments during the period between the trial and the end of the term.
“(5) * * *
“(6) Any other uncertainties growing out of the terms of the contract.” ( Id., sec. 372.) From the considerations above adduced it is evident that the principal factor to be considered in a case like that now before us is the salary which the plaintiff was by contract entitled to draw, plus the value of food and lodging for himself and family, for the period during which the contract was yet to run when he was discharged.
As regards the stipulated compensation we note that, by the express terms of the contract, the plaintiff’s salary is fixed at P300 per month. It is admitted, however, that in February, 1917, this amount was voluntarily augmented by the employer to P400 per month. As we understand the references to this matter, not only in the pleadings but also in the oral testimony, the extra P100 thus paid to the plaintiff was in the nature of a bounty. Certainly, there is nothing to show that there was any novation of the contract such as would have entitled the plaintiff to recover compensation at a higher rate than P300 per month, if the service had been rendered and it had been necessary to sue for the salary. In considering the contract right’s of the parties to this action, it must, therefore, be assumed that P300 per month was the salary contracted for.
The perquisites incident to the plaintiff’s position as manager of the Hotel de France consisted of food and lodging in the hotel for himself and family during the term of the contract; and it appears that the family vacated the hotel at the end of April, 1918. The uncontradicted testimony of the plaintiff is to the effect that the expenses thereafter incurred by him upon account of food and lodging for himself and family amounted approximately to P300 per month, and the trial judge accepted this estimate as correct.
It appears that the plaintiff has received no part of his salary for April, 1918, for the reason that upon the date of his discharge he was debtor to the hotel upon an account for tobacco to the extent of P328.88, there being a balance of P28.88 against him, as of the end of the month. At the end of April his family vacated their apartment at the hotel; and from that date the plaintiff’s pecuniary loss by reason of his wrongful discharge, until the termination of the period of the contract, was at the rate of P600 per month. As by the terms of the contract the employment would not have terminated, in the ordinary course of events, until December 31, 1920, a simple arithmetical computation shows that, if the plaintiff had continued in the service of the defendant company until that date, he would have received after May 1, 1918, by way of salary and for food and lodging, as per contract, benefits of the value of P19,200. The apparent gross pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, by reason of his wrongful discharge, may therefore be taken to be the sum of P19,171.12, deducting the small balance due on May 1, 1918, upon his account for tobacco. But this is only one of the various factors to be considered in the estimation of damages; end in our opinion it would be about as unjust to the defendant to award this sum as damages as it would be to the plaintiff to award to him—as a few of the American courts appear to have done in such cases—only the damages that accrued prior to the institution of the action, or prior to the trial in the court below. Justice, we think, is to be found somewhere between these two extremes.
The principal consideration to be here taken into account against allowing the total gross amount above indicated is found in the fact that after his dismissal the plaintiff’s time was his own, and he was free to seek other means of livelihood; and this consideration is particularly pertinent to that portion of the contract period which had not yet elapsed when the taking of proof was closed and cause submitted to the trial court. In this connection it appears that the present action was instituted on May 8, 1918, or within about two weeks after the cause of action arose. The trial of the case was begun on December 12, 1918, and after one or more adjournments, the taking of proof was concluded April 23, 1919. The decision of the trial court was not rendered until September 4, 1919. It is thus apparent that when the cause was submitted, the contract had more than twenty months still to run.
As regards the period that elapsed between the date of the plaintiffs dismissal and the time when he testified in court, we are reasonably satisfied that he had been in enforced and involuntary idleness. The statement of the plaintiff, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, to the effect that he made efforts to secure employment from the time he left the hotel, but was unable to obtain it, seems to us to be true; and there is no proof in the record to refute it, or to show that he might have obtained employment if he had exerted himself more strenuously to that end. The letters presented in evidence as Exhibits L, M, N, O, P, and Q, show that in November and December, 1918, the plaintiff made efforts to secure employment in several commercial houses in Manila, but failed. The trial judge inferred that the plaintiff had made no previous efforts to secure employment, and bearing in mind the well-known fact that business was active in this city in the year 1918, his Honor concluded that if the plaintiff had desire to obtain employment at once upon his discharge, he could have done so. Nevertheless, his Honor awarded damages at the rate of P700 per month for eight months, in addition to the plaintiff’s wages for April, 1918, thereby making casus omissus of damages with respect to the period of the contract which was still to elapse after the case was submitted. For reasons already expressed, it is obvious that this estimate of the damages is erroneous.
In the first place, we observe that it was not necessarily incumbent on the plaintiff to prove as a part of his case in chief that he had not been able to obtain remunerative employment after his dismissal and up to the time of the trial. By the weight of authority the burden of proof upon this point was upon the defendant. (Aldaz vs. Gay, 7 Phil., 268.) But having satisfactorily shown this fact, the plaintiff was clearly entitled to recover damages at the contract rate up to the time when the cause was submitted for decision, or at least to the date when the plaintiff testified in court. Thus far the damages may be said to be ascertainable with certainty, and such is usually the case where the trial is had after the term of the contract has expired.
As to the damages inflicted upon the plaintiff by reason of his being deprived of the benefits of the contract after the date of the trial below, precision in the estimation of the damages is impossible, for it cannot be assumed as a matter of law that the plaintiff’s enforced idleness will continue indefinitely. The law of service is a law of life. The general rule is that sooner or later men who are capable of service find employment, and enforced idleness is the exception. It should not be presumed in advance that the exceptional will occur. To assume that the plaintiff must remain idle through the entire term of contract merely because he had not found employment up to the time of trial would put a premium on idleness and incompetency.
In this connection we may again quote to advantage from Mr. Labatt, who comments as follows upon the subject of the damages recoverable with respect to that portion of the term which is still to run after the trial:
“The obligation of the servant to seek for and accept any eligible employment is manifestly not less predicable with respect to the time between the trial and the end of the term than with respect to the period preceding the trial. Accordingly, the amount which, having regard to the elements specified in section 372, ante, would be recoverable, must be reduced to such an extent as may be reasonable in view of the considerations that the servant will be at liberty to obtain another position, and that he will remain under a continuous obligation to endeavor to obtain it, until the expiration of the period covered by the broken contract. The sum to be allowed under this head is that which, in the opinion of the jury or other tribunal which is assessing the damages, the plaintiff should, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, be able to earn before the end of the term. Some of the factors to be considered in this connection are the same as those which are relevant in determining whether the servant’s duty to seek for other employment has been adequately fulfilled in respect to the period preceding the trial. But it is clear that the proper amount of the deduction to be made, with reference to the existence of this duty, from the damages otherwise assessable, must be far more largely a matter of conjecture, where the future is in question, than it is where the estimate is concerned with past conditions.” (1 Labatt, Master and Servant, 2d ed., sec. 400.)
In the light of the principles above enunciated, and having in view all the pertinent facts revealed in the record, it is the opinion of this court that the plaintiff will be adequately compensated for the breach of contract on the part of the defendant by an award of P12,000 as damages, over and above the amount owing by the plaintiff to the defendant on the account for tobacco, which is the subject of the cross-complaint.
Judgment will therefore be entered that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant Hotel de France Company the net sum of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), and the judgment appealed from will be modified accordingly, without costs. So. ordered.
Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Araullo, C. J., did not take part in the discussion and resolution of this case.