[ G. R. No. 16486. March 22, 1921 ] 41 Phil. 497
[ G. R. No. 16486. March 22, 1921 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is under discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the inter-island steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into Manila Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez y Quid, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work of raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them. The accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but between these and the boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. As it was full midday, and there was nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of the current, he was borne down into the water and was drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the water, the accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this reason they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as these witnesses are sure that Venancio did not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused at this juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except to show the temporary excitement under which he was laboring. On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to watch for the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered. Though this friendly vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered to a representative of his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for granted that he is dead.
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct that he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers could see; and this circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be extinguished by asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility that he might have swum ashore, after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we consider too remote to be entertained for a moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned there likewise can be no doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself into the river, acted solely in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, “If a man creates in another man’s mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result.” (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N. S.], 701.)
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in the brief of the Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual, after having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the injured person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning. The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the wounds caused by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that he had received no succour, and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide. The Supreme Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: “That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him, and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.” (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Cargantel, and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed. (Par. 3, art. 9, Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories, to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentence is in accordance with law; and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Mapa, C. J., Malcolm, Avancena, and Villamor, JJ., concur.