[ G. R . No. 16808. January 03, 1921 ] 41 Phil. 322
[ G. R . No. 16808. January 03, 1921 ]
ANDRES BORROMEO, PLAINTIFF, VS. FERMIN MARIANO, DEFENDANT. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
Quo warranto proceedings have been instituted in this court to determine the right of the plaintiff and of the defendant to the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District.
The only facts, and these are undisputed ones, which need be noticed, are the following: Andres Borromeo was appointed and commissioned as Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, effective July 1, 1914. He duly qualified and took possession of the office on that date. On February, 25, 1920, he was appointed Judge of the Twenty-first Judicial District, and Fermin Mariano was appointed Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District. Judge Borromeo has since the latter date consistently refused to accept appointment to the Twenty-first Judicial District.
Judges of First Instance are appointed by the Governor-General with the consent of the Philippine Senate to serve until they reach the age of 65 years. (Adm. Code, sees. 65, 66, 148.) One Judge of First Instance is commissioned for each judicial district, except the ninth. (Sec. 154.) The oath of office of the judge is “filed with the clerk of the court to which the affiant pertains and shall be entered upon its records.” (Sec. 128.) Judges of First Instance may only be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duly in a district other than their own for the purpose of trying land registration cases and for vacation duty. (Sec. 155.) The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, to which particular attention is addressed by the Attorney-General, is, “but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent a judge of first instance of one district from being appointed to be judge of another district.” A Judge of First Instance can be removed from office by the Governor-General only if in the judgment of the Supreme Court sufficient cause shall exist involving serious misconduct or inefficiency in office. (Sec. 173.)
The cardinal rule of statutory construction requires the court to give effect to the general legislative intent if that can be discovered within the four corners of the Act. When the object intended to be accomplished by the statute is once clearly ascertained, general words may be restrained to it and those of narrower import may be expanded to embrace it, to effectuate the intent. Along with this fundamental principle is another, equally well-established, that such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted, as will give effect to all provisions of the statute. (2 Lewis’ Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 662, et seq.; In re Allen [1903], 2 Phil., 630; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 287.)
Leaving out of consideration for the moment the last part of section 155 of the Administrative Code, the provisions of the Judiciary Law are plain and unambiguous. Judges of First Instance are appointed judges of the courts of first instance of the respective judicial districts of the Philippine Islands. They are not appointed judges of first instance of the Philippine Islands. They hold these positions of judges of first instance of definite districts until they resign, retire, or are removed through impeachment proceedings. The intention of the law is to recognize separate and distinct judicial offices.
The concluding portion of section 155 of the Administrative Code, although not beginning with the usual introductory word, “provided,” is nevertheless, in the nature of a proviso, and should be construed as such. The office of a proviso is to limit the application of the law. It is contrary to the nature of a proviso to enlarge the operation of the law. It should not be construed so as to repeal or destroy the main provisions of the statute. A proviso which re directly repugnant to the purview or body of an Act is inoperative and void. (See generally, 25 R. C. L., pp. 984, et seq.; and specifically, the leading cases of McKnight vs. Hodge [1909], 55 Wash., 289, 104 Pac, 504, 40 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1207; McCormick vs. West Duluth [1891], 47 Minn., 272, 50 N. W., 128; Idaho Power & Light Co. vs. Blomquist [1916], 26 Idaho, 222; 141 Pac., 1083, Ann. Cas. [1916 E], p. 282, where these principles concerning provisos are applied.)
To arrive at a correct decision with reference to the proviso before us, let it first be recalled that the law is emphatic in its specification that, save when judges of first instance are detailed to try land registration cases or when assigned to vacation duty, “no judge of first instance shall be required to do duty in any other district than that for which he is commissioned.” The keyword to the proviso which follows is “appointed.” This word should here be given its usual signification. Many of the decisions follow the definition of “appoint” found in the Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia. “Appoint” is there defined as “to allot, set apart, or designate; nominate or authoritatively assign, as for a use, or to a position or office.” All the authorities unite in saying that the term “appoint” is well-known in law and whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or designation of an individual. Appointment signifies no more than selection for public office. (4 C. J., 1402, 1404, citing numerous decisions.)
The effect to be given to the word “appoint” is corroborated by the principles of the law of public officers. Appointment and qualification to office are separate and distinct things. Appointment is the sole act of those vested with the power to make it. Acceptance is the sole act of the appointee. Persons may be chosen for office at pleasure; there is no power in these Islands which can compel a man to accept the office. (22 R. C. L., 423.) If, therefore, anyone could refuse appointment as a judge of first instance to a particular district, when once appointment to this district is accepted, he has exactly the same right to refuse an appointment to another district. No other person could be placed in the position of this Judge of First Instance since another rule of public officers is, that an appointment may not be made to an office which is not vacant. (29 Cyc, 1873.) In our judgment, the language of the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code, interpreted with reference to the law of public officers, does not empower the Governor-General to force upon the judge of one district an appointment to another district against his will, thereby removing him from his district. Returning again to the principle of statutory construction that a proviso should not be given a meaning which would tend to render abortive the main portions of the law, it should further be recalled that judges of first instance are removable only through a fixed procedure. Moreover, impeachment proceedings, as conducted by the Supreme Court, may be in the nature of jurisdiction, conferred upon the Supreme Court by ratification of the Congress of the United States, which, it has uniformly been held, cannot be diminished. (We make no ruling on this point because unnecessary for the resolution of the case.) But, certainly, if a judge could be transferred from one district of the Philippine Islands to another, without his consent, it would require no great amount of imagination to conceive how this power could be used to discipline the judge or as an indirect means of removal. A judge who had, by a decision, incurred the ill-will of an attorney or official, could, by the insistence of the disgruntled party, be removed from one district, demoted, and transferred to another district, at possibly a loss of salary, all without the consent of the judicial officer. The only recourse of the judicial officer who should desire to maintain his self-respect, would be to vacate the office and leave the service. Unless we wish to nullify the impeachment section of the Administrative Code, and thus possibly to encroach upon the jurisdiction conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Organic Law, section 155 must be interpreted so as to make it consistent therewith.
What we have said is reenforced by the authorities most directly in point. In the early decision of Marbury vs. Madison ([1803], 1 Cranch, 137), the Supreme Court of the United States, in unmistakable terms, explained the powers of the Judiciary in enforcing the Constitution as the Supreme Law of the Land and held that the President of the United States had no power to remove a justice of the peace of the District of Columbia from office. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said that “When the officer is not removable at the will of the executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled: it has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed. The discretion of the executive is to be exercised, until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated, in all cases where, by law, the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.” The great jurist further on observed that “It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is.”
In State of Louisiana vs. Dowries ([1869], 21 La. Ann., 490), the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that a judge of a court could, under the Constitution of that State, only be removed from office by impeachment, by address of the Legislature, or by proceedings under the intrusion act. It was held that the appointment and commissioning by the Governor of the State of a party to an office which has legally been filled, without the vacancy being first declared according to law, was an absolute nullity.
The Attorney-General brings to our notice an obsolete law which had escaped us, and which, if any lingering doubts exist, would serve to remove them. This law is Act No. 396, enacted by the Philippine Commission in 1902. Section 4 thereof, separate and distinct from the other provisions of the Act, and not tacked on as a proviso, provided that “any judge of a Court of First Instance * * * may be transferred from one judicial district to another by order of the Civil Governor, with the advice and consent of the Commission. Any judge so transferred shall, upon such transfer, cease the performance of judicial duties in the district to which he was originally appointed, and shall be the regular judge thereafter in the judicial district to which he has been so assigned.” But.Act No. 396 was thrice repealed by the Philippine Legislature; the first time, impliedly by the enactment of Act No. 2347, the Judiciary Reorganization Act, and subsequently, expressly by the Administrative Code of 1916 and the Administrative Code of 1917. Instead, also, of continuing the phraseology of section 4 of Act No. 396, the Legislature merely included the proviso to which we have alluded. It cannot, therefore, admit of doubt that the members of the Philippine Legislature had before them the Act of the Philippine Commission and preferred, not to perpetuate the old law, but to insert language of their own. The purpose of the Philippine Legislature was clearly to safeguard the interests of the judiciary, and this laudable purpose, it is for us now to effectuate.
Far more convincing than precedent or argument are great and basic principles long inherent in popular government intended to create an independent judiciary. A history of the struggle for a fearless and an incorruptible judiciary prepared to follow the law and to administer it regardless of consequences, can be perused with ever-recurring benefit. Since the early days of the Republic, the judicial system in the United States, with certain exceptions which only served to demonstrate more fully the excellence of the whole, has been viewed with pride, and confidently relied upon for justice by the American people. The American people considered it necessary “that there should be a judiciary endowed with substantial and independent powers and secure against all corrupting or perverting influences; secure, also, against the arbitrary authority of the administrative heads of the government.” (Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.) It was such a conception of an independent judiciary which was instituted in the Philippines by the American administration and which has since served as one of the chief glories of the government and one of the most priceless heritages of the Filipino people.
The Attorney-General in the argument in support of his motion for reconsideration, quotes the last preceding sentence and says that he dissents therefrom. The number of authoritative replies to the proposition advanced by the law officer of the government relative to the intention to establish an independent judiciary in these Islands, is limited only by space in which to quote them. Possibly we can do no better than to make our own the language of Mr. Justice Trent, speaking for a unanimous court, in Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366, 384), when he said: “This government, being modelled after the Federal and State governments in the United States, now possesses a complete governmental organization, with executive, legislative, and judicial departments, which are exercising functions as independent of each other as the Federal or State governments.” (For the legislative version of the same idea, see Administrative Code, sec. 17.)
On occasion, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands has applied the accepted theory of the division of powers, termed by the United States Supreme Court as “one of the chief merits of the American system of written constitutional law” (Kilbourn vs. Thompson [1881], 13 Otto, 168), and has unhesitatingly refused to interfere with the official acts of the Governor-General or to intrude on the rights and privileges of the Philippine Legislature. (In re Patterson [1902], 1 Phil., 93; Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, supra} In re McCulloch Dick [1918], 38 Phil., 41; U. S. vs. Bull [1910], 15 Phil., 7; U. S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1; Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886.) As an instance of this class of decisions, in Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, supra, this court, in considering the right of the Philippine Senate to be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, said:
“The grant of power to the Philippine Senate and the Philippine House of Representatives, respectively is full, clear, and complete. * * * The judiciary, with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of the legislature to remain where the sovereign authority has placed it. Since, therefore, the Philippine Senate is made the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its elective members, this tribunal neither can, nor ought, to take jurisdiction of the case.”
Although much more reluctantly, and also much more infrequently we are happy to add, the court has had to defend the judiciary against legislative and executive encroachment. (Ocampo vs. Cabangis [1910], 15 Phil., 626; In re Guarina [1914], 24 Phil., 37; Barrameda vs. Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44; and Province of Tarlac vs. Gale [1913], 26 Phil., 338.) As an instance of the latter class of decisions, in Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, supra, Mr. Justice Moreland, speaking for the court, said:
“The judiciary is one of the coordinate branches of the Government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil., 534; United States vs. Bull, 15 Phil., 7.) Its preservation in its integrity and effectiveness is necessary to the present form of Government * * * It is clear * * * that each department is bound to preserve its own existence if it live up to the duty imposed upon it as one of the coordinate branches of the government. Whatever a person or entity ought to do or must do in law, it has the power to do. This being true, the judiciary has the power to maintain its existence; and whatever is reasonably necessary to that end, courts may do or order done. But the right to live, if that is all there is of it, is a very small matter. The mere right to breathe does not satisfy ambition or produce results. Thefefore, courts have not only the power to maintain their life, but they have also the power to make that existence effective for the purpose for which the judiciary was created. They can, by .appropriate means, do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of Government. Courts have, therefore, inherent power to preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity and to insure effectiveness in the administration of justice. This is clear; for, if the judiciary may be deprived of any one of its essential attributes, or if any one of them may be seriously weakened by the act of any person or official, then independence disappears and subordination begins. The power to interfere is the power to control, and the power to control is the power to abrogate. The sovereign power has given life to the judiciary and nothing less than the sovereign power can take it away or render it useless. The power to withhold from the courts anything really essential for the administration of justice is the power to control and ultimately to destroy the efficiency of the judiciary. Courts cannot, under their duty to their creator, the sovereign power, permit themselves to be subordinated to any person or official to which their creator did not itself subordinate them.”
A stirring plea has been made by the learned representative of the Government for a decision which will work for the public welfare. We agree that, under the peculiar conditions existing in the Philippines, it is sometimes well for a judge not to remain indefinitely in a particular district. But it is a far cry from this premise to the use of a method not sanctioned by existing law and savoring of military discipline. Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of governments We are pleased to think of judges as of the type of the erudite Coke who, three centuries ago, was removed from office because when asked “if in the future he would delay a case at the King’s order,” replied: “I will do what becomes me as a judge.”
For the reasons given, we are of opinion that the reasonable force of the language used in the proviso to section 155 of the Administrative Code taken in connection with the whole of the Judiciary Law, and the accepted canons of interpretation, and the principles of the law of public officers, leave room for no other construction than that a Judge of First Instance may be made a judge of another district only with his consent.
It is our holding that the plaintiff Andres Borromeo is lawfully entitled to the possession of the office of Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District. It is our judgment that the defendant Fermin Mariano shall be ousted from the office of Judge of the Twenty-fourth Judicial District, and the plaintiff placed in possession of the same. The motion for reconsideration filed by the Attorney-General is denied. No costs shall be allowed. Let this be entered as the order of the court. So ordered.
Araullo, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., signed the original decision, but was not present when the motion for reconsideration was filed and when this decision was promulgated.