[ G.R. No. 14057. January 22, 1919 ] 39 Phil. 533
[ G.R. No. 14057. January 22, 1919 ]
THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SYDNEY SMITH, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D E C I S I O N
MALCOLM, J.:
The defendant, Sydney Smith, a civil employee of the United States Army, was charged by appropriate information filed in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with having assaulted Colonel J. B. Bellinger, of the United States Army, “a person in authority.” To the information, the defendant interposed a demurrer, based on the principal allegation that the court was without jurisdiction, since the person alleged to have been assaulted was an officer of the United States Army and not a person in the Insular service, so that the offense charged could be at most a simple assault. The demurrer having been overruled, the defendant pleaded not guilty, was tried, was convicted of the crime denounced in article 249 of the Penal Code, and was sentence to two years, four months, and one day of presidio correccional, with the corresponding accessory penalties, and to pay a fine of 625 pesetas and the costs. Defendant’s five assignments of error present three main issues, namely: (1) As the most fundamental, whether those articles of the Penal Code which define the crime of atentado contra la auioridad (assault upon a person in authority) have been displaced by the establishment in the Philippine Islands of a republican form of government; (2) Likewise of primary importance, whether a person in authority or a public officer as mentioned in the Spanish Penal Code, includes an officer in the United States Army; (3) Going to the facts and the penalty, whether the accused has been proved guilty of any offense and, if so, as to what the punishment should be. We will consider these points ad seriatem.
Counsel for appellant contends that those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with assaults upon persons in authority, are contrary to the genius and fundamental principles of the American character and system of Government, and that they were therefore crowded out, by implication, as soon as the United States established its authority in the Philippine Islands. The argument is that the gulf which separates such articles from the spirit which inspires all penal legislation of American origin is as wide as that which separates a monarchy, like Spain at the time of the promulgation of this legislation, from a democratic republic like that of the United States, and that .penalties, out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchial conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been obliterated by the present system of Government in the Islands. The Attorney-General replies that in a monarchy the same as in a republic, the prestige of officials must be maintained. “Without order,” says the Attorney-General, “there can be no society, and without authority there can be no order.”
Mention is made of these antagonistic contentions principally to introduce the second and more decisive issue. As a matter of fact, while the writer endeavored to establish the thesis in his dissenting opinon in the case of United States vs. Tabiana and Canillas ([1918], 37 Phil., 515), that those provisions of the Spanish penal code concerning assaults upon persons in authority were in the nature of a political law enacted and promulgated by a monarchy and were thus entirely incompatible with democratic institutions, this view failed to convince a majority of the court. It can, therefore, be taken for granted that until otherwise held by a higher tribunal, or until repealed or revised by the Philippine Legislature, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands will continue to enforce the provisions of the Penal Code relating to assaults upon persons in authority.
The Penal Code was formulated by the Spanish authorities for the Monarchy as existing in Spain and in the Philippine Islands in the year 1887. A person in authority within the purview of this Penal Code included religious, military, and civil officials. (See Viada, Comentarios al Codigo Penal, vol. 2, pp. 209, 344 et seq.) For instance, a decision of the supreme court of Spain of October 22. 1885, considered a bishop as a person in authority.
Even if these articles of the Spanish Penal Code are not so repugnant in principle to democratic institutions as no longer to be effective, yet it is undeniable that the courts have on many occasions only grudgingly imposed the severe penalties therein provided for, and have by judicial interpretation attempted to circumscribe their scope. (See, for example, the majority decision in United States vs. Tabiana and Canillas, supra.) It would thus be preposterous to suppose that,,with a change of sovereignty which has caused a complete separation of Church and State and the abolition of all special privileges for a particular religious sect, the courts would sanction any higher prerogatives for a Church official than they would for any citizen. (See U. S. vs. Balcorta [1913], 25 Phil., 273.) It is by following out to its logical conclusion the same line of reasoning, that we believe inapplicable at the present day the Spanish constructions of these articles, or that Spanish jurisprudence inspired by Spanish conditions, should be made to include officers in the military service of the United States. The Congress of the United States has created two agencies to serve the United States in the Philippine Islands. Each agency was given widely different powers and duties. The Army was created for a special service, which it may be called upon to perform in any portion of the country. The Government of the Philippine Islands was created with the broad and general powers of civil government, restricted to a particular portion of territory. These two governments, the one military and the other civil, both deriving their powers from the Constitution of the United States and the Congress of the United States, and acting under the general supervision of the President, stand side by side and independent of each other in the Philippine Islands. (See Grafton vs. United States [1907], 206 U. S., 333; Tan Te vs. Bell [1914], 27 Phil., 354.) The United States Army is a national organization with laws, rules, and regulations especially provided for its efficiency and discipline. These laws, rules, and regulations are presumably effective in the Philippines. The (Government of the Philippine Islands, a civil government, has likewise laws, rules, and regulations especially adapted to its objects. Members of the Army are for many purposes governed by these civil laws. The Philippine courts have jurisdiction to try military offenders charged with a violation of the penal laws of the Philippine Islands. (U. S. vs. Sweet [1901], 1 Phil., 18.) Yet, such jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that officers of the United States Army are to be given special protection by laws of a civil nature. The decisions of this court have invariably assumed that the officer referred to was a functionary of the Civil Government. But when Major Carrington of the United States Army was charged with a violation of the Penal Code, the United States Supreme Court said that “As a soldier he (Carrington) was not an official of the Philippines, but of the United States.” (Carrington vs. United States [1908], 208 U. S., 1. See also In re Fair [1900], 100 Fed., 149.) Within the meaning of articles 264 and 401 of the Penal Code, an officer of the United States is not a person vested with jurisdiction and is not a public officer, who takes part in the performance of duties in the public service of the Philippine Islands. We think that the terms “person in authority,” and “public officer” found in the Spanish Penal Code must be given a restricted meaning so as to include only persons who perform some of the functions of the Government of the Philippine Islands.
The evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggressor was Smith, the defendant, and not Colonel Bellinger. It may be that the assault was provoked by a grievance of the accused who thought that the Colonel had said of him that he belonged to a “colored regiment and was married to a negress.” However, this is beside the point. The determining fact is that the accused attacked and maltreated his immediate chief.
The information is so worded as to permit of conviction of a minor and included offense. Leaving out the surplusage it would read; “That on or about the 28th day of February, 1918, in the city of Manila, the said Sydney Smith did, then and there wrongfully, feloniously, and with criminal intent, attack and,assault Colonel J. B. Bellinger.” This charge, proved as it is, constitutes the misdemeanor punished by article 588, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code. In conformity with the foregoing, it is held that the defendant and appellant cannot be convicted of a violation of articles 249 to 252 of the Penal Code, but is guilty of having inflicted physical injuries upon another, and must therefor be sentenced to fifteen days of arresto, with the .costs of both instances against him. The law also provides for censure. And this is right, for no person whether for a real or a fancied grievance, should so demean himself as to attempt to take the law into his own hands and to assault another. For such conduct, the defendant is in addition to the penalty above imposed hereby reprimanded. So ordered. Johnson, Araullo, and Moir, JJ., concur.